

## "NITS MAKE LICE"

### The Extermination of North American Indians, 1607–1996

"Kill and scalp all, little and big... Nits make lice."

—Colonel John M. Chivington  
Instruction to his troops at Sand Creek, Colorado

FROM the time Juan Ponce de León arrived in North America in 1513, searching for gold and a mythical fountain of youth in what the Spanish called *La Florida* (or *Pascua Florida*), until the turn of the twentieth century, up to 99 percent of the continent's indigenous population was eradicated.\* As of 1900, the U. S. Bureau of the Census reported barely over 237,000 native people surviving within the country's claimed boundaries, and the Smithsonian Institution reported less than a third of a million for all of North America, including Greenland.<sup>1</sup> Although the literature of the day confidently predicted, whether with purported sadness or with open jubilation, that North American Indians would be completely extinct within a generation, two at the most, the true magnitude of the underlying

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\*See, e.g., Ann L. Henderson and Gary R. Mormino, eds., *Spanish Pathways in Florida, 1492–1992* (Sarasota, FL: Florida Humanities Council/Pineapple Press, 1991). Ponce de León was by no means the first European to come to North America. While there are various other possibilities, including the Basques, Irish, even the Phoenicians, it is certain that a group of Norse led by Leif Eriksson arrived in present-day Newfoundland—they called it "Vineland"—about 500 years earlier than the initial Columbian voyage. There, they encountered natives, probably Beothuks, possibly Inuits, whom they dubbed "skraelings" ("savages"). Unsure whether these beings were human or some sort of spirit life, the Vikings provided a preview of all that was to follow by killing one (this is interpreted as a kind of "scientific experiment" to determine whether the victim would bleed and die like an ordinary mortal). They then proceeded to kill a group of captives. The skraelings responded by driving most of the Norse away and gradually killing off a hardcore lot who attempted to stay on; see generally, Gwyn Jones, *The Norse Atlantic Saga* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Frederick J. Pohl, *The Viking Settlements of North America* (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1972). On the other contenders as "discoverers" of America, see, e.g., Tim Severin, *The Brendan Voyage* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978); Barry Fell, *America, B.C.* (New York: Times Books, 1976) and *Saga Americana* (New York: Times Books, 1980); Robert F. Marx with Jennifer G. Marx, *In Quest of the Great White Gods: Contact Between the Old and New World from the Dawn of History* (New York: Crown, 1992).

demographic catastrophe has always been officially denied in both the United States and Canada.<sup>2</sup>

The primary means by which this obfuscation was achieved has been through a systematic and deliberate falsification or suppression of data concerning the size of the pre-invasion aboriginal population.<sup>3</sup> By minimizing estimates as to how many people there were to begin with, the extent of native population reduction was made to seem far less severe than it had actually been. Concomitantly, by making it seem that the continental indigenous population had been extraordinarily sparse, such demographic manipulations fostered the impression that much North American territory consisted of *terra nullius*, vacant land, unoccupied and thus open for the taking by any “hardy pioneer” wishing to invest the time, labor, and privation which came with “settling” it.<sup>4</sup>

In this manner, orthodox historians and their cohorts in cinema and popular literature have been able to present the process of Euroamerican “nation-building” north of the Río Grande as something rather noble, not always entirely fair or devoid of conflict, but basically well intended and ultimately in the best interests of all concerned. In this carefully sanitized version of events, the relatively few indigenous people who were here at the outset did indeed die back to a marked degree, but this “tragedy” was something “unfortunate,” “unintended,” “inadvertent,” and “altogether unavoidable.”<sup>5</sup>

Whatever variations of detail may be provided by a particular teller, the story is always the same in its essentials: while it is admitted that some small proportion of the natives were killed outright during the “Indian Wars”—in open and honorable combat, usually provoked at least equally by the Indians—emphasis is placed on the idea that the great bulk of those who disappeared died of diseases “unwittingly” introduced by incoming Europeans, to which America’s natives had no immunity.<sup>6</sup> Since there was no intent—neither Europeans nor Euroamericans had a “scientific understanding” of pathogens and epidemiology at the time—there could be no culpability, or so it is said. And without understanding, intent, and consequent culpability among the invaders, any suggestion that the process of native population reduction might have been genocidal are not just “inappropriate” but “wildly irresponsible.”<sup>7</sup>

A very tidy rendering, to be sure. The problem is that virtually all of it is untrue. The purpose of this essay is to set the record a bit straighter, first with respect to the real size of North America’s indigenous population, circa

1500, and then concerning the true role played by disease in obliterating it, and finally concentrating on what the “disease argument” is designed to divert attention away from: the manner in which those Indians who did *not* die of disease were killed. It will conclude with a survey of the conditions imposed upon the remaining native population of North America in the twentieth-century aftermath of our historic decimation.

### **Statistical Extermination**

Throughout most of the present century, the federally established-and-maintained Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., America’s officially ordained repository of Truth in such matters, has categorically asserted the fiction that the size of the indigenous population everywhere north of Mexico added up to “not more than one million” in 1492.<sup>8</sup> Lately, in the face of overwhelming evidence, it has conceded that its estimate was low by a factor of at least 100 percent, that it had “erred.” And so, it has now doubled its count, admitting that there “may have been as many as two million” native people on the North American continent before commencement of the European invasion.<sup>9</sup>

As Francis Jennings and others have demonstrated, however, the Smithsonian’s supposedly “scientific” estimates have not only been radically low, they have always rested on a combination of blatantly manipulated data and no data at all. The conventional estimate came from “anthropological giant” James M. Mooney, published (posthumously) in 1928.<sup>10</sup>

A hint of Mooney’s method appears in a remark about the estimates for New England. Mooney wrote that “the original Indian population of New England was probably about 25,000 or about one-half what the historian [John Gorham] Palfrey makes it.” Apparently Mooney had followed the tradition of Palfrey’s own acceptance; that is, he took the estimate of a predecessor and discounted it. The same sort of procedure had been used by every generation of scholars since the original data was recorded in the seventeenth century, and by Mooney’s time discount upon discount had reduced the accepted figures to a small fraction of what was mentioned in the sources. It is as if one were to estimate the population of white Americans in 1790 by successive slashes of the census data of that year on the grounds that the census takers were probably exaggerating their numbers for undisclosed reasons. In acknowledging John Gorham Palfrey as an authority superior to the sources, Mooney accepted the implications of Palfrey’s own biased interpretation of the source data, and by halving Palfrey’s population estimates, he extended Palfrey’s spurious logic further than Palfrey himself had gone.<sup>11</sup>

Jennings attributes such biases on the parts of Mooney, Palfrey, and similar “scholars” to an adherence to proto-Nazi doctrines of racist pseudoscience which the American academy had conjured up, beginning in the early nineteenth century.<sup>12</sup> This seems likely, because Mooney’s work is littered with terms like “half-negro mongrel” and such phrases as “of fairly healthy blood.”<sup>13</sup> In any event, he appears to have “applied the same sort of logic to his estimates for all of North America, [arriving at a] total of 1,100,000.”<sup>14</sup> This figure was immediately challenged by more scrupulous researchers—the archaeologist J.H. Spinden, for example, pointed out that construction of the huge burial mound complexes of the Ohio and Mississippi River Valleys required populations vastly larger than those the areas were assigned by Mooney—but to no avail.<sup>15</sup> Mooney’s numbers corresponded to the ideological needs of the status quo and were quickly enshrined as dogma.

Actually, they were first subjected to a “rigorous reclassification”—that is, reorganized according to the preferences of Alfred L. Kroeber, reigning dean of American anthropology—and subjected to a further reduction of 10 percent across the board, leaving a “finalized” North American estimate of slightly under a million; his hemispheric estimate came to only 8.4 million.<sup>16</sup> The factual/scientific basis for Kroeber’s sweeping diminishment of Mooney’s continental estimate is no more apparent than was Mooney’s in diminishing Palfrey’s, or Palfrey’s in diminishing those of his predecessors. As close as Kroeber ever came to stating an actual method was the exercise of what he called “the generic presupposition that the Spaniards counted or estimated excessively.”<sup>17</sup> Beyond that, he simply indulged himself in the arbitrary derogation of peoples he himself had never really investigated.

[Kroeber] emphatically rejected the notion that the nations of North America could be considered capable of so ordering their societies and technologies as to increase their populations beyond a static and sparsely distributed token representation. Kroeber’s allotment of one million persons...divides into the total area of Canada and the United States (including Alaska) in the ratio of one person per seven square miles. His explanation for this sparsity virtually blamed the condition of savagery, though he must be credited with avoidance of the term itself. He reasoned that Indian societies were characterized by “insane, unending, continuously attritional” warfare and by “the absence of all effective political organization, of the idea of the state.”<sup>18</sup>

Aside from seeming to confuse the history of Native America with that of Europe in terms of “insane” bellicosity, Kroeber appears to have been blissfully unaware that both his findings with respect to indigenous population

density, and his assertions concerning their lack of sociopolitical organization, flatly contradict even the possibility of Indians having engaged in the kind of protracted attritional warfare of which he accused them (there being no evidence of it in any case). In the same vein, he disregarded a considerable quantity of hard research running counter to his own gratuitous and degrading characterizations of indigenous agriculture and technology, all of which pointed towards a much larger pre-invasion population than he was willing to admit.<sup>19</sup> Consistency being no more an inherent requirement of propaganda than facts, however, his estimates were published in what he called his “definitive text” in 1939, and immediately accorded the status of Official Truth they were to enjoy for the next fifty years.<sup>20</sup>

Meanwhile, a different sort of work was going on among less establishment-oriented scholars at the University of California at Berkeley, notably Carl O. Sauer, Woodrow W. Borah, Sherburne F. Cook, and Leslie B. Simpson. Working directly from archival records in Mesoamerica, the Caribbean, and New Spain, they began to (re)assemble an overall demographic portrait of the populations the Spanish originally recorded during the early invasion period, a procedure producing estimates several times those sanctioned by Smithsonian orthodoxy.<sup>21</sup> To this, Kroeberians had little to reply other than to insist vacuously that “most anthropologists will consider [Mooney or Kroeber] a safer authority than Cortés or Las Casas, or registers of baptisms and deaths by priests knowing only some missions in one province,” and they did what could be done to keep such “dissident” work from being published.<sup>22</sup>

By the early 1950s, the “Berkeley School” had begun increasingly to integrate what, for lack of a better term might be called “agricultural archaeology”—extrapolating from the aggregate acreage in regions known to have been under cultivation at the point of contact, in combination with soil type/richness, types of crops planted, and meteorological records to arrive at carrying capacity for local agricultural systems, and thus population estimates—into their research methods.<sup>23</sup> This allowed them not only a greater degree of precision in computing the numbers of Indians alive in the postinvasion setting, but in the immediate preinvasion context as well.<sup>24</sup> From there, they were able to advance a hemispheric population estimate of up to 100 million—vastly greater than anything sanctioned by the Smithsonian at the time—and to begin probing the real impacts of conquest and colonization in the New World.<sup>25</sup>

The main weakness in the work done by Borah, Cook, and their colleagues concerned North America, a deficiency addressed by others. Applying the Berkeley group's techniques of archival/agricultural analysis to an area of northern Florida occupied by the Timucuans before they "became extinct," Henry F. Dobyns arrived at a maximum pre-invasion population estimate of over half a million for just that small region.<sup>26</sup> Bruce Trigger similarly compiled and analyzed material on Huron agricultural patterns sufficiently to advance a firm estimate of their pre-invasion population at 32,000, or forty persons per square mile.<sup>27</sup> In New England, an area where both Mooney and Kroeber insisted the aboriginal population was not larger than 25,000, Francis Jennings, working primarily from archival materials, arrived at an estimate for the year 1600 of 72,000 to 90,000 members of the five great confederacies in the southern portion alone.<sup>28</sup> Even the conservative National Geographic Society eventually conceded that about 3,000 Indians still resided on the 109 square miles of Martha's Vineyard during the early seventeenth century, a population density of 27 persons per square mile; on the eleven square miles of nearby Block Island, there were approximately 1,200 inhabitants, or 109 persons per square mile.<sup>29</sup>

Dobyns, meanwhile, had begun to compile such data and, by 1966, was prepared to offer a preliminary estimate of the total aboriginal population above the Río Grande as having been at least 12.5 million.<sup>30</sup> By his estimation, the Great Lakes region was inhabited by up to 3.8 million people in 1492. Another 1.2 million lived along the Pacific coast; more than 2.7 in the Sierra, Great Basin, and Plains regions; nearly a million in the upper Sonora Desert; 5.25 million in "the Great Mississippi River Valley, its major Missouri, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Red River tributaries, and their affluents."<sup>31</sup>

The southeastern portion of the continent was also thickly populated, with high densities on or near the coast. The shores of the Gulf of Mexico from the Attakapa people east through the Apalachee may have supported as many as 4.6 persons per square kilometer for a total of about 1,100,000 individuals. The Timucuan chiefdoms, the Calusa, and smaller groups inhabiting peninsular Florida numbered perhaps 697,000 persons, with an average density of 5.72 persons per square kilometer. The Atlantic coastal plain from Florida to Massachusetts afforded a favorable habitat to about 2,211,000 Native Americans. Records of early historic population density rose to as many as 13.77 per square kilometer in southern New England. The Virginia-Maryland tidewater region was still another area of dense Native American settlement. Population densities might appear as high elsewhere in North America were the documentary record equally detailed for earlier Colonial years.<sup>32</sup>

After another fifteen years' research, Dobyns concluded there may have been as many as 18.5 million people inhabiting pre-invasion North America, and that the hemispheric population could have reached 112 million.<sup>33</sup> These figures, published in 1983, were immediately subjected to intense scrutiny,<sup>34</sup> most constructively by Cherokee demographer Russell Thornton, whose major concern was to try and establish not so much how many indigenous people *might* have been in North America as how many people there *were*. He therefore reprocessed Dobyns' "maximal" estimates using a set of rather stringent criteria, arriving by 1987 at a "minimal" estimate of 9–12.5 million, some 2 million inhabiting what is now Canada.<sup>35</sup> Lately, a number of scholars have adopted the practice of splitting the difference between Thornton's minimum and Dobyns' maximum estimates, using 15 million as the most likely approximation of the real size of the aboriginal North American population.<sup>36</sup>

Put another way, the demographic reality of aboriginal North America was about *fifteen times* that pretended by Smithsonian convention until well into the 1980s, and about seven-and-a-half times what it is prepared to admit now. While upward revision of estimates to conform with the evidence has elicited all manner of howls from paleoconservatives and allegedly "responsible" academics about the need for exercising "proper scientific caution" in such matters,<sup>37</sup> the fact is that it is orthodoxy itself which threw both science and caution to the winds in deliberately low-counting the pre-invasion population of the continent. Estimates approximating those of Dobyns and Thornton have, after all, been available to anyone who cared to use them since at least as early as 1860.<sup>38</sup> As Jennings observes, they "simply ignored" such inconveniences.<sup>39</sup>

The Smithsonian has never found it necessary to exercise much restraint in embracing all manner of patently idiotic speculations—from Kroeber's absurd contention that the aboriginal population of California hunter-gatherers was somehow larger than that of eastern seaboard agriculturalists,<sup>40</sup> to Vance Haynes' and Paul S. Martin's ridiculous notion that Ice Age Indians were responsible for the extinction of the mastodon and other paleolithic mammals through "jump kills" and the like,<sup>41</sup> to R. Douglas Hurt's nonsensical assertion that crops were grown in the poor and sandy soil of Canyon de Chelly for centuries without native farmers having ever discovered how to fertilize their fields,<sup>42</sup> to the astonishing idea that the Anasazi stored their own excrement, not for use as fertilizer but as a larder of winter

nutrients,\* to perpetual claims of having finally found an American Indian society that actually practiced cannibalism<sup>†</sup>—*whenever* they serve to denigrate indigenous cultures.

In reality, the motives underlying the resistance to revised demography has no more to do with methodological considerations than did Mooney's and Kroeber's original manipulations of the data. The motive in demanding a low count—a sort of retrospective statistical extermination, as it were—is what it has always been: to do otherwise would be, as historian Wilbur Jacobs observed more than twenty years ago, to “change everything” from interpretations of indigenous sociopolitical organization to understandings of aboriginal technologies and economies.<sup>43</sup> Above all, it would destroy the “virgin land” mythology which is key to the prevailing, neatly sanitized version of American history, thereby opening the door to a serious and generalized consideration of the question of genocide in North America.<sup>44</sup>

Denial of that genocide is paramount. To observe that the number of native people shrank by three-quarters over four centuries, from a million at the outset to a quarter-million at the end, is to say that something plausibly

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\*The so-called “Second Harvest Hypothesis” was advanced by a team of anthropologists from the University of New Mexico in 1980, promptly pronounced “interesting” by the Smithsonian, and, as a consequence, showcased in the *New York Times*. Thereafter, it was picked up by no less than the Revolutionary Communist Party U.S.A. to “prove” that traditional indigenous cultures have nothing of value to offer the world; “The RCP, Searching for the Second Harvest,” in Ward Churchill, ed., *Marxism and Native Americans* (Boston: South End Press, 1983).

†The idea of indigenous American cannibalism is roughly comparable to the myth of ritual murder used by the nazis against the Jews; see, e.g., John Weiss, *Ideology of Death: Why the Holocaust Happened in Germany* (New York: Ivan R. Dee, 1996) pp. 17–8. It began with Christopher Columbus's attribution of the practice, based upon no direct evidence at all, to the people he called “Caribs,” whom he never encountered. Indeed, the very term “cannibal” derives from a mispronunciation of the word “Carib.” Although Columbian fable about flesh-eating natives has been long and amply rebutted—most recently by Robert A. Myers in his article, “Island Carib Cannibalism” (see the 1984 edition of Utrecht's *New West Indies Guide*)—it continues to be regurgitated as Truth in standard texts; e.g., Kirby Martin, et al., *America and Its People*, op. cit., p. 19. Orthodox anthropologists have also proven extraordinarily persistent in attempting to establish its “fundamental validity” with respect to *some* American Indian society, whether it be the Tonkawas, Anasazis, Mohawks, Brazilian forest peoples, or *whoever* (all of these have been disproven). One of the more vicious strains, since it merges with a broader myth of human sacrifice, concerns the Mexicas (Aztecs), perhaps most forcefully presented by Michael Harner in his essays, “The Ecological Basis of Aztec Sacrifice” (*American Ethnologist*, No. 4, 1977) and “The Enigma of Aztec Sacrifice” (*Natural History*, No. 76, 1977); both were rebutted in detail by Marshall Sahlins in the November 23, 1978, issue of the *New York Review of Books*. Despite there never having been a shred of credible evidence to support the cannibalism myth, the Smithsonian establishment has yet to enter anything resembling the categorical skepticism—or outright rejection—of it that it has expressed with respect to the abundantly well-documented case for increased estimates of the size of aboriginal North American population. See additionally, Richard Arens, *The Man-Eating Myth* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

explainable as “benign” occurred. To concede that the population began at two million and fell by seven-eighths during the process of “settlement” is to strain such explanations severely, although they remain at least superficially tenable. But to acknowledge that there were twelve, or fifteen, or eighteen million people in North America in 1492 is to say that somewhere between 96–99 percent of the native inhabitants of the continent were eradicated. Such figures do not lend themselves to facile and blameless explanations, so they must be denied if genocide itself is to be denied.

The practice is no different in principle from that of neonazi “revisionists” who pretend the Jewish population of Europe was much smaller than it actually was in 1939. Their purpose is to minimize impressions of the extent and impact of the nazi Holocaust by comparing these artificially reduced estimates of prewar population to the number of postwar survivors. From there, they move on to deny that the Jews suffered genocide at all.<sup>45</sup> To all appearances, this neonazi assault on truth and memory may well have been informed by the techniques of Smithsonian scholars vis-à-vis American Indians. The only significant distinction to be drawn between the two groups is that the neonazis comprise a sort of pseudointellectual lunatic fringe, while deniers of the American holocaust constitute an elite core of the U.S. and Canadian academic status quo, with all the power to shape public opinion this implies.

### Vectors of Death

After minimization, the most common mode of denying that genocide was perpetrated against the indigenous peoples of North America is what is referred to as the “disease factor.”<sup>46</sup> The standard histories to which students are exposed belabor the idea that “microbic weapons” to which natives “lacked antibodies” were “unwittingly” introduced, beginning with the conquistadors, and “took a rapid toll.” The “native populace... kept dying off from contact with European diseases”—not, apparently, from contact with Europeans themselves—like “smallpox, typhoid, diptheria, the measles, and various plagues and fevers.” Consequently, the indigenous population of Mexico, for example, “declined dramatically—by about 90 percent during the 50 years following the invasion of Cortés’s army.”<sup>47</sup> The army itself, it seems, had nothing to do with it.

Even those scholars who are willing to accept the size of the pre-invasion Native North American population for what it was prove willing to indulge themselves in this manner. Consider Cornell University professor

Steven T. Katz, who cites both Dobyns and Thornton in the relevant sections of his recent study of genocide:

Very probably the greatest demographic disaster in history, the depopulation of the New World, for all its death and terror, was largely an *unintended* tragedy, a tragedy that occurred despite the sincere and indisputable desire of the Europeans to keep the Indian population alive. The native people died primarily because of pandemics against which there was no protection. Nature, not malice, was the cause of the massive, incomprehensible devastation (emphasis in the original).<sup>48</sup>

There are, of course, elements of truth to this. There can be no question that Christopher Columbus and his crew—and undoubtedly others of the early Spanish invaders as well—were unaware at the outset that they were carrying pathogens to which America's native peoples had never been exposed and therefore possessed no immunity, and of the extent of the lethal effect these microbes would unleash.\* Onsets do not, however, last forever. By 1550 at the latest, and probably earlier, it was common knowledge in Europe that there was a firm correlation between the arrival of "explorers, settlers and military expeditions" on the one hand and massive die-offs of native peoples from the above-mentioned diseases on the other. This is frequently remarked upon—piously attributed to the "hand of God" and often *celebrated*—in the literature of the day.<sup>49</sup>

The theme of divine intervention on behalf of Europe's "chosen peoples"—a later regime would describe it as a "master race"—is reiterated endlessly, serving as a near-perfect mystical mask behind which to hide more practical motives and knowledge. A random sampling of contemporaneous quotations might begin with that of a pair of Jesuits explaining in 1570 that the basis for a successful Spanish colonization of San Luis (now Virginia) resided in "Our Lord having chastised it with six years of famine and death,

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\*The very first epidemic, which broke out in Española among the Tainos as a result of Columbus's second voyage, has now been identified as type A influenza, transmitted by hogs acquired in the Canary Islands. It appears to have spread to the mainland independently of the Spanish, decimating the Cakchiquel Maya, beginning in 1523; Francisco Guerra, "La epidemia americana de influenza en 1493," *Revista de Indias*, No. 45, 1985. Juan Ponce de León quite possibly touched off the first North American pandemic, of smallpox upon his arrival in Florida in 1513; Dobyns, *Their Number Become Thinned*, *op. cit.*, p. 254. The troops of Hernán Cortés then unleashed two epidemics, first of what seems to have been measles (*sarampión*) in 1531 and then of smallpox in 1532, during their conquest of Tenochtitlán. Another apparent smallpox epidemic followed in 1538; Torobio de Motolinía o Benavente, *Memoriales o libro de las cosas Nueva España y de los naturales dello* (Mexico City: UNAM, 1971); Dobyns, *Their Number Become Thinned*, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-4. These may well have involved a genuinely "unwitting" introduction of pathogens. By the 1540s, however, the connection between European contact and massive native die-off was becoming clear to all concerned.

which has brought it about that there is very much less [native] population than usual.”<sup>50</sup> Or, as Pedro de Liévano, Dean of the Cathedral of Guatemala, put it 1582, “the secret judgments of God” were responsible for demolishing the Mayan population of his area, thus allowing the easy pacification and colonization of the demoralized survivors by the Spaniards, an inherently superior group selected by heaven itself to perform the task.<sup>51</sup>

Such rationalizations were hardly restricted to the Spanish. The English—Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell himself having proclaimed God an Englishman at about the same time—not only used them, but were far more openly jubilant about it. In describing the consequences of indigenous peoples’ “quarrelsome” attitude about being pushed out of their territory around the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1631, Puritan leader Cotton Mather rejoiced that “God ended the controversy by sending the smallpox amongst the Indians...who were before that time exceedingly numerous.”<sup>52</sup> A few years later, the governor of the Carolina Colony solemnly intoned that, “the hand of God was eminently seen in thin[n]ing the Indians, to make room for the English.”<sup>53</sup> All of this was a sanctimonious subterfuge, as Jennings has pointed out, rhetoric designed by the European elites—“conquest aristocracies,” he calls them—to “overpower their own countrymen’s moral scruples” about what was happening to Indians. Consciously “reaching for illegitimate power,” he says, they “customarily assume[d] attitudes of great moral rectitude to divert attention from the abandonment” of any recognizable moral standard.<sup>54</sup>

Nowhere does the record reveal anyone, at least nobody in a position of authority, recommending that, in the face of all this “death and terror,” contact should be curtailed (at least until some remedy could be found). To the contrary, the rate of expansion was increased as rapidly as possible by every participating European power.<sup>55</sup> Additionally, the evidence is overwhelming that they consistently imposed policy within their areas of acquisition—slave-labor systems, deliberately induced famines, massive dislocations of the populace, etc.—which they *knew* from their own bitter experience with plagues in Europe would greatly exacerbate the effects of whatever diseases were afoot.\* This is hardly the stuff of “innocence” or “inadvertence.”

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\* There is abundant evidence that the connection between the physically debilitating effects of these policies and the Indians’ catastrophic death rates by disease was well known very early, but that the policies were nonetheless endemic. Consider, for example, an instruction from the utterly ruthless Spanish overlord Pedro de Alvarado to his subordinates in 1533—a point when he desperately needed an effective native labor force to process his quota of gold for the Crown—that normal practice be temporarily suspended as an expedient to preserving the lives of native workers during an

Absolution from genocidal intent has always been retroactively bestowed upon the early invaders, their own myriad statements to the contrary notwithstanding, by virtue of their lacking any genuine “scientific knowledge” of microbes and epidemiology, understandings unavailable until the late nineteenth century.<sup>56</sup> Such reasoning is obfuscatory at best. I, for one, being virtually illiterate in both ballistics and chemistry, have never acquired a proper scientific understanding of how a .357 magnum handgun actually works. Were I to take such a weapon and fire it pointblank at someone, I doubt very much that the argument of my very real scientific ignorance would stand me in especially good stead at my subsequent murder trial. All that would be required in the minds of the prosecution, judge, jury, and appeals courts would be that I had an average common-sense understanding of the cause and effect involved in what I did. On this basis they would all find me to be criminally culpable, and quite properly so.

No lesser standard is reasonably applicable to the conduct of the Columbian adventurers and those who followed, since the juridical/philosophical concepts involved have been evident in most doctrines of European law, ethics, and morality since well before 1492.<sup>57</sup> In this sense, the apologist routine about not judging the actions and attitudes of historical figures by the allegedly more benevolent mores of today has no bearing at all.<sup>58</sup> With this principle in mind, it would be well to take a close look at a few things which have been passed off under the rubric of “the disease factor” as resulting from “nature, not malice,” and, not only unwitting and unintentional, but “despite the sincere and indisputable desire of the Europeans to keep the Indian population alive.”

### *Death by Disease in the Spanish Missions*

Some of the worst policy-driven escalations of death from disease north of the Río Grande were the result of slave-labor systems on the Spanish missions in Florida, Texas, California, Arizona, and New Mexico from roughly 1690–1845.<sup>59</sup> Run first by the Jesuits, later by the Franciscans, these institu-

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epidemic: “Because measles has struck the Indians I order those who hold *encomiendas* and *repartimientos* (categories of slave laborers), on punishment of forfeiting them...to care for and cure their charges without engaging them in any activity, for experience has shown in other similar epidemics that much territory has been depopulated”; quoted in Francisco Antonio de Fuentes y Guzmán, *Recordación Florida* (Guatemala City: Sociedad de Geografía e Historia, 3 Vols., 1932–1933) p. 338. For an overall view of Alvarado’s attitude toward Indians, and consequent verification that the directive is not indicative of an overall concern with their well-being, see David E. Stannard, *American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) pp. 76, 81, 134.

tions were supposedly devoted to the Indians' physical well-being, as well as their spiritual/moral "enlightenment" through revelation of the "benefits of work."<sup>60</sup> As late as 1865, New Mexico Indian Superintendent Felipe Delgado wrote to U.S. Indian Commissioner William P. Dole, in response to queries concerning traffic in native slaves by the missions in his area (a violation of the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation and pursuant federal legislation), that the object of the priests' efforts "has not been to reduce them to slavery, but rather from a Christian piety...to instruct and educate them in civilization... This has been the practice in this country for the last century and a half, and the result arising from it has been to the captives, favorable, humane and satisfactory."<sup>61</sup>

In actuality, the missions were deathmills in which Indians, often delivered en masse by the military, were allotted an average of seven feet by two feet of living space in what one observer, V.M. Golovin, described as "specially constructed cattle pens."<sup>62</sup> Usually segregated by sex unless married by Catholic ceremony, each gender typically shared an open pit serving as a toilet facility for hundreds of people.<sup>63</sup> Although forced to perform arduous agricultural labor "from morning to night," six days per week, the captives were provided no more than 1,400 calories per day in low-nutrient foods, with missions like San Antonio and San Miguel supplying as little as 715 calories per day.<sup>64</sup> Even Spanish military officials are known to have complained that such rations were grossly insufficient to keep the Indians alive.<sup>65</sup> This was *not* for lack of available foodstuffs:

[Despite] agricultural crop yields on the Indian-tended mission plantations that Golovin termed "extraordinary" and "unheard of in Europe," along with large herds of cattle and [especially in California] the easily accessible bounty of sea food, the food given the Indians was... "a kind of gruel made from barley meal, boiled in water with maize, beans, and peas; occasionally, they [were] given some beef."<sup>66</sup>

The caloric intake of these Indian mission slaves should be contrasted with that of imported African slaves at about the same time. The best estimates are that Africans were provided on average with slightly over 4,200 calories per day, with field hands often receiving as much as 5,400 calories in relatively high-nutrient foods.<sup>67</sup> The latter, which is not considered excessive, given the strenuous nature of the labor performed, is *eight times* what an Indian received to perform the same tasks. Plainly, the Indians, unlike their black counterparts, were being worked and starved quite literally to death, as the records of their wholesale expiration by "disease" at every mission in California readily attests.

Although there are too many gaps in the archival material to allow a pre-

cise estimate as to the number of Indians consumed by the holocaust of the missions, it certainly ran into the hundreds of thousands.<sup>68</sup> From the considerable evidence that *does* exist, it is clear that death rates consistently outstripped birthrates by as much as 800 percent. During the initial three-year period of the mission of San José Cumundi, for instance, 94 Indians were baptized while 241 died. At Nuestra Señora de Loreto, the figures were 76 baptisms and 131 dead. At Nuestra Señora Guadalupe, 53 were baptized and 130 died. Santa Rosalía de Mulegé showed 48 baptisms, 113 deaths; San Ignacio, 115 baptisms and 293 deaths; Purísima de Cadegomó, 39 baptisms and 120 deaths.<sup>69</sup> This comes to over a thousand deaths at just this handful of missions in only three years. There were scores of others, and the process was only beginning. It would continue without interruption—and at a much higher intensity—for another century and a half. It was a rate of death which, “in less than half a century, would completely exterminate a population of any size that was not replenished with new conscripts” brought in ever-increasing numbers by the military.<sup>70</sup>

The reason for this discrepancy in treatment between indigenous slaves and those brought in from Africa had nothing to do with the Spaniards taking a comparatively humane view of Africans.<sup>71</sup> Rather, it was purely economic: importation of Africans was expensive, whereas native people here provided a comparatively cost-free, apparently renewable—and therefore readily *expendable*—source of labor power.<sup>72</sup> As distinguished from blacks (once they were here; millions were sacrificed to precisely the same financial imperatives during their transportation from Africa),\* it was simply more profitable to replace native people as they died than to feed them. To that purpose, colonial troops drove the Indians into the yawning maws of the missions until there were none left who could be easily rounded up. By then, the Spanish (later Mexican) dominion over California and the northern Sonora was coming to an end.

Leaving aside differences in scale, technology, and the degree to which sociomilitary organization had evolved among the managers of the mission slave system in North America, it is indistinguishable in its intents and effects

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\* African chattel were readily expendable during the process of transatlantic shipment insofar as their loss simply drove up the “per unit” price of those ultimately delivered to the Americas. Hence, blacks were crammed into the holds of ships under abysmal conditions and fed a diet remarkably similar to that imposed upon the mission Indians. As a result, by what may be considered the most conservative credible estimate, between 1500 and 1900, “of the 12 million [people taken from Africa by] the Atlantic slave trade, around 15 percent, or up to two million...died on the Atlantic Voyage—the dreaded ‘Middle Passage’”; Patrick Manning, “The Slave Trade: The Formal Demography of a Global System,” in J.I. Inikori and S.L. Engerman, eds., *The Atlantic Slave Trade: Effects on Economies, Societies and Peoples in Africa, the Americas and Europe* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992) p. 120.

from that administered for the Third Reich by Albert Speer and others during the 1940s.<sup>73</sup> Unlike Speer, who was convicted of crimes against humanity by the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1946 and served twenty years in Spandau prison for the toll taken by his programs—and who openly conceded the criminality of at least part of what he was involved in—his North American Spanish counterparts never recanted their deeds and were never punished.<sup>74</sup> Instead, they went to their graves triumphant, and are now revered and commemorated in books, paintings, place names, and public statuary throughout the area in which they operated.<sup>75</sup>

Probably most remarkable in this regard is Fray Junípero Serra, in charge of the northern California mission complex during its peak period and a man whose personal brutality was noteworthy even by those standards (he appears to have delighted in the direct torture of victims, had to be restrained from hanging Indians in lots, à la Columbus, and is quoted as asserting that “the entire race” of Indians “should be put to the knife”).<sup>76</sup> Proposed for canonization as a saint by the Catholic Church, Serra’s visage, forty feet tall, today peers serenely down upon motorists driving south from San Francisco along Highway 101 from its vantage point on a prominent bluff.<sup>77</sup>

Another statue of Serra, a much smaller bronze which has stood for decades before San Francisco’s city hall, is being moved to a park as part of an expansion/remodeling of the city office facilities. Officials denied requests from local Indians that it be placed in storage, out of public view, offering the compromise of affixing a new plaque to address native concerns about the incipient saint’s legacy.<sup>78</sup> Church lobbyists, however, have undermined even that paltry gesture, preventing the inclusion of wording which might have revealed something of the true nature of the mass murder and cultural demolition over which Serra presided. Both the man and the missions, the Vatican insisted, echoing Delgado’s 1865 falsehood, were devoted to “mercy and compassion.”<sup>79</sup>

### *Forced Marches and Internments*

During the nazi period in Germany, especially from 1942–45, vast numbers of people died in concentration camps, not by direct killing methods such as shooting and gassing, but from disease, starvation, and exposure due to the horrendous conditions imposed upon them.<sup>80</sup> As the Third Reich disintegrated in 1945, many thousands more perished as they were force-marched from camps about to be overrun by the advancing Allies to locations deeper in

German-held territory.<sup>81</sup> In neither of these processes have the deaths which accrued been categorized as inadvertent or accidental. On the contrary, as is entirely appropriate, the victims have been included in the totals of those who fell prey to nazi crimes against humanity,<sup>82</sup> and, in many cases, the perpetrators were tried, convicted, and punished under international law.<sup>83</sup>

Application of the same standard to the supposedly unintentional decimation of the American Indian population by disease produces some illuminating insights. In 1830, for example, the United States Congress passed the Indian Removal Act, a statute authorizing use of military force to compel the relocation of all indigenous people east of the Mississippi River to points west.<sup>84</sup> This precipitated, among numerous other atrocities, the so-called "Trail of Tears" in which the populations of the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole nations were rounded up by troops and interned at prearranged points within their own homelands. Once concentrated in this fashion, each people—men, women, children, and elders alike—was marched at bayonet-point for hundreds of miles, without provision of anything approaching adequate food, shelter, or medical support.<sup>85</sup> Needless to say, attrition among those subjected to such treatment was pronounced.

The Choctaws are said to have lost 15 percent of their population, 6,000 out of 40,000; and the Chickasaw...surely suffered severe losses as well. By contrast, the Creeks and Seminoles are said to have suffered about 50 percent mortality. For the Creeks, this came primarily in the period after removal; for example, of the 10,000 or more who were resettled in 1836–37...an incredible 3,500...died of "bilious fevers."<sup>86</sup>

The toll was perhaps highest of all for the Cherokees. According to the most recent study, which is exceedingly thorough, about 55 percent of all Cherokees alive in 1838, when they were interned, died as a direct result of the extreme privations they suffered along the Trail.<sup>87</sup> Given that the Smithsonian Institution's official estimate of Cherokee losses (advanced by James Mooney in 1900) is still only 25 percent,<sup>88</sup> it seems likely that comparable research with regard to the Choctaws would reveal that they too suffered a much higher proportionate reduction of population than is admitted in conventional histories. A reconstruction of the data with regard to the Chickasaws, which has never been seriously attempted, would undoubtedly lead to much the same conclusion.<sup>89</sup>

Nor was the Trail of Tears "anomalous." Following their military defeat at the hands of Colonel Christopher "Kit" Carson in 1864, the Diné (Navajos) were interned at Fort Defiance, Arizona.<sup>90</sup> From there, they underwent what

is called "The Long Walk"; the entire people was force-marched about 300 miles in the dead of winter to a location known as the Bosque Redondo, adjoining old Fort Sumner in eastern New Mexico.<sup>91</sup> Once there, they were reinterned for four years, during which time they were compelled to live in—literally—covered holes in the ground, subsisting on utterly inadequate rations (often a thin gruel made of boiled flour), and with nothing resembling genuine medical care.<sup>92</sup> The most conservative credible estimates place Diné attrition from the ordeal at not less than half the total population.<sup>93</sup>

Very similar conditions of internment were imposed by the United States upon many native peoples throughout the nineteenth century. Prominent examples include the Santee Dakotas in Minnesota, whose keeper, federal Indian agent Andrew Myrick deliberately withheld rations and told the starving people to "eat grass" when they complained. The Santees then revolted—decapitating Myrick and stuffing the mouth of his severed head with grass in the process—only to be put down with great brutality by U.S. troops, who quickly restored the status quo and conducted a mass hanging of Indian leaders in reprisal.<sup>94</sup> Much the same situation prevailed in northern California with respect to the Modoc uprising of 1872–3,<sup>95</sup> and was the precipitating factor attending the so-called "Meeker Massacre" perpetrated by the Utes in 1879.<sup>96</sup>

The list can be continued at length: the Northern Cheyenne lost about half their population while interned at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, from 1876 to 1878;<sup>97</sup> rations, always meager, were suspended altogether for several months in 1876 on the Great Sioux Reservation in present-day South Dakota and were resumed only when the interned Lakotas "consented" to the alienation of most of their land;<sup>98</sup> the conditions under which the Chiricahua and other western Apache groups were incarcerated at San Carlos and other reservations in Arizona during the 1870s and '80s were so grotesque that federal officials referred to them as amounting to an "extermination program."<sup>99</sup> Even peoples who never militarily resisted Euroamerican expropriation of the land-base—the Poncas, for instance—were subjected to such treatment.\*

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\*The unoffending Poncas were forcibly relocated from their Nebraska homeland to the gigantic internment center which was Oklahoma in 1877. Two years later, having meanwhile been reduced to only 530 survivors through "disease attrition," a small group headed by Standing Bear escaped and returned home. Quickly captured by the army, they petitioned for judicial relief, causing a federal judge to enter a decree that Standing Bear should be considered "a person" (i.e., a human being) within the meaning of U.S. law—*United States ex. rel. Standing Bear v. Crook*, 25 Fed. Cas 695 (C.C.D. Ne., 1879)—a matter which had up till then been less than clear. He and his group were therefore allowed to remain on a small parcel of land along Nebraska's Niobrara River. The military and Bureau of Indian affairs openly refused, however, to extend this principle of human rights to the remainder

In each case, spiraling death rates resulted technically from “disease”—always in combination with deliberately induced malnutrition, sustained exposure to the elements, and other physically debilitating circumstances (separating death by disease from death by starvation, etc., in such instances is virtually impossible)—rather than direct killing.<sup>\*</sup> In no case, however, can such fatalities be legitimately described as having accrued from unwitting or unintentional actions on the parts of responsible officials. This is illustrated by the U.S. execution of Captain Henry Wirz, a Confederate officer, after the Civil War. Wirz’s offense was that, while serving as commandant of Georgia’s Andersonville prison camp, he had caused “needless death and suffering” among Union prisoners by forcing them to endure conditions no worse those experienced by Indian women and children interned by the United States both before and after his trial.<sup>†</sup> Hence, there can be no question as to whether U.S. officials were fully conscious of the criminal nature of their Indian internment policies, even as they implemented them.

### *Dislocation, Famine, and Infertility*

More pervasive than the effects of the missions, internments, and forced marches discussed above were the effects of the systematic process of dislo-

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of the Poncas—or any other Indians, for that matter—for another sixty years; see Earl W. Hayter, “The Ponca Removal,” *North Dakota Historical Review*, No. 6, 1932; Grant Foreman, *The Last Trek of the Indians* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946); Thomas Henry Tibbles, *The Ponca Chiefs: An Account of the Trial of Standing Bear* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972).

<sup>\*</sup> The relationship between malnutrition and other forms of physical debilitation (chronic overwork, exposure to the elements, etc.), susceptibility to disease and propensity to succumb to it once it has been contracted are obvious but little studied in this connection. Virtually no effort has been expended in trying to separate victims into groups according to such criteria, which might begin to clarify what was inadvertent—and what was not—in terms of native population decline in America. Rather, all American Indians not killed outright have been conventionally—and all too conveniently—lumped in with the category of unwittingly transmitted disease. Methodologically, the problem might be approached in the manner demonstrated by Andrew B. Appleby, “Disease or Famine? Mortality in Cumberland and Westmoreland,” *Economic History Review*, 2nd Ser., No. 26, 1973, and John D. Post in “The Mortality Crisis of the Early 1770s and European Demographic Trends,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, No. 21, 1990.

<sup>†</sup> Shelby Foote, *The Civil War, Vol. III: Red River to Appomattox* (New York: Random House, 1974) pp. 1032–3. Foote describes Wirz’s prosecution as “trumped up.” Be that as it may, the charges brought against him clearly indicate that the federal government understood imposition of the sort of conditions suffered by Indians interned at many agencies to be criminally actionable, regardless of who committed it. As concerns the U.S. military itself, such treatment of prisoners was explicitly prohibited—under criminal sanction—with its adoption, in April 1863, of a set of field instructions prepared by Dr. Francis Lieber (the so-called “Lieber Code”); Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, *Documents on the Laws of War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) p. 7. Also see Ovid L. Futch, *The History of Andersonville Prison* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1968).

cating indigenous peoples and/or destroying the economic basis of their survival. This began at almost the first moment of the English invasion in the 1580s,<sup>100</sup> escalated steadily for a period of about 200 years, and then increased geometrically during the nineteenth century. Its results were always the consequence of conscious and deliberate policy decisions, constituted the primary causative factor in every “Indian War” fought on the continent, and comprised an essential element of the strategy of all Euroamerican military campaigns conducted against North American Indians.

The pattern was probably set in 1610 by the Jamestown Colony, established in what would become Virginia, with the articulation of an Indian policy based on a presumed “right of Warre” entitling the English, as inherently superior beings, to “invade the Country and destroy them...whereby wee shall enjoy their cultivated places [and] their cleared grounds in all their villages (which are situate in the fruitfulest places of the land) shall be inhabited by us.”<sup>101</sup> While there was, as will be seen in the next section, slaughter aplenty attending this obvious prefiguration of what public figures in the United States would later call “Manifest Destiny”—and Adolf Hitler would subsequently term *Lebensraumpolitik*—the main mode of its realization focused on obliteration of the native economy.<sup>102</sup>

In order to accomplish this, it was first necessary to lull the opposition into a false sense of security through a treaty of “peace and friendship” so that the colonists might “have the better Advantage both to surprise them, & cutt down their Corne.”<sup>103</sup> Both the deception and the tactics which followed worked splendidly.

[The Indians’] canoes and fishing weirs were smashed, their villages and agricultural fields were burned to the ground... In a single raid, the settlers destroyed corn sufficient to feed four thousand people for a year... Starvation [was] becoming the preferred [English] approach to dealing with the natives. By the end of the winter of 1623 the Indians acknowledged that in the past year alone as many of their number [were dead] as had died since the first arrival of the [English] a decade and a half earlier.<sup>104</sup>

Rendered destitute, homeless, harried and harassed relentlessly, the starving and disease-ridden members of the largest mid-Atlantic indigenous confederation—the Pamunkeys, Chickahominies, Naunsemonds, Rappahannocks, Paspaheghs, and several smaller peoples known collectively to Europeans as the “Powhatan Empire”—dwindled to a remnant of no more than 600 by the late 1600s.<sup>105</sup> They had been so thoroughly “rowted, slayne and dispersed” that they were “no longer a nation,” as one colonist gloated.<sup>106</sup>

Where there had been perhaps 100,000 or more Indians only a few decades earlier, a burgeoning population upwards of 60,000 English men and women went busily about the business of “civilizing the wilderness” they’d created atop a once-thriving civilization.<sup>107</sup>

Immediately southward, in the Carolinas, things were much the same. Comparable tactics were pursued in the Tuscarora War of 1711–12 and the Yamasee War of 1715–16.<sup>108</sup> Nor were things different to the north, where the Plymouth Colony was established in 1620. There, in a virtual replay of the experience of Sir Walter Raleigh’s lost colonists at Roanoke forty years earlier, the “Pilgrim Fathers” had to be saved from starvation during their first winter ashore—an event symbolized to this day in Angloamerica’s annual celebration of the “Thanksgiving” holiday—by the local Wampanoags, Pequots, and other Indians, who voluntarily shared their usual bountiful agricultural harvest. The following spring, these pitiful English hunter-gatherers were taught how to plant crops for themselves.<sup>109</sup>

Once they’d achieved self-sufficiency, of course, the Pilgrims set about destroying their native saviors with a vengeance, finishing the first part of the job by 1637.<sup>110</sup> Richard Drinnon, among others, has described the link they forged between total destruction of the indigenous way of life on the one hand and of the very habitat of New England on the other.<sup>111</sup> By 1675, when the colonists of what was by now not only Plymouth, but Massachusetts and Connecticut colonies as well, turned from the now-obliterated Pequots and Western Niantics to tackle the adjacent Wampanoags and Narragansetts, the wholesale and systematic destruction of villages and croplands was standard tactical fare.<sup>112</sup> Ultimately, the application of such techniques of warfare led to what has been called the “Great Dispersal” in which the bedraggled residue of once proud and populous peoples—the Androscoggin, for example, and the Norridgewocks and Pigwackets, Maliseets, Passamequodies and Pocumtucks, Quiripi, Unquahogs, Massachusetts, Mahicans, Abenakis, and many others—fled westward, or north into Canada, in an often futile attempt to escape complete eradication.\*

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\*The figures after the period of dislocation and economic warfare are revealing. By 1690, the Norridgewock had been reduced to 100 men, a total which dropped to 25 survivors—a 75-percent decline under *peaceful* conditions—by 1726; the Androscoggin declined from 160 men in 1690 to 10 in 1726; the Pigwackets showed 100 surviving males in 1690, seven in 1726 (all such “warrior counts” should be multiplied by a factor of five to arrive at population totals); Collin G. Calloway, *The Western Abenaki of Vermont, 1600–1800: War, Migration, and the Survival of an Indian People* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990) pp. 129–30. The same situation prevails with data reflecting the period

A century later, as the fledgling United States fought its way clear of English colonial dominion, the use of such methods became even more evident. As early as 1776, in an account of the rebel victory in a campaign against England's Cherokee allies, it was reported that the Indians' "towns is all burnt Their Corn cut down and Themselves drove into the Woods to perish."<sup>113</sup> In 1779, Continental Army General John A. Sullivan earned the nickname "Town Destroyer" from the Senecas, another people allied to the English, when he pursued to the letter his orders from overall commander George Washington to "lay waste all the settlements around...that the country not only be overrun but destroyed, [and not to] listen to any overture of peace before the total ruin of their settlements is effected." As Sullivan reported from the field, his troops "destroy[ed] everything that contributes to [the Senecas'] support" turning "that whole beautiful region from the character of a garden to a scene of drear and sickening desolation."<sup>114</sup>

This was followed, in 1780, by a report from General George Rogers Clark, indicative of the type of warfare his ranger unit was conducting deep in what are now the states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, that "it was estimated that at two [Shawnee] towns, Chillicothe and Piqua, more than five hundred acres of corn were destroyed, as well as every species of edible vegetable."<sup>115</sup> Fourteen years later, U.S. General Anthony Wayne, or "Mad Anthony," as he was called by friend and foe alike, reported from an expedition mounted to finish off the Shawnees and their allies that, having won the battle of Fallen Timbers, "we remained for three days and nights on the banks of the Maumee...during which time all the houses and cornfields were consumed and destroyed for a considerable distance." In sum, the troops had burned "immense fields of corn" for a stretch of about fifty miles along the river.<sup>116</sup>

And so it went, from east of the Mississippi to the far west, where, in 1864, Kit Carson's campaigners were finally able to defeat the Diné by laying waste to the Indians' agricultural complex on the floor of Canyon de Chelly, poisoning their wells, and so on.<sup>117</sup> By 1868, units like Custer's

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1650–1700. The Maliseets and Passamequodies, for instance, were both reduced by 67 percent; the 18,000-strong Pocumtucks dropped to 920 (a 95-percent decline); the Quiripi and Unquahogs, who began with a population of around 30,000, were left with fewer than 1,500 (a 95-percent decline); the Massachusetts, numbering at least 44,000 at the onset, could report barely 6,000 survivors (an 81 percent decline); the Mahicans were 92-percent destroyed; the Eastern Abenaki had declined by 78 percent; their cousins, the Western Abenaki, who had numbered about 12,000 had been reduced to some 250 survivors (a destruction rate of 98 percent); Snow and Lamphear, "European Contact and Depopulation in the Northeast," *op. cit.*, p. 24, Table I.

Seventh Cavalry Regiment had adopted the tactic of slaughtering Indian pony herds wherever possible, not only to destroy their opponents' combat mobility, but to deprive them of the ability to subsist by hunting.\* The capstone to the whole performance was the army's policy, announced by General Phil Sheridan in 1873, of encouraging the deliberate extermination of an entire species of large mammals, the North American bison ("buffalo"), in order to "destroy the commissary" of the Plains Indians.<sup>118</sup>

In every instance, the destruction of indigenous economies was undertaken within the framework of an overarching intent, expressed as a matter of policy by the respective governments involved, to achieve the outright "extermination" of targeted indigenous peoples.<sup>†</sup> In each case, the object was to bring about a massive fatality rate, not just among native combatants but within the target population *as a whole*.<sup>119</sup> Without exception, the desire was, if not to obtain the complete liquidation of given populations during the conduct of "wars" per se, then to take a longer view: extinction might be reasonably expected to claim any survivors, converted as they were into an atomized cloud of refugees, unable to feed, clothe, or house themselves, through a combination of starvation, exposure, and consequent lowered resistance to all manner of diseases.<sup>120</sup>

Another factor concerns the psychological effects on the Indians—

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\* Custer's pioneering of the tactic occurred after his bloody attack on a noncombatant Cheyenne winter encampment on the banks of Oklahoma's Washita River on November 28, 1868. After the survivors had fled, an estimated 875 animals were slaughtered. "Additionally, the 7th had captured all the Indians' supply of dried buffalo meat, meal flour, and other provisions, including most of the Cheyennes' clothing. As critical as anything to the Indians was the loss of their lodges, fifty-one of them. A warrior might revere his horse, but it was his lodge that gave him and his family shelter and permitted survival on the open plains." All of it was burned. There can be no doubt that the "Boy General" intended what was left of his vanquished foe to die of starvation, exposure—or disease—as a result of his actions; Stan Hoig, *The Battle of the Washita* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976) pp. 137–9.

† There was never anything fuzzy about such statements, as is witnessed in those of Thomas Jefferson, reputedly the greatest humanitarian among the "slaveholding philosophers of freedom" who made up America's founding fathers. Writing to his Secretary of War in 1807, Jefferson, at the time President of the United States, instructed that any native resistance to U.S. expansion into their territories should be overcome militarily, with the object that the Indians be "exterminated, or driven beyond the Mississippi." This was sound policy, he argued, based on such examples as the Powhatans and Pequots, because "in war, they will kill some of us; we shall destroy *all* of them." (emphasis added). Five years later, in 1812, he again took up the theme, opining that Euroamericans were "obliged" to drive all Indians they encountered "with the beasts of the forests into the Stony Mountains," concluding in 1813 that this meant pursuing all Indians east of the Mississippi "to extermination, or to drive them to new seats beyond our reach," and that it was probably preferable to "extirpate them from the earth"; quoted in Drinnon, *Facing West*, *op. cit.*, pp. 96, 98, 116; Ronald T. Takaki, *Iron Cages: Race and Culture in Nineteenth Century America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979) pp. 61–5.

acute anxiety, trauma, and depression, generally referred to as “demoralization,” which responsible colonial and U.S. officials—and average citizens, for that matter—*knew* resulted from the kind of warfare they were waging. The literature of the entire period from 1607 to 1920 is replete with observations of this or that Indian, or entire people, having “lost the will to live” in the face of the sudden dispossession of both their homeland and their way of life, as well as most of their friends and relatives.<sup>121</sup> The correlation between such psychological devastation and the inability of the average human organism to fend off disease is no mystery today, and it was not *then*. Instead, it was an anticipated by-product of economic warfare, the effects of which were uniformly celebrated.\*

Finally, there is another subtext to the psychology of traumatic demoralization, much less remarked upon, although this too was never a great secret: in periods of severe stress and despair the ability of humans to procreate drops off dramatically.<sup>122</sup> Under the conditions imposed upon American Indians, it could have been readily foreseen—and *was*—that their birthrates would plummet in rather direct correlation to their spiraling rates of death.<sup>123</sup> Infertility was as much a part of the calculations of the exterminators as was the inducing of lowered resistance to disease.<sup>124</sup> Altogether, there was nothing at all unwitting, unintentional, accidental, or inadvertent about the way the great bulk of North America’s indigenous population was “vanished by microbe.”<sup>125</sup> It was *precisely* malice, not nature, which did the deed.

### *“To Extirpate This Execrable Race”*

If there are any lingering doubts as to whether the invaders deliberately spread disease among North American Indians, it is time to lay them to rest once and for all. Contrary to the orthodoxy that the Europeans who came to the New World were ignorant of how disease spread, it had been a practice since at least as early as Tamerlane (Timur), circa 1385, to catapult the corpses of plague victims and the carcasses of diseased animals into besieged

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\*Examples are legion. See, e.g., *Some Meditations Concerning Our Honorable Gentlemen and Fellow Soldiers, in Pursuit of the Barbarous Natives in the Narragansett Country* (Plymouth Colony, 1675), the oldest surviving news broadside printed in North America; reproduced in Drinnon, *Facing West*, *op. cit.*, p. 54. Or, moving ahead a couple of centuries and more, consider the words of President Theodore Roosevelt: “Of course our whole history has been one of expansion... That the [Indians] recede or are conquered, with the attendant fact that peace follows their retrogression or conquest, is due solely to the power of the mighty civilized races who have not lost their fighting instinct, and which by their expansion are gradually bringing peace into the red wastes where the barbarian peoples of the world hold sway”; Theodore Roosevelt, *The Strenuous Life* (New York: Macmillan, 1901).

cities.<sup>126</sup> While such early experiments in biological warfare were generally unsuccessful, they do demonstrate unequivocally that the Old World, or at least its military leadership, had learned the mechanics of rudimentary epidemiology well before 1492.

In North America, where wave after wave of epidemics, and several pandemics, wracked native populations, often with a timing uncannily convenient to those who had set out to conquer or eradicate them, the first instance in which there is clear reason to suspect these lessons were being applied occurred in 1636.<sup>127</sup> This came with the execution of Captain John Oldham, an officer/diplomat for Massachusetts Colony, by the Narragansetts. The Indians apparently believed—rightly or wrongly—that Oldham had deliberately infected them with smallpox in 1633, probably by dispensing contaminated “gifts,” unleashing an epidemic which claimed more than 700 of their people and numerous of their allies.<sup>128</sup> He was therefore brought before the council of Narragansett sachems on Block Island, tried for this and possibly other offenses, and paid the price.<sup>129</sup>

There is considerable duplicity involved in what happened next. While they were certainly aware of who had killed Oldham (and why), both Massachusetts Governor John Winthrop and William Bradford, his counterpart on the Plymouth Plantation, publicly blamed the Pequots for the “murder,” thus predicating the almost total annihilation of that people in 1637.\* Since it was actually the more powerful Narragansetts, not the Pequots, who were convinced the colonists might be seeking to reduce their numbers through intentional contamination, the idea must be considered a contributing factor to the outbreak of “King Philip’s War” some forty years later. Such suspicions are known to have been harbored by several of the lesser nations


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\* Winthrop in particular had benefit of not less than five eyewitness accounts of Oldham’s execution, all of them attributing his death to the Narragansetts; Winthrop, *History of New England*, *op. cit.*, pp. 191–2. Perhaps realizing that laying the “murder” of Oldham at the feet of the Pequots, whose land was most immediately coveted by the colonists, might not hold up, Winthrop and Bradford quickly added the death of a Plymouth colonist, Captain John Stone, to their list of “grievances.” This, too, was pure sophistry. Stone had in fact been killed by the Pequots in 1635, but it was common knowledge that his death resulted from an attempt to kidnap and ransom several Indians. Plymouth had entered no protest at all, both because of the obvious justice of his fate and because he was at the time “banished from the colony on pain of death if he should ever reappear” because of piracy, sexual offenses, and the use of “threatening speech” against officials. He was, moreover, wanted by Dutch authorities in New Amsterdam for a prior kidnapping; Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 189–90; Winthrop, *History of New England*, *op. cit.*, pp. 52, 105; William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620–1647* (New York: Modern Library, 1981 reprint of undated original) pp. 257–60. Also see Alfred A. Cave, “Who Killed John Stone? A Note on the Origins of the Pequot War,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, No. 49, 1992.



"Extirpate this execrable race."

In the world's first documented instance of a genocide accomplished by bacteriological means, Lord Jeffrey Amherst — for whom a city in Massachusetts is now named — ordered smallpox-infected blankets to be passed out to Ottawas and Leni Lenâpés in 1763. How many other occasions in which similar activities occurred is unknown, but Amherst was by no means the only culprit. Photo: Library of Congress



Smallpox victims as portrayed in the Florentine Codex, compiled c. 1550 by surviving Aztec scribes.

— the Eastern Niantics, for example, and the Nipmucks—who, along with the larger Wampanoag confederation under Metacom (“King Philip”), aligned with the Narragansetts against the English in the fighting.\*

It is not until another ninety years had passed, however, during the last of the so-called “French and Indian Wars” before positive proof emerges that England was indeed using biological techniques, as such, to eradicate native populations.<sup>130</sup> In 1763, having been fought to a humiliating stalemate in the Ohio River Valley by a French-aligned indigenous military alliance organized by the Ottawa leader Pontiac, Lord Jeffrey Amherst, the English commander-in-chief, wrote a letter to a subordinate, Colonel Henry Bouquet, suggesting that a peace parley be convened and, as was customary at such events, gifts distributed.<sup>131</sup>

Amherst...wrote in a postscript of the letter to Bouquet that smallpox be sent among the disaffected tribes. Bouquet replied, also in a postscript, “I will try to [contaminate] them with some blankets that may fall into their hands, and take care not to get the disease myself”... To Bouquet’s postscript Amherst replied, “You will do well to [infect] the Indians by means of blankets as well as to try every other method that can serve to extirpate this [execrable] race.” On June 24, Captain Ecuyer, of the Royal Americans, noted in his journal: “...we gave them two blankets and a handkerchief out of the smallpox hospital. I hope it will have the desired effect.”<sup>132</sup>

To say that it did would be to understate the case. The disease spread like wildfire among the Ottawas, Mingos, Miamis, Lenni Lenâpés (Delawares), and several other peoples. By conservative estimate, the toll was over 100,000 dead, a matter which effectively broke the back of native resistance in what the United States would later call the “Northwest Territory,” allowing its conquest less than thirty years later.<sup>133</sup> Amherst’s maneuver, which displays a considerable familiarity with the notion of disease as a weapon, has been erroneously described as a “milestone of sorts” in military history by Robert O’Connell, in his book *Of Arms and Men*.<sup>134</sup> Actually, since he specified the group targeted for “extirpation” as being not just opposing combatants, but an entire *race*, the “Ohio Valley incident” is not properly understood as an example of biological warfare. Rather, it indisputably an instance of genocide pursued through microbes.<sup>135</sup>

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\*There is no question at all that the Indians felt themselves faced with outright extermination by any and all means, and that this was an exactly accurate interpretation of the desires of colonial officials in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. It is also a certainty that these officials, following the pattern set in the earlier Pequot War, fabricated a pretext to motivate their citizenry to pursue such genocidal ambitions; Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 298–302; Edward Leach, *Flintlocks and Tomahawks: New England in King Philip’s War* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1958).

This was by no means a singular incident, although it is the best documented. Only slightly more ambiguous was the U.S. Army's dispensing of "trade blankets" to Mandans and other Indians gathered at Fort Clark, on the Missouri River in present-day North Dakota, beginning on June 20, 1837. Far from being trade goods, the blankets had been taken from a military infirmary in St. Louis quarantined for smallpox, and brought upriver aboard the steamboat *St. Peter's*. When the first Indians showed symptoms of the disease on July 14, the post surgeon advised those camped near the post to scatter and seek "sanctuary" in the villages of healthy relatives.<sup>136</sup> By then, the disease was already showing up at Fort Union, adjacent to the main Mandan village some forty miles further upriver. The trader there, Jacob Halsey, who was married to an Indian woman, then attempted to administer a vaccine which had been stored by the army rather than used to inoculate the people for whom it was supposedly provided.\*

The perfectly predictable result of the "Fort Clark episode"<sup>137</sup> was the igniting of a pandemic which raged for several years, decimating peoples as far north as the Blackfeet, Bloods, and Piegans in southern Alberta and Saskatchewan, to the west as far as the Yuroks and other northern California peoples, and southward to the Kiowas and Comanches on the Staked Plains of Texas.<sup>†</sup>

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\*Evan S. Connell, *Son of the Morning Star: Custer and the Little Big Horn* (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1984) pp. 15–6. The matter of vaccine is important. Deniers such as Steven Katz are wont to point to a federal policy announced in 1833 "requiring" the inoculation of all Indians against smallpox as "proof" that the U.S. earnestly attempted to prevent the disease from spreading among the indigenous population; Steven T. Katz, "The Uniqueness of the Holocaust: The Historical Dimension," in Alan S. Rosenbaum, ed., *Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) p. 21. Katz, and those like him, neglect to inquire whether the supposed inoculation requirement was ever acted upon. The answer is a flat no. In post after post, vaccines, when they were provided at all, languished in storerooms rather than being administered. If we've learned anything at all through historical observation of governmental conduct, it should be that ostentatious policy pronouncements lacking anything resembling serious implementation are usually a cover for something else (most often an unstated policy running in the opposite direction). In any event, arguing that the 1833 policy statement proves what Katz says it does is roughly equivalent to arguing that since the nazis maintained medical facilities at Auschwitz they must really have had the Jews' health at heart.

†By the most conservative estimates, the Mandans were virtually exterminated, falling from a population of 2,000 down to perhaps 50 survivors in a matter of weeks; the Blackfeet/Blood/Piegan confederation lost about 8,000 people; the Pawnee, 2,000; one-third of the 9,000 Absarokes (Crows) died; about half the more than 8,000 Assiniboin; as much as three-fifths of several northern California peoples, including the Yurok and Wintu. Peoples suffering substantial but lesser impacts include the Yanktonai Nakota (400), Oklahoma Choctaw (500), and Kansas (100). Although they are known to have been impacted to varying degrees, often heavily, data are unavailable on the Arikara, Hidatsa, Gros Ventre, Lakota, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa, Kiowa Apache, Jicarilla Apache, Comanche, Winnebago, Oklahoma Chickasaw, Shoshone (both Mountain and Western), Paiute, and several others; Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust and Survival*, *op. cit.*, pp. 94–5.

There is no conclusive figure as to how many Indians died—it depends a bit on how many one is willing to concede were there in the first place—but estimates run as high as 100,000.<sup>138</sup> However many people perished, their “vanishing” made the subsequent U.S. conquest of the entire Plains region, begun seriously in the 1850s, far easier than it would otherwise have been.

By this point, California, along with its residual population of native people, had been acquired by the United States from Mexico. There is nothing confusing about the meaning of language found in an 1853 San Francisco newspaper, explaining how the incoming Angloamericans were handling their “Indian Question”: “people are...ready to knife them, shoot them, or inoculate them with smallpox—all of which have been done (emphasis added).”<sup>139</sup> Thus, by the mid-nineteenth century, it appears that the eradication of Indians through *deliberate* infection with plague diseases had become so commonplace that it was no longer a military specialty. Rather, it had been adopted as a method of “pest control” by average civilians. All that is missing are the details as to exactly who did it to which group of northern California natives, how many times and with what overall degree of success. Whatever it was, it fit within a conscious strategy of the citizenry, described in the *San Francisco Bulletin* on July 10, 1860, to effect the “ultimate extermination of the race by disease.”<sup>140</sup>

Given these circumstances, as well as those described in this section more generally, it is at best an absurdity to contend that attrition through disease represents anything approximating a “benign” explanation for the complete extinction of numerous North American native peoples—or the near-total disappearance of the “race” as a whole—between 1600 and 1900. To the contrary, based on the evidence the presumption should be—and should have been all along—that the waves of epidemic disease that afflicted indigenous populations during these centuries were deliberately induced, or at least facilitated, by the European invaders.\*

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\*The argument that “methodological responsibility” requires conclusive documentary evidence to establish intentionality in each and every instance where it is to be presumed to have played a role holds no water at all. If the historical profession actually adhered to such rarefied standards, it would not even be able to demonstrate that Adolf Hitler played a role in exterminating the Jews and Gypsies; see, e.g., Gerald Fleming, *Hitler and the Final Solution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). Presumption in historical analysis is based, not on excruciatingly detailed evidence in every instance, but upon assessment of phenomena within the overall context in which they occurred. In view of the overall pattern of their policies, actions, and rhetoric, the nazis are reasonably presumed guilty of a wide range of things by historians, absent compelling evidence to the contrary in any given instance. The same principle holds true for the invaders of America: they should not, and should never have been, automatically presumed innocent *in the face of* their overwhelmingly clear pattern of rhetoric, action, and policy.

To do otherwise is tantamount to arguing, as some “scholars” do, that the approximately 50 percent of the Jews who died as a result of “ghettoization and general privation” at the hands of the nazis shouldn’t be tallied into the toll of the Holocaust since, after all, they perished from “natural causes” like starvation and disease.<sup>141</sup> Framed more broadly, it would be the same as saying that of the estimated fifty million fatalities usually attributed to the Second World War, at least two-thirds should not be counted since they died of malnutrition, exposure, disease, and war-related traumas rather than from “direct killing techniques.”<sup>142</sup> If such “standards” seem ridiculous when applied in these contexts—and they should—they should seem no less so when applied to the devastation of Native North America.

### **Profiles in Extermination**

Having rebutted the main lines of argument by which the North American holocaust is minimized and denied, it is time to turn to that from which they are designed to divert attention: the matter of direct killing. Here, we again encounter minimization and denial of the first order. Consider a very recent formulation offered by Steven T. Katz to “debunk” the notion that indigenous people suffered literal extermination: “Even Russell Thornton, who has vigorously attempted to highlight the roles of warfare and genocide in the decline of the Indian population, is forced by the unsailable demographic evidence to conclude that, at most, ‘45,000 American Indians [were] killed in wars with Europeans and Americans between 1775–1890. To this might be added...8,500 American Indians killed in individual conflicts during the period, to arrive at a total of 53,000 killed.’”<sup>143</sup>

That is to say, in a period of 115 years, during which the indigenous population declined by over 1.5 million, only 53,000 casualties, or 3.7 percent of the total lost, can be counted as having been intentionally murdered. For the pre-1775 period, the percentage of loss due to warfare (and individual murder) is even lower. Thornton, for example, in attempting to configure losses in the prerevolutionary era, suggests doubling the post-1775 figure of 53,000 to arrive at a pre-1775 aggregate. Accordingly, if we follow this suggestion, if only for purposes of argument, we have a projection, however crudely arrived at, of 106,000 casualties due to war and conflict situations in this earlier epoch. However, given the much higher total native population in this native contact period—anywhere up to ten or more times as great as what it was after 1775—the percentage of loss represented by this hypothesized 106,000 casualties shrinks to some fraction of 1 percent.<sup>144</sup>

Leaving aside the transparency of Katz’s attempt to constrain the definitional boundaries of “murder” to absurdly narrow limits, there is a more

immediate problem: this is not at all what Thornton said. It is worth quoting at length here in order to clearly establish the extent of Katz's manipulation. Thornton himself prefaces the page cited by Katz with a quotation from an 1894 report of the U.S. Bureau of the Census:

It has been estimated that since 1775, more than [8,500 Indians] have been killed in individual affairs with [whites]... The Indian wars under the government of the United States have been more than forty in number. They have cost the lives of...about 30,000 Indians... The actual number of killed and wounded Indians must be very much greater than the number given, as they conceal, where possible, their actual loss in battle, and carry their killed and wounded off and secrete them. The number above is of those found by whites. Fifty percent additional would be a safe number to add to the numbers given.<sup>145</sup>

He then writes, "Assuming these figures are correct and, for purposes of illustration, adding 50 percent American Indian dead to the 30,000 estimate yields 45,000 American Indians killed in wars with Europeans and Americans between 1775 and 1890. To this might be added the above reported 8,500 American Indians killed in individual conflicts during the period, to arrive at a total of 53,500 killed by the government's own admission. The Indians killed in wars and individual affairs before 1775 might easily double the figure."<sup>146</sup> Far from embracing this governmentally derived estimate as his own, however, Thornton immediately points to one glaring omission in its database—the Indian dead from "intertribal warfare" instigated by the invaders—and then cuts to the heart of his point.\*

As these deaths are added, the mortality figures become considerably more substantial: 150,000? 250,000? 500,000? We do not know. Suffice it to say, American Indians suffered substantial population loss due to warfare stemming from the European arrival and colonization... We can only guess at the numbers of American Indians killed by genocide. And it is undoubtedly more problematic to guess the losses from genocide because genocide was neither as well recorded nor as well publicized as warfare.<sup>147</sup>

From there, he provides considerable material to illustrate exactly the sorts and quantities of fatalities he is including within his classification of

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\*The argument will no doubt be raised that Indians killed by Indians should not be held against the invaders, regardless of the degree of coercion, etc., employed by the latter to obtain precisely that result. By the same logic, Jews killed by *kapos*, especially those who were themselves Jewish, at Auschwitz, should not be held against the nazis; see Danuta Czech, "The Auschwitz Prisoner Administration," in Yisrael Gutman and Michael Berenbaum, eds., *Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp* (Bloomington/Washington, D.C.: Indiana University Press/U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1994) esp. pp. 362–5.

genocide,<sup>148</sup> all of which remains as conspicuously unmentioned by Katz as is Thornton's own estimate of up to a half-million dead from warfare alone. Much of what Thornton offers has been covered above. The remainder is included among the matters discussed in the following subsections. Once again, it seems appropriate to begin at the beginning and trace the evolution of the more overt forms of slaughter through to approximately 1900.

### *Opening Rounds*

The "Indian Wars" in North America started at almost the moment the first Europeans set foot upon the continent. Ponce de León's fabled 1513 quest for the Fountain of Youth in Florida—actually, at least in part, a slaving expedition meant to replenish the dwindling supply of fodder for the *encomiendas* on Española and other Caribbean islands—was marked by a series of aggressive acts against, and resultant altercations with, the local Ais and Calusas.<sup>149</sup> In 1521, Ponce returned to set up a permanent colony, only to be mortally wounded by a Calusa arrow while attempting to pacify the indigenous population by cold steel. He died shortly thereafter in Cuba.<sup>150</sup>

By then, Alverde Piñeda had explored the Gulf Coast, come upon the Mississippi River, and set in motion Spanish slaving enterprises on a larger scale.<sup>151</sup> It was slavers who first probed the Atlantic coastline as far north as Maine.<sup>152</sup> One result was the establishment of what was meant to be a permanent slave-trading post dubbed San Miguel de Guadalupe, on Sapelo Sound in present-day Georgia, in 1526. This first European settlement in North America since those of the Vikings had failed five centuries earlier lasted less than a year.<sup>153</sup> Another expedition, this one headed by veteran conquistador Pánfilo de Narváez in 1528, landed on the Florida coast with 400 men and eighty horses and attempted to hack their way through the Apalachees of the panhandle region. Ultimately, there were only five known survivors among the Spanish, four of whom managed to walk all the way to Mexico by 1536.\*

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\*The best account of Narváez's expedition comes from one of the four survivors, Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca. See his *Cabeza de Vaca's Adventures in the Unknown Interior of America* (Potomac, MD: Scripta Humanística, 1986 edited translation of the 1542 original); also see Morris Bishop, *The Odyssey of Cabeza de Vaca* (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1933). It should be noted that the group which escaped Florida was much larger, and left on rafts. They were starving and resorted to cannibalism before being wrecked in a storm along the Texas coast, where the few that were left were found by local Karankawas. Predictably, the Indians, who were "shocked" to discover evidence that the Spaniards had been devouring one another, were later themselves falsely branded as cannibals by Spanish historians.

The near-total demographic collapse of the indigenous Caribbean population had driven the premium on fresh supplies of slave labor through the roof by the mid-1530s.<sup>154</sup> Simultaneously, the astonishing trove of precious metals garnered by Cortés in his sacking of Tenochtitlán sparked a frenzy to discover further “Cities of Gold.” And, of course, Spain was still seeking a water route to India and China.<sup>155</sup> All three factors, combined with an active interest in further territorial expansion, led the Spanish to intensify their activities in North America, mainly through the massive 1539–42 expeditions headed by Francisco Vázquez de Coronado and Fernando de Soto into the southwestern and southeastern portions of the continent, respectively.

Coronado’s foray, involving over 300 men-at-arms and about a thousand indigenous mercenaries from northern Mexico, was unabashedly devoted to locating and conquering the fictional “Seven Cities of Cíbola,” reputedly somewhere in the area of what are now New Mexico and eastern Arizona.<sup>156</sup> What he found instead were the Tewa and Kerasan pueblos, first Zuni, then Hopi, then the remainder, all the way north and east to Taos.<sup>157</sup> Along the way, his troops emptied native larders, commandeered other property, raped the local women and—to “make an example which would discourage rebellion” at such treatment—laid waste to the village of Arenal, burning its occupants at the stake.<sup>158</sup> This atrocity prompted the very kind of resistance it was meant to deter, and before it was over, thirteen additional pueblos were destroyed along with their inhabitants.<sup>159</sup> By the spring of 1542, having marched as far as central Kansas and killed several thousand Indians in his futile search for golden cities, the would-be Cortés was defeated. He left a small garrison near the present location of Santa Fe and retreated southward into Mexico.\*

Meanwhile, to the east in Florida, de Soto’s force, 600-strong, had landed near Tampa Bay in May 1539. From there, it moved northward as far as the Carolinas, doubled back into Georgia, then moved erratically westward through what are now Alabama and Mississippi before crossing the great river into Arkansas. Along the way, he encountered a number of indigenous peoples, including the Tocobagans, Timucuan, Apalachees, Tuscaloosas,

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\* Both Coronado and his second-in-command, García López de Cárdenas, suffered the fate of many such failures: they were tried by the Crown for their crimes against Indians. Coronado, still commanding a certain prestige of rank, was exonerated and died in Mexico City, impoverished and eclipsed, in 1544. López, on the other hand, was convicted of the massacre at Arenal and died in prison. This is not proof that Spain was “struggling for justice in the New World” so much as it is evidence that the Spanish were perfectly aware that their treatment of native people was criminal, whether it succeeded or not; Weber, *Spanish Frontier*, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

Cofitachiquis, Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Natchez, and perhaps the Caddos.<sup>160</sup>

De Soto had brought an ambulatory larder in the form of hundreds of pigs whose numbers increased along the march, but he regularly plundered the food supplies of the natives, taking dried corn, squash and beans from storage. He had brought twice the number of Spaniards that Coronado did, but unlike Coronado... de Soto captured slave labor along his route. He had worked out the plan before leaving Spain, for he brought along iron chains and collars to link Indians into human baggage trains. Indian women “who were not old nor the most ugly,” de Soto’s secretary later explained, the Spaniards “desired both as servants and for foul uses...they had them baptized more on account of carnal intercourse with them than to teach them the faith.” Uncooperative Indians might be put to the sword, thrown to the dogs, or burned alive, or might have a hand or nose severed. De Soto killed and mutilated Indians with little provocation, for in the words of one chronicler who knew him, [he] was “much given to the sport of hunting Indians from horseback.”<sup>161</sup>

Wherever it went, the expedition “left a trail of shattered lives, broken bodies, ravaged fields, empty storehouses, and charred fields.”<sup>162</sup> Resistance mounted as they moved inland and word of their barbarities spread among the native populations ahead of them. Although badly outnumbered, the Spanish, clad in armor and bearing superior weaponry, more than held their own. De Soto buried his dead, had the wounds of his injured treated with the fat of slain Indians, and pressed on.<sup>163</sup> Finally, in late March 1541, a group of Chickasaws made a surprise attack and managed to burn a number of the troops as they slept cooped up in winter shelters.<sup>164</sup> After that, combat was avoided wherever possible and “the invasion of the interior” began to lose steam.<sup>165</sup> It petered out altogether when de Soto himself died in May 1542. What was left of his force—about half of those who had started out—floundered about for some months before making boats and escaping across the Gulf to Mexico.<sup>166</sup>

Although the number of Indians killed in these early expeditions was not great as compared to the scale of butchery that would soon prevail in North America—there were probably around 10,000 native dead, *en toto*—the manner of killing and the attitudes it revealed speak far louder than the bodycount itself.\* In this sense, they serve as a preview of things to come, all

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\*This leaves aside the number of Indians taken by Spanish slavers during this period, which is unknown, but must have been considerable. It is certain that Lucas Vasquez de Allyón, for one, took several boatloads, at perhaps 200 per load, to be consumed on the plantations of Española in 1520, and that he operated for another nine years. Esteban Gomez, a Portuguese, not only supplied the Caribbean islands, but delivered a load of fifty Indian slaves, probably from South Carolina, to Spain in 1525. There were a number of others plying their trade along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts between 1515

the more so as they proved to be the fulcrum upon which the weight of the Old World began to swing into the New north of the Río Grande. Only a little more than two decades after Coronado's and de Soto's bedraggled remnants fled back to New Spain, the Spanish had returned to Florida to stay.<sup>167</sup> Before century's end, they would be a permanent presence in New Mexico.<sup>168</sup> Worse, the English, French, and Dutch were coming, too.

*A Terror to the Reste...*

The initial effort by the English to establish a colony, led by Martin Frobisher in 1576, was undertaken after a crewman found what was believed to be gold on the shores of Baffin Island during an attempt to discover a northern water route to Asia. When the mineral turned out to be pyrite, Frobisher contented himself with capturing "sundry tokens of people" (Inuits) and taking them back for display before London society.<sup>169</sup> The same sorts of outlooks and practices prevailed during other English voyages of exploration of the era.<sup>170</sup>

In 1585, Sir Walter Raleigh sought to found a permanent colony, Roanoak, near Hatteras, a Croatoan village on the outer banks of North Carolina.<sup>171</sup> Although the local Indians were initially welcoming, feeding the newcomers and teaching them agriculture and other survival skills, the Roanoak colonists proved so belligerently arrogant that a state of virtual low-intensity warfare was quickly established.<sup>172</sup> At some point between 1587, when Raleigh delivered a fresh load of 117 recruits to his enterprise, and 1590, when the next English supply ship arrived, the entire population of the Roanoak Colony simply disappeared. Since this was attributed to defeat at the hands of the Croatoans—literally "eaten by the savages," according to one anthropologist during the 1970s<sup>173</sup>—the venture was thereupon broken off.\*

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and 1560. Additionally, it is known that the de Soto expedition maintained a supply of up to 800 slaves, captured en route, throughout its three years in the field. All told, it is probable that the number of slaves taken was several times the number of Indians killed outright, and the former were just as lost to their people as the latter; see generally, Lauber, *Indian Slavery in Colonial Times*, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–61.

\* The evidence is strong that the fate of the Roanoak colonists was to be adopted ("naturalized") as tribal members ("citizens") by the Croatoans: "Many years later, in 1650, the Croatoan Indians migrated from Hatteras to mainland North Carolina, where they were known as the Lumbees. Some of them were fair-haired and blue-eyed. Among their family names were the names of Roanoak settlers such as Dial, and there was a curious singsong in their speech, reminiscent, it was said, of Elizabethan English"; Ted Morgan, *Wilderness at Dawn: The Settling of the North American Continent* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993) p. 82. This, incidentally, was common practice among many, if not most, North American indigenous peoples, who had been adopting/naturalizing one another since time immemorial. Contrary to the rigid insistence upon "blood" evident among many

A bit north, in Virginia, things were moving in a different direction. On May 14, 1607, the English Southern Virginia Company landed a colonizing expedition on a peninsula along what they called the James River, near present-day Williamsburg.<sup>174</sup> Nominally headed by a civilian governor, Sir Thomas West de la Warr, the Jamestown Plantation, as it was quickly dubbed, was actually under command of Captain John Smith, a professional soldier hired to render its planned aggression efficient.\* The first violence was on the fourth day, when an Indian was assaulted for “stealing” a hatchet for which he’d apparently traded food (the English, it has been pointed out, seem never to have been able to feed themselves).<sup>175</sup> This led to the first battle, which occurred on May 26.<sup>176</sup>

The colonists had already been busily erecting fortifications against the very Indians who’d been feeding them, a rather obvious indication of their intentions. With his base established and the colonists organized into a coherent military force, and with reinforcements on the way, Smith moved in 1608 to impose the exploitative relationship with the natives he’d been sent to create: “When the Paspahighs and Chickahominies...refused to trade, he pursued them with such vehemence and did such damage to their houses, boats, and weirs that they quickly sued for peace and loaded his barges with corn. To secure the return of stolen weapons or tools he did not scruple to torture Indian prisoners or, worse yet from their standpoint, shackle them in a dungeon.”<sup>177</sup>

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contemporary Indians—an attitude clearly internalized from their colonizers—traditional native societies were never plagued with the concepts of “race,” exclusivism, and supremacism that mark western European cultures. Native peoples were thus quite uninhibited about incorporating whites, and later blacks, into themselves as full member/citizens. It was English colonialism in particular which sought to abolish the practice on grounds of its presumed racial supremacy, in much the same fashion the Germans would do under the Nuremberg Laws. See, e.g., James Axtell, “The White Indians of North America,” in his *The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Jack D. Forbes, *Black Africans and Native Americans: Race, Color and Caste in the Making of Red-Black Peoples* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *Settling with the Indians: The Meeting of English and American Cultures in America, 1580–1640* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980); Drinnon, *Facing West*, op. cit., pp. 3–20. On the nazis’ 1935 “Blood Protection Law,” see, e.g., Stefan Kühl, *The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German National Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 97–9. Overall, see Ashley Montague, *Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race* (Cleveland/New York: World, 1964); Joel Kovel, *White Racism: A Psychohistory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984 revision of the 1970 Pantheon edition).

\*Not only was a subsequent colony, Delaware, named in honor of de la Warr, but the indigenous population there, the Lenni Lenâpé, were called “Delawares” as well. As to aggression, Smith’s original instructions were to clear whatever native inhabitants were encountered from the seacoast and then push them further inland at whatever rate seemed practicable; Edward Arber and A.G. Bradley, eds., *Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, President of Virginia and Admiral of New England, 1580–1631*, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1910) Vol. 1, pp. xxxiii–xxxvii.

His field commanders were equally ruthless. When two English emissaries sent to purchase an island from the Nansemonds were tortured and killed [in retaliation for an earlier English atrocity], troops under Captains John Martin and George Percy “Beate the Salvages outt of the Island, burned their howses, Ransacked their Temples, Tooke downe the Corp[s]es of the dead kings from off[f] their Toambes, and caryed away their pearles, Copper and braceletts, wherewith they doe’dcor[at]e their king’s funeralles.” When Captain Francis West and three dozen men were sent to the Potomac to trade for corn, they loaded their pinnace but “used some harshe and Crewell dealinge by cut-teinge off[f] towne of the Salvages heads and other extremeties.”<sup>178</sup>

There is solid evidence that Wahunsonacock (whom the English called Powhatan; they called his confederation that, too, although it called itself Tsenacommacah), a Pamunkey and principal leader of the local Indian confederation—which was greatly superior in numbers and could undoubtedly have obliterated the colonists at this point, had they a mind to—made every effort to negotiate some sort of equitable arrangement to end the fighting before it got out of hand.<sup>179</sup> The English, however, were having none of it. Their objective, stripped of all gloss and veneer, was outright extermination: “[It] is infinitely better to have no heathen among us, who at best were but thorns in our sides, then to be at peace and in league with them,” as one participant later put it.<sup>180</sup>

Smith was seriously injured by the accidental explosion of a powder cask in 1609, and returned to England (he never came back to Jamestown), but de la Warr launched his war of annihilation the following year.<sup>181</sup> Field command was assigned to Captain George Percy, who pursued the strategy described above, and proved himself every bit as vicious as Smith.

In August, seventy men under command of Percy, led by an Indian prisoner in a handlock, assaulted the Paspahugh town, killing sixteen and capturing the chief’s wife and children. After burning the natives’ houses and cutting down their corn (which was not unneeded at Jamestown), the soldiers groused that any natives were spared. So a military council met and decided to put the children to death, “which was effected by Throwinge them overboard and shoteinge owt their Braynes in the water.” With great difficulty Percy managed to prevent his men from burning the “Queen” at the stake until she could be more humanely put to the sword. On the way home the expedition stopped at Chickahominy to cut down the inhabitants’ corn and burn their houses, temples, and religious “idols.” Such scenes were repeated up and down the river all fall.\*

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\* Axtell, *After Columbus*, *op. cit.*, p. 207. The exterminationist sensibilities of the colonists, rank-and-file and leadership alike, is readily apparent, not only in the troops’ murder of the vanquished Paspahugh leader’s children—who might have made good hostages—but in de la Warr’s response when Percy arrived at Jamestown with the man’s captive wife: “Governor de la Warr was unhappy with him

The following summer saw the arrival of a further 600 troops, well armed and with “a great store of armor.” Shortly, a column of a hundred iron-clad men led by Governor Thomas Dale—de la Warr had retired for reasons of health—assaulted the town of the Nansemonds, repeating Percy’s performance of the year before, but killing a much larger number of Indians in the process.<sup>182</sup> From then on, the colonists began to build an increasing number of satellite forts, none of which could be approached by an Indian without permission lest he or she suffer, at best, the severing of a hand or, more often, summary execution as “a Terrour to the Reste.”<sup>183</sup> The native people, for their part, withdrew further and further, seeking to find a safe distance.

A war of attrition was pursued until 1614, when a “truce” was arranged after Wahunsonacock’s daughter, Pocahantas, was captured by Captain Thomas Argall and held hostage.<sup>184</sup> Although the colonists, now led by George Yeardley, continued to undermine the Tsenacommacahs, encroaching upon their farmlands and killing them at a steady pace—meanwhile tripling their own population—Wahunsonacock appears to have held up his end of the agreement until his death in 1618.\* Leadership of the confederation passed to his younger brother, Opechancanough, who began casting about for some means of averting the extinction quite literally staring his people in the face. The Indians had run out of room to retreat, and could afford no more unreturned casualties.<sup>†</sup>

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because he had not yet killed the queen. Advised by his chief lieutenant that it would be best to burn her alive, Percy decided instead to end his day of ‘so mutche Bloodshedd’ with a final act of mercy: instead of burning her, he had the queen killed by stabbing her to death”; Stannard, *American Holocaust*, *op. cit.*, p. 106. Both authors are quoting from Percy, “‘A Trewe Relacyon’: Virginia from 1609–1612,” *op. cit.*, pp. 271–3.

\*The *quid pro quo* seems to have been that, in exchange for his daughter’s safety, Wahunsonacock would use his influence to prevent, or at least hold to a minimum, his people’s military responses to the colonists. The latter, for their part, promised to cease their physical aggression, but never really did. Rather, they simply throttled back the pace of butchery—with perhaps another 500 Indians killed in the six years from 1615 through 1621—confident that at that rate the “truce” would spare them physical consequences; see generally, Robert Beverley, *The History and Present State of Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947 edited reprint of 1705 original).

†“By 1622 the land-hungry English had claimed most of the excellent waterfront along the James River, interfering with Powhatan access to fields, reed-gathering areas, and the waterway itself; Ian K. Steele, *Warpaths: Invasions of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 45. As colonist Edward Waterhouse put it at the time, with considerable accuracy: the Tsenacommacahs experienced “the dayly feare that possesse them, that we by our growing continually upon them, would dispossesse them of this Country” and their very existence; quoted from Susan Myra Kingsbury, ed., *The Records of the Virginia Company of London*, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1906–1935) Vol. 3, pp. 556–7. Another intriguing possibility, unremarked in the literature, is that the Tsenacommacahs were convinced, as the Narragansetts were a bit later, that the colonists had deliberately infected them with an epidemic which took several hundred between 1617 and 1619. It is suspicious insofar as the Indians, despite frequent and close proximity to the English for a decade,

Opechancanough's counteroffensive, when it came, was thus born of pure desperation. On March 22, 1622, the Tsenacommacahs rose as a body, killing 347 colonists in a drive to push them back within the boundaries that had prevailed ten years earlier.<sup>185</sup> Sir Francis Wyatt, who had replaced Yeardley as governor, then instructed his military commanders to resume the colony's earlier tactics of total war, "even to...rooting them out from being longer a people upon the face of the earth...by force, by surprise, by famine in burning their Corne...by pursuing and chasing them with blood-Hounds to draw after them, and Mastives to seaze them...by driving them (when they flye) upon their enemies, who are around them, and by animating and abetting their enemies against them."<sup>\*</sup>

The officers complied with a vengeance, laying waste to towns, villages, and fields by the score, stalking the Tsenacommacahs continuously. Perhaps 3,000 Indians were killed in only a few months. When Opechancanough requested a peace parley in May 1623, Wyatt used the occasion to murder "nearly two hundred natives by having them toast the peace with poisoned sack."<sup>186</sup> A second attempt, a few months later, was used as an ambush in which another fifty leaders were shot and hacked to death.<sup>187</sup> In a two-day battle in July 1624, more than 800 Pamunkeys were slaughtered.<sup>188</sup> And so it went until 1632, when it was decided that there were so few remaining Tsenacommacahs that it was no longer worth the time and expense of tracking them down and killing them.<sup>189</sup>

There was one last spasm in 1644, as Opechancanough, by then old and enfeebled, led the starving remains of his once-proud and populous confederacy in a futile attempt to carve out some small niche for themselves in what had been their homeland. Caught by surprise, the colonists lost around 500 killed, but in their thousands they swarmed into action, obliterating the last of the Tsenacommacahs' fighting strength and capturing Opechancanough himself in 1646.<sup>190</sup> The old man was taken in chains to Jamestown and placed on display before being shot to death by a soldier displeased by the fierceness of

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showed no signs of illness until the precise moment the latter were sufficiently well established and populous to begin a major territorial expansion. Then, suddenly and mysteriously, the Indians began to die like flies.

\*Kingsbury, Vol. 3, *The Records of the Virginia Company*, op. cit., pp. 557–8, 672, 683; Vol. 4, p. 71. This strategy of driving a targeted native population up against other peoples, thus forcing the latter into territorial defense—as was done to the Tsenacommacahs vis-à-vis the far stronger Susquehannocks, as well as the Chesapeake confederation of Patowomecs (Potomacs), Monacans, Accomacs, Accohannocks, and others—would become standard fare in the English inventory of techniques to decimate Indians without appearing to do so.

his pride.<sup>191</sup> This final scourge of the Tsenacommacahs was not so costly in terms of slaughtered native noncombatants because the colony's newest governor, William Berkeley, sensed potential profits and ordered his troops "to spare the women and children," wherever possible, "and sell them" into slavery.\*

This final liquidation of the "Powhatan Empire" set the stage for equally savage assaults on the other indigenous nations of Virginia and the Maryland Colony, immediately northward.<sup>†</sup> Already, in November 1623, "the Virginia militia had expanded its range and made new enemies by ["mistakenly"] attacking and burning Moyaone, the stockaded Potomac town of the Piscataway."<sup>192</sup> The process was slowed somewhat by political convulsions in England itself, manifested in Virginia as "Bacon's Rebellion" (1675–76)<sup>‡</sup> and some serious sparring with both the Dutch and, briefly, the Swedes over colonial rights.<sup>§</sup> However, the burgeoning numbers of English colonists, their insa-

\*Morgan, *Wilderness at Dawn*, *op. cit.*, p. 233. About 1,500 native women and children were thus disposed of in the West Indies; Rountree, *The Powhatan Indians*, *op. cit.*, p. 85–6. The number of Indian dead is, as always, difficult to establish with certainty, but would certainly be at least 500. The result was that the original 100,000 or more Tsenacommacahs had been reduced to about 1,000 by 1675, and continued to decline thereafter.

†Actually, the Tsenacommacahs did not go completely out of existence until the early eighteenth century. Until then, a small group, mostly Pamunkeys, was maintained as a Jamestown "tributary." They were led after the murder of Openchancanough, by Necotowance. When he was killed in 1655 while helping defend the colony from a strange group of Indians called "Richahecrians" by the English—they've never been truly identified—who briefly incurred from the west, he was replaced by a woman, Cockacoeske. She seems to have been the last Tsenacommacah leader of any significance; Martha M. McCartney, "Cockacoeske, Queen of the Pamunkey: Diplomat and Suzerain," in Peter H. Wood, Gregory A. Waselkov and M. Thomas Hatley, eds., *Powhatan's Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989).

‡The "rebellion" undertaken by colonist Nathaniel Bacon and 200 militia members in 1675 was only marginally connected to the civil war in England of 1642–1649 which resulted in the beheading of Charles I and transformation of the government in the latter year (Bacon claimed he was a "royalist" and that he refused to recognize the legitimacy of the replacement body). More to the point was his desire to assume a dominant position over the Indian slave trade, and, for that purpose, to prosecute wars against the natives more rapidly than the colonial regime desired (all prisoners taken being legally defined as slaves for life). The rebellion petered out when Bacon suddenly died of natural causes in October 1676; Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957) pp. 49–67.

§The shortlived colony of New Sweden (1638–1655) had little lasting impact. Over the short run, however, it preoccupied the English, and resulted in the arming of the already powerful Susequehannocks, whom the Swedes were courting as allies against the other European powers, with state-of-the-art weaponry, including cannons. This, in turn, slowed the rate at which England was able to overpower the Susequehannocks themselves; Francis Jennings, "Susequehannocks," in Bruce Trigger, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians*, Vol. 15: *The Northeast* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978). The Dutch, operating out of their colony of New Amsterdam, later the city of New York, were busily raiding Virginia tobacco shipping during this period as an offshoot of the three rapid-fire Anglo-Dutch wars in Europe (1652–54, 1665–67, and 1672–74); Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 50; more broadly, see Amandua Johnson, *The Swedish Settlements on the Delaware: Their History and Relation to the Indians, 1638–1664* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1911).

tiable desire for land on which to expand the increasingly lucrative production of tobacco, and the profitability of the trade in native slaves all combined as incentive for a series of openly exterminatory wars against regional Indians.\*

The spark was ignited in July 1675 by the Doeg, a small tribe on the Maryland side of the Potomac who were now a close neighbor of the [much larger and more powerful] Susquehannock. Angry with Thomas Mathew, a wealthy Virginia planter who reportedly refused to pay for goods received, the Doeg took hogs from one of Mathews' plantations. The English pursued, killing several of the tribe and recovering the hogs; in revenge, a Doeg war party killed one of Mathews' herdsman. Two Virginia militia captains then led thirty men across the Potomac into Maryland. While one group terrorized a Doeg settlement, killing ten, the other militiamen attacked a nearby cabin, killing fourteen before discovering that they were Susquehannock, erstwhile English allies. Once again, Virginians had displayed surprising, or feigned, difficulty distinguishing between [American Indian] friend and enemy. Maryland protests against both the invasion and the killing of innocent [Indians] were soon forgotten in the midst of a wave of [Indian] attacks on the frontiers of both colonies.<sup>193</sup>

In the fighting which followed, a number of smaller peoples like the Doegs, Occaneechees, and Piscataways were decimated to the point of disappearance.<sup>194</sup> The Susequehannocks proved a much tougher opponent—in 1675, for example, about a hundred of them fortified the remains of the Piscataway town torched in 1623, complete with Swedish cannon, and withstood a siege by 500 Maryland militia for seven weeks—but were eventually worn down.<sup>195</sup> By 1680, harried relentlessly by the militias, the Susequehannocks were effectively dissolved as a people, their survivors absorbed by the five nations of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) confederation in what is now Pennsylvania and New York.<sup>196</sup> As of 1700, it is estimated that fewer than 3,000 indigenous people remained within the entire expanse of lush agricultural land extending from the Chesapeake Bay to the Appalachian Mountains, once one of the most densely populated regions in all of Native North America.<sup>197</sup>

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\*By 1672, Virginia was exporting 17 million pounds of tobacco per year to England, aboard more than a hundred ships. Nearly 15,000 indentured servants were among the 38,000 colonists, most of them working in tobacco production. They were augmented by an estimated 2,500 African chattel slaves by that point (native slaves being mainly shipped to Caribbean markets, from whence they could not escape back to their peoples); *Historical Statistics*, series Z, pp. 13–4, 457–9. Also see Robert V. Wells, *The Population of the British Colonies in America before 1776: A Survey of the Census Data* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

## *Yea Rats and Mice or Swarms of Lice*

The record of the English colonists who “settled” the already long- and well-settled area which became “New England” is, if anything, worse than that of their colleagues further south. Things got off to a rocky start in 1602, when an exploratory probe of the area around Cape Cod resulted in hostilities with local Wampanoags (Pokanokets), which caused a hasty departure of the explorers. In 1603 the English returned and attempted to erect a fortification, but were again routed, this time by a group of Nausets. In 1605, George Weymouth, sailing for the Plymouth Company, landed along the Kennebec River, kidnapped five Eastern Abenaki, and returned to England.<sup>198</sup> Two years later, George Popham and Raleigh Gilbert, a pair of former pirates turned Plymouth Company stockholders, returned to the Kennebec with 120 men to establish what they called the Sagadahoc Colony. They built a fort, but shortly ran afoul of the Skidwarre and Tahanedo bands of Abenaki and, by 1608, this beachhead was also abandoned.\*

The primary difficulty encountered by all of these ventures was that there were far too many indigenous people in the immediate area—estimates run as high as 90,000 in 1600—for them to simply impose themselves.<sup>199</sup> This problem was rectified in 1614 by Captain John Smith, of Jamestown fame, who suddenly materialized on the coastline with a company of Plymouth Company voyagers, shot seven Indians in three quick skirmishes, and abducted 27 Patuxet Wampanoags and Nausets to sell as slaves in the West Indies on the way home.<sup>200</sup> Mysteriously—the Indians had had close contact with Europeans for years without getting sick—epidemics broke out in the immediate aftermath of Smith’s expedition.†

Between 1616 and 1618, a devastating “virgin soil epidemic”...raged through New England. Fully 90 percent of the Wampanoag died of an unidentified European disease, as did a comparable number of Massachusetts and nearly as many Pawtucket and

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\*The incentive was that the company had been granted the “right” by Charles I to develop a “parcel of 1,000 square miles around anywhere it chose to build a post between 38° and 45° north latitude”; Charles McLean Andrews, *The Colonial Period in American History*, 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934–1939) Vol. 1, pp. 90–7.

†The earliest known contact in this region occurred when Giovanni da Verrazano, sailing for France, landed in 1524. Spanish slavers may well have been there even earlier—certainly, they appeared periodically throughout the sixteenth century—and it is possible the Vikings came this far south five centuries earlier still. Then there are the English ground parties, beginning in 1602, Henry Hudson’s 1609 voyage and contacts, and so on. It is indeed “interesting” that none of this often more substantial interaction produced a “virgin soil epidemic,” but that one broke out just when it was most convenient—in fact, *necessary*—for the English. Again, God or man?

Eastern Abenaki. Dozens of known coastal villages along Massachusetts Bay were entirely abandoned... [This vastly] improved English chances of establishing a colony successfully in what was now an underpopulated area.<sup>201</sup>

Hence, by the time the "Pilgrims" showed up in 1620, complete with an ample inventory of weapons and a professional soldier, Myles Standish, to oversee their use, there was plenty of "vacant land" for them to select as the site of what was to be England's first durable colony in the north.<sup>202</sup> The Wampanoags, who had been regionally ascendant—and upon whose land the English settled like another plague—were so decimated that the balance of power among the Indians had shifted abruptly to the Narragansetts.<sup>203</sup> They were more or less content, so long as the colonists did not seriously incur upon their territory, a matter which would not become an explosive issue for another half-century.

Under these conditions, there was only minor military scuffling for the next seventeen years as the newcomers consolidated the Plymouth Plantation, as they called it, and imported another thousand constituents.\* The Massachusetts Bay Colony, founded in 1629, added another 4,000 English.<sup>204</sup> The Indians, for their part, were preoccupied not only with trying to define their relationship to the invaders but with sorting things out among themselves, given the radical alteration of their respective demographics only a decade before.<sup>205</sup> A very intricate web of diplomacy developed, as all sides maneuvered for an advantageous position,<sup>206</sup> a situation further complicated when a new smallpox epidemic ripped through the native communities in 1633.

There is some indication that the disease was deliberately induced by the English with the aim of reducing the power of the 30,000-strong Narragansetts, who were as inclined to align themselves with the New Amsterdam Dutch as with either Plymouth or Massachusetts Bay.<sup>207</sup> As it turned out, the main effect of the disease was to kill about 10,000 of the estimated 13,000 Pequots by 1635.<sup>208</sup> The English devoted substantial diplomatic energy to isolating what was left of the victims from any possi-

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\*This is not to say the colonists were militarily inactive. For instance, acting on a tip from Massasoit, the principle Wampanoag leader, that the Massachusetts were planning to attack the colonists, Standish took out an eight-man patrol and methodically murdered seven Massachusetts sachems. The tip turned out to be disinformation. Massasoit had in effect used Standish to weaken the Massachusetts to the advantage of his own people. Standish hardly minded, however, given that his major objective was to keep all the Indians as weak as possible, and divided among themselves; Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation*, *op. cit.*, pp. 108–10, 113–9.

bility of defensive alliance other than with their Western Niantic tributaries. With this accomplished by 1637—in fact, the Narragansetts and Mohegans were enlisted as English allies against the Pequots—the leadership of both Plymouth and Massachusetts collaborated with that of the unofficial colony of Connecticut to fabricate a pretext, and then set out on a war of extermination.\*

Massachusetts mounted a column of ninety men under Captain John Endicott and dispatched it to heavily populated Block Island. The group's orders were to kill every adult male residing there and capture as many women and children as possible since "they would fetch a tidy sum in the West Indies slave markets."<sup>209</sup> The plan failed when Endicott attempted to engage the Pequots, European-style, in open combat. Instead, the Indians used a meeting on the matter as a delaying tactic while they evacuated their noncombatants. In the end, the Pequots, who seem to have wanted to avoid the war which was being forced upon them, simply melted away into the woods, leaving the frustrated English with no way to vent themselves other than by burning homes and fields.<sup>210</sup>

On the mainland, Captain John Mason was much more crafty. Having augmented his own mixed Massachusetts-Connecticut force of ninety men with about eighty Mohegans under Uncas, their principle leader, and nearly 500 Narragansetts led by Miantonomi, he set out to attack a lesser Pequot "fort" on the Mystic River.<sup>211</sup> Taking a circuitous route which allowed them to bypass the truly fortified Pequot River town of Sassacus, named for the principal Pequot leader, and also the defensive cordon the Indians had thrown up to prevent exactly what it was he meant to do, Mason launched

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\*Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.* pp. 85–210. As is pointed out at pp. 220–1, the question of prior intent in this respect has always been deliberately obfuscated by American historians, beginning with the Massachusetts Puritans' William Hubbard in 1677. Hubbard, it seems, "edited" the account of Captain John Mason, commander of the militia force which perpetrated the Mystic Massacre. For example, where Mason's text read, "We had formerly concluded to destroy them by the Sword and save the plunder," Hubbard rewrote things to read, "We had resolved a while not to have burned [the village at Mystic], but being we could not come at them, I resolved to set it on fire." Hubbard also altered Mason's 1638 account to make it appear that, rather than being completely defenseless, Mystic was defended by 150 Pequot warriors. Jennings is citing the 1736 reprint of Mason's *A Brief History of the Pequot War* (Ann Arbor: March of America Facsimile Series No. 23, 1966), pp. 7–8; William Hubbard, *The Present State of New England, Being a Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New England* (London, printed for Theo. Parkhurst, 1677) p. 126. It should be noted that Plymouth Governor William Bradford (*Of Plymouth Plantation*, *op. cit.*, p. 296) confirms Mason's rather than Hubbard's version. This information has been equally accessible all along. Consequently, it is obvious that the orthodox interpretation of Puritan objectives during the Pequot War have been quite intentionally distortive of the facts: a calculated pattern of denial lasting three-and-a-half centuries.

his assault in the predawn of May 26.<sup>\*</sup> His men were instructed to take no prisoners at all, and it is apparent that they counted on the “savages” who accompanied them to join in the slaughter with gusto.<sup>212</sup> When they realized what was afoot, however, both the Narragansetts and Mohegans refused to participate.<sup>†</sup>

Thus left to his own devices, Mason ordered his militiamen to set fire to the entire town, burning alive as many as 900 “women, children and helpless old men.”<sup>213</sup> Those who tried to escape the blaze were cut down with swords and axes.<sup>‡</sup> As Plymouth Governor William Bradford later described the scene, paraphrasing Mason’s own exultant account:

It was a fearful sight to see them thus frying in the fire and the streams of blood quenching the same, and horrible was the stink and scent thereof; but the victory seemed a sweet sacrifice, and they gave the praise thereof to God, who had wrought so wonderfully for them, thus to enclose their enemies in their hands and give them so speedy a victory over so proud and insulting an enemy.<sup>214</sup>

There were five known survivors, all of whom managed to hide themselves among Uncas’ Mohegans, their traditional enemies, who, along with the Narragansetts, were already denouncing the needlessness of the slaughter.<sup>§</sup> Arriving too late—the English and their Indian “allies” had already left—the Pequot fighters were “astonished and demoralized.”<sup>215</sup> About 200 attempted to surrender themselves to the Narragansetts, but most of these were discovered and killed by colonists.<sup>216</sup> Another fifty or so, led by Sassacus, tried to find refuge among the Mohawks, but, at the

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\* Mason’s original orders were to attack Sassacus and destroy the Pequots’ fighting capacity. Once in the field, however, he decided “to avoid a direct attack on Sassacus’s strongly defended main village in order to attack from the rear”; Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 218. In other words, he was very consciously seeking a “soft target” composed of noncombatants. These, Mason recounted smugly, were caught entirely by surprise, “being in a dead, indeed their last, Sleep”; *Brief History*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

† Mason and most subsequent historians have attributed this refusal to “cowardice”; *ibid.*, p. 10. The facts again indicate otherwise. By all appearances, both the Narragansetts and the Mohegans, “primitives” that they were, considered the slaughter of noncombatants dishonorable and declined to have anything to do with it.

‡ “Many were burnt in the fort, both men, women, and children. Others, forced out...our soldiers received and entertained with the point of a sword. Down fell men, women, and children.” Underhill, who seems to have learned his chaplain’s lessons well, justifies this by observing that “sometimes the Scripture declareth women and children must perish with their parents”; Underhill, *Newes from America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–40.

§ “Those that escaped us, fell into the hands of the Indians [Mohegans and Narragansetts] that were in the rear of us...not above five of them escaped out of our hands [to be protected by Uncas and Miantonomi]”; Underhill, *ibid.*, p. 296. On Narragansett and Mohegan denunciations of the massacre, see Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

request of the English, were put to death.<sup>217</sup> For more than a year, the militias of the three participating colonies scoured the woods, killing Pequots whenever and wherever they found them.<sup>218</sup> Before it was over, at least two-thirds—probably more—of all Pequots alive at the beginning of the “war” were dead. Those who survived were mostly absorbed by the Mohegans.<sup>219</sup> The Western Niantics were for all practical purposes totally eradicated.\*

The Pequots were “rooted out” as a tribe. Winthrop put the body count [for Mystic alone] at between eight and nine hundred. In 1832 one observer counted only “about forty souls, in all, or perhaps a few more or less” living in the township of Groton; in the 1960s the official figure was twenty-one Pequots in all of Connecticut. And there would have been no living members of that tribe had the colonizers had their way. They sought, as Mason said, “to cut off the Remembrance of them from the Earth.” After the war, the General Assembly of Connecticut declared the name extinct. No survivors should be called Pequots. The Pequot River became the Thames, and the village known as Pequot became New London.<sup>220</sup>

The message was not lost on the remaining indigenous peoples of the region; “New England” was meant to become exactly that: a vast area utterly depopulated of its native inhabitants, occupied exclusively by the English. Shaken by this realization, and by what he’d witnessed at Mystic, Miantonomi underwent a profound change. No longer devoted to advancing Narragansett interests at the expense of other Indians, he was something of

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\* Since the days of William Hubbard, there have been persistent “scholarly” efforts to make the Pequot War appear as something other than an instance of genocide. Samuel G. Drake, Francis Parkman, John Gorham Palfrey, Alden T. Vaughan, and many others have taken their turns at the task. The most recent version is that of Steven T. Katz, who, noting that since “the number killed was probably less than half the tribe,” goes on to argue that because *some* Pequots survived, *ipso facto* the Puritan campaign to exterminate them “was not, either in intent or execution, genocidal.” Of course, by this “definition,” Katz’s own Jewish people—whom he claims are unique in having experienced genocide—could not have suffered such a fate, since some of *them* survived as well. He goes on to caution that we should refrain from “misapplying” the term genocide with respect to the extermination of the Pequots and Niantics; “The Pequot War Reconsidered,” *New England Quarterly*, No. 64, 1991. As Henry David Thoreau once put it—although he had Francis Parkman in mind—“It frequently happens that the historian, though he professes more humanity than a trapper, mountain man, or gold-digger, who shoots [an Indian] like a wild beast, really exhibits and practices a similar inhumanity to him, wielding a pen instead of a rifle”; quoted in Drinnon, *Facing West*, *op. cit.* p. 363. Samuel Adams Drake, *The History of the Indian Wars in New England* (Roxbury, MA: C.E. Tuttle, 1965); Francis Parkman, *The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War After the Conquest of Canada*, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1874); John Gorham Palfrey, *History of New England*, 5 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1858–1890); Alden T. Vaughan, *The New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620–1675* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965).

a pioneer, becoming one of the first major figures in North American native history to try and weld together a general alliance of indigenous nations to contain—and possibly expel—the invading Europeans.<sup>221</sup>

The colonists' attentions were subsumed for a while by internal bickering—mainly a squabble over who would gain the territorial spoils of eradicating the Pequots—and with the taking of New Netherlands from the Dutch, but they eventually got around to dealing with the “threat” presented by this precursor of Tecumseh.\* Miantonomi, by this point having engineered a compact with the powerful Mohawks to the west, was captured and held in a Connecticut jail for several months.<sup>222</sup> Eventually, he was executed as one by-product of a May 1643 meeting in New Haven at which the New England colonies proclaimed themselves unified against both Dutch and Indians.<sup>223</sup> Thereafter, any attempt by native people to foster a counterbalancing unity among themselves was termed a “conspiracy” and “provocation” to war.<sup>224</sup>

Connecticut was finally chartered as a royal colony in 1662. Rhode Island followed a year later, and, in 1664, the Dutch holding of New Netherlands became the English colony of New York (it was retaken by the Dutch a bit later and had to be “reconquered” in 1674).<sup>225</sup> Working out the relationships presented by these developments—and raiding the French communities of Acadia—again commanded the bulk of English attention for a full decade.<sup>226</sup> By 1675, however, with more than 50,000 colonists in the general area, New England felt itself strong enough to achieve a “final solution” to its “Indian problem.”<sup>227</sup> This took the form of an all-out campaign to obliterate the Narragansetts, Wampanoags, and several smaller peoples such as the Nausets and Nipmucks in what was called “King Philip’s War.”†

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\*There were at the time four competing New England colonies and two more in the making: those of Plymouth Plantation and Massachusetts Bay, the still unofficial Connecticut Colony, and an upstart called New Haven Colony, founded in 1637, more or less specifically to cash in on Pequot land. Uninvolved in the “spoils of war” dispute were the incipient colonies of Rhode Island and New Hampshire. Massachusetts, however, was pressing a claim that Rhode Island was in fact part of itself; Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, pp. 94–6.

†A bit of self-criticism is due. One problem with relying on the sorts of materials I have in this essay is that one’s historical reconstruction ends up being decisively—and inaccurately—male-oriented. An instance in which this is plainly true is at hand. Although the war in New England during 1675–76 is associated with the name of Philip (Metacom), because of his position as titular military leader on the Indian side, the likelihood is that he himself took political instruction from Mangus, the preeminent Narragansett sunksquaw (the perfectly honorable Algonkian title—it was, like the male “sachem,” bestowed only upon those of stature—from which the derogatory Euroamerican corruption, “squaw,”

Again, there is every indication that the indigenous nations involved did all that was within their power to avert armed conflict.<sup>228</sup> And, again, there is evidence that the Indians had reason to believe they'd been deliberately infected with a disease, possibly influenza.<sup>229</sup> Combined with increasing English encroachments into the very hearts of remaining native territories and an insufferable degree of colonial arrogance, these circumstances had already generated a very high level of volatility among the natives by June of 1675, when three prominent Wampanoags were executed at Plymouth on charges of "plotting" against the English.<sup>230</sup> At that point, Metacom ("King Philip"), successor to Massasoit as principal Wampanoag leader, led a "revolt" intended to reassert some aspect of his people's rights and autonomy.<sup>231</sup>

At first, the Indians did quite well. Metacom, having learned the lesson of Mystic, first moved his noncombatants deep into the swampy Pocasset territory, on the Hoosack River, and placed them under the protection of that people's leader, a woman named Weetamoo.<sup>232</sup> Although he had only about 300 fighters at his disposal, the Wampanoag "king" then conducted a hit-and-run guerrilla campaign that thoroughly demoralized the 10,000 men of the combined Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Connecticut militias.<sup>233</sup> Finally, in dire need of a "victory," and afraid to strike at their real adversary's Hoosack stronghold, the militia did what the Jamestown colonists had done at Piscataway, and what the descendants of both groups would do repeatedly thereafter: they conducted a devastating surprise assault on a completely uninvolved native community, invading the "sister colony" of Rhode Island, where the Narragansetts had been granted sanctuary.<sup>234</sup>

The United Colonies, for reasons that still remain suspicious, chose to attack the winter camp of the still-neutral Narragansett [and] raised nearly a thousand troops for [the purpose]. They were recruited from the militias and supplied and paid in the proportions of Massachusetts, 517; Connecticut, 315; and Plymouth, 158. Josiah Winslow, Plymouth's native-born governor, was given command of the expedition... Attacking [on] December 19, 1675, the impetuous English soldiers...burned food and shelter, which they needed, and killed valuable captives, which they wanted... Of the Narragansett, at least 48 warriors were wounded and 97 were killed, as were [up to]

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derives). She was one of those executed after the native defeat; Robert Steven Grumet, "Sunksquaws, Shamans, and Tradeswomen: Middle-Atlantic Coastal Algonkian Women During the 17th and 18th Centuries," in Mona Etienne and Eleanor Burke Leacock, eds., *Women and Colonization: Anthropological Perspectives* (New York: Praeger, 1980).

1,000 women and children. The outraged Narragansett survivors fled to join Philip, wintering with the Mahican (not Mohegan).\*

Thus reinforced—by this point, some Nipmucks had joined them as well—the Wampanoags resumed raiding with even more effectiveness during the spring of 1676, hitting Lancaster, Medfield, Weymouth and Groton, Massachusetts in rapid succession. The Indians still showed no propensity to kill like the English, however, and time was definitely not on their side.<sup>†</sup> Cut off “from the fields which had subsisted them and forced to hunt in unfamiliar territory, the Narragansett and Wampanoag refugee armies and their attending families suffered food shortages” which were grinding them down.<sup>235</sup> It follows that the next great feat of colonial arms came in May, when Captain William Turner of Connecticut—having first ascertained an absence of combatants among them—led 150 of his militia against a large group of Indians gathering food at Peskeompscut on the Connecticut River, about twenty miles north of Hatfield. Attacking at dawn, these brave men managed to slaughter about 300, mostly women, children, and old men.<sup>236</sup>

The colonies finally resorted to a sort of counter guerrilla warfare, fielding small “ranger” units composed of experienced woodsmen. They were motivated to track and kill Indians piecemeal by the placement of a bounty upon any heads they brought in, as well as the promise that they might keep all loot obtained and sell into slavery any prisoners taken.<sup>237</sup> Meanwhile, “Connecticut militia... wantonly slaughtered more people than they captured from two sizable groups of Narragansett who were obviously short of food and gunpowder.”<sup>238</sup> In July, a Plymouth soldier wrote his wife that, since May, his unit had “killed and taken upward of one hundred Indians but never an English slain nor wounded.”<sup>239</sup> The same month, a Connecticut force invaded

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\* Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 102; “Suspensions survive that Plymouth-Massachusetts cooperation already included an agreement that the first would confiscate Wampanoag lands and the second would take those of the Narragansett”; Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.* p. 304. In any event, the troops, “ran amok, killing the wounded men, women, and children indiscriminately, firing the camp, burning the Indians alive or dead in their huts”; Richard Slotkin and James K. Folsom, eds., *So Dreadful a Judgment: Puritan Responses to King Philip’s War, 1676–1677* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1978) p. 381.

† The largest number of fatalities inflicted, about fifty, was at Lancaster, where a woman, Mary Rowlandson was taken captive. She was well treated, especially under the circumstances, and released unharmed a few months later. Her subsequent “journal,” however, became a mainstay of anti-Indian propaganda for the next century and more; *The Sovereignty and Goodness of God Together with the Faithfulness of His Promise Displayed: Being the Narrative of the Captivity and Restoration of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson* (Boston, 1682).

Rhode Island again, just long enough to butcher 126 people, 92 of them women, who had taken refuge there.<sup>240</sup> On August 12, Metacom himself was shot in the back and killed while trying to evade an ambush.<sup>241</sup> The severed head of the slain sachem was then paraded as a trophy through the streets of Plymouth, and what was left of his people began to give up the fight.

For decades, Philip's head was displayed on a pike atop the brick watchtower of Plymouth's Fort Hill. Philip's nine-year-old son escaped execution, but was sold into slavery in Bermuda. Leading Wampanoag warriors who surrendered their entire bands to Benjamin Church, who had promised their lives would be spared, were summarily executed amid public enthusiasm, and their followers sold into slavery. The atmosphere was not unlike that in Marblehead, in neighboring Massachusetts, where a group of women beat and stoned to death two...prisoners being escorted to jail. Of the estimated 3,000 [Indians] killed in the war, at least one-quarter were Wampanoag. All the captured, and many of those who surrendered, were sold into slavery... Wampanoag society was entirely destroyed, and few survivors lived in Plymouth. The aroused citizen armies of New England had once again come to define victory as "extirpation," and this victory seemed their most complete.\*

The Nausets had ceased to exist altogether, and the Nipmucks were in essentially the same condition.<sup>†</sup> As for the Narragansetts, a number of whom had sought sanctuary in "neutral" Rhode Island, they too were enslaved, albeit mostly within the colony itself rather than being shipped off to the Caribbean.<sup>242</sup> The Indians, wrote a triumphant Puritan leader, Increase Mather, had been "consumed...by Sword & by Famine and by Sickness, it being no unusual thing for those that traverse the woods to find dead Indians up and down... Not above an hundred men [are] left of them who last year were the greatest body of Indians in New England."<sup>243</sup> All in all, the sentiments of the "good Christians" of the colonies is perhaps best summed up in a jingle, very popular at the time, which compared those exterminated to vermin: "A swarm of Flies, they may arise/a Nation to annoy/Yea Rats and

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\* Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 107; Other estimates of native casualties run as high as 5–6,000. Enslavement was by no means restricted to "hostiles." Indeed, "early in the war, a group of neutral Wampanoag living near Dartmouth had voluntarily presented themselves to Plymouth authorities for protection, but were promptly sold into slavery [in the West Indies] despite the protests of Benjamin Church, who had negotiated with them." Plainly, the erasure of the Wampanoags was meant to be as complete as that of the Pequots. As for Mr. Church, either he was extraordinarily naïve about his countrymen's intentions (especially the second time around) or he performed an extraordinarily duplicitous function for them.

† About a hundred Nipmucks survived, but only by converting to Calvinism and thereby extinguishing themselves as a people; see "John Easton's Relación" in Charles H. Lincoln, ed., *Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675–1699* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913).

Mice or Swarms of Lice/a Nation may destroy.”\* It was an outlook which would prevail among the invaders for the next two centuries.

*The Most Savage of Practices...*

As Francis Jennings has observed, “So many myths about savage warfare have circulated that the civilized European origin of war against noncombatants needs to be explicitly recognized. The armed conquest in New England [and Virginia]...closely resembled the procedures followed by the English in Ireland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In these lands, the English...held the simple view that the natives were outside the law of moral obligation. On this assumption, they fought by means that would have been dishonorable, even in that day, in war between civilized peoples.”<sup>244</sup>

Four of their usages, transferred from Ireland and Scotland to America, profoundly affected the whole process of European-Indian acculturation: (1) a deliberate policy of inciting competition in order, by division, to maintain control; (2) a disregard for pledges and promises to natives, no matter how solemnly made; (3) the introduction of total exterminatory war against some communities of natives in order to terrorize others; and (4) a highly developed propaganda of falsification to justify all acts and policies of the conquerors whatsoever.<sup>245</sup>

The answer to the oft-posed question as to why, given their preponder-

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\* *Some Meditations*, *op. cit.* Of course, we have no shortage of “responsible” historians to explain that all this was neither genocidal nor even racist. The classic example is that of Columbia University’s Alden T. Vaughan, who not only advances the bald assertion that the colonists’ open exterminism was somehow “remarkably humane, considerate and just” but lays responsibility for their annihilation squarely at the feet of the *victims*; “blatant and persistent [Indian] aggression” was the cause of all conflict in New England, he says, as if the slaughtered peoples had traversed the Atlantic and invaded the British Isles. Moreover, he claims, racism is an inapplicable concept in assessing colonial motivations in waging war since the colonies distinguished between Pequots, Narragansetts, Wampanoags, etc., rather than fighting them all at once (as if they had a choice; to have taken them all on in 1637 would plainly have resulted in the English, not the Pequots and Niantics, being exterminated); see Vaughan’s “Pequots and Puritans: The Causes of the War of 1637,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser. XXI, 1964; and *The New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620–1675* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965). The latter was received with great fanfare and fawning reviews in such publications as *Library Journal* (“a model for historians”), *Christian Science Monitor* (“shows Puritans tried to treat Indians with decency and concern”), *Church History* (“will remain the standard work in its field”), *New York Times Book Review* (“throws new light on the nature of Massachusetts Indian society”), *New England Quarterly* (“we can be grateful”), all in 1965. Richard Drinnon, on the other hand, does a fine job of laying bare the implicit teleological racism in Vaughan’s denial of the racist content of Puritan views of native people—how *else* are we to understand things like William Bradford’s 1637 dictum that the colonists should see “the Pequents, and all other Indeans, as a common enemie”?—and links him solidly to the pattern of systematic historiographic falsification originating with William Hubbard; Drinnon, *Facing West*, *op. cit.*, pp. 356–64. Also see the critiques of Vaughan offered by Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 14, 180, 193–5, 217, 221–2, 267, 273; and Stannard, *American Holocaust*, *op. cit.*, pp. 276–8.

ant military advantage in the early years of Jamestown and Plymouth, the native peoples of each area did not simply annihilate the invaders, is thus rather straightforward: it did not and could not occur to them. Put simply, neither the Tsenacommacahs nor the Pequots, the Narragansetts, the Wampanoags nor any other known preinvasion indigenous people pursued warfare by way of killing their opponents' women, children, and elders.<sup>246</sup> Indeed, the terms of native warfare did not emphasize killing at all.\* By the standards of what we now call—and, for that matter, what was then called—“civilized behavior,” the supposed “savages” were, and in many cases would remain to the end, far more accomplished than their European counterparts.<sup>247</sup>

Reality has, however, been all but entirely inverted over the centuries via the propaganda mechanisms of orthodox historiography and anthropology.<sup>248</sup> A prime signifier is the question of scalping and other forms of bodily mutilation. Invariably ascribed by “responsible scholars” and “objective journalists” to native people as a means of stirring up the requisite popular sentiment for campaigns of extermination, or, *post hoc*, to provide a handy rationalization of what had already occurred, the record of this most “most savage of [the] practices” marking the horrors of Indian-white warfare is actually the reverse.<sup>249</sup>

Although it is likely that at least some Indians practiced scalping in one or another fashion before the European invasion,<sup>†</sup> “there is no doubt that

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\* “[As] to pre-Columbian warfare we know almost nothing, and what little we do know suggests that where wars took place, they were infrequent, short, and mild: in fact ‘war’ . . . seems a misnomer for the kinds of [fighting that took] place, in which some act of bravery or retribution rather than death, say, or territory, would have been the object, and two ‘war parties’ might skirmish without [lethal] effect on either one and none at all on home villages. Early European settlers often made a mockery of Indian warfare. . . . John Underhill wrote of the Pequots that their wars were more for pastime than to conquer and subdue their enemies, and Henry Spelman, who lived among the Powhatans, said that ‘they might fight seven years and not kill seven men’ . . . . Organized violence, in short, was not an attribute of traditional Indian societies, certainly not as compared with their European contemporaries, and on the basis of this imperfect record what is most remarkable about them is their apparent lack of conflict and discord”; Sale, *The Conquest of Paradise*, *op. cit.*, pp. 318–9.

† Amid all the vast proliferation of serious misinformation about American Indians screaming to be corrected, James Axtell, in collaboration the Smithsonian’s still-reigning “Indian expert,” William Sturdevant, determined in the mid-1970s that a top priority for their combined attention should be rebuttal of a “the increasingly popular suggestion in non-Indian literature and the Indian press” that whites might actually have introduced the idea of scalping to Indians. After years of research on this weighty subject—revealing as it is of his own and Sturdevant’s powerful racial/cultural biases more than anything else—Axtell offered his proof that the practice preexisted the invasion in an essay entitled “The Unkindest Cut, or Who Invented Scalping? A Case Study,” first published in the *William and Mary Quarterly* in 1980. He then went on to pen a second essay, “Scalping: The Ethnohistory of a Moral Question,” explaining why he felt the first was so important (in this, Axtell follows directly in the footsteps of his mentor, Smithsonian historian Wilcomb E. Washburn; see, e.g., “A Moral History of Indian-White Relations: Needs and Opportunities for Study,” *Ethnohistory*, No. 4, 1957). Both of Axtell’s essays are included in his *The European and the Indian*, *op. cit.*

[generalized] scalp-taking...was due to the barbarity of White men rather than the barbarity of Red men.”<sup>250</sup> Or, to put it another way, “contrary to Hollywood’s history book, it was the white man who created the tradition of scalping” as we know it today.<sup>251</sup> In truth, the practice probably finds its origins in the same wars of pacification in Scotland and Ireland from whence the English imported the rest of their exterminationist techniques, albeit the entire repertoire mutated into more extreme form when transplanted to North America. Consider the technique employed by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, English commander in Ireland during the late sixteenth century:

The heddes of all those (of what sort soever thei were) which were killed in the dai, would be cutte off their bodies and brought to the place where he incamped at night, and should there bee laied on the ground by eche side of the waie ledyng into his owne tente so that none could come into his tente for any cause but commonly he muste passe through a lane of heddes which he used *ad terrorum*.<sup>252</sup>

Nearly three centuries later, although such methods had been long abandoned in Europe, U.S. General Alfred Sully would be doing very much the same thing in the Dakota Territory, having the skulls of Lakotas mounted on poles to adorn the entry to his headquarters.<sup>253</sup> As was noted in the preceding section, Massachusetts offered a bounty on Indian heads to rangers during King Philip’s War, and the head of Philip himself was displayed at Plymouth for decades.<sup>254</sup> Payment for heads—and possibly a scalp bounty as well—was also offered to the Narragansetts early in the war, an effort to convince them to assist in the slaughter of Wampanoags before the Narragansetts were themselves targeted for extermination.<sup>255</sup> There is no record of the Narragansetts availing themselves much of this opportunity for the obvious reason that the whole concept underlying such atrocities was alien to American Indians.

The English purpose in taking heads was not only to terrorize the populace. It also served to confirm the count of enemy killed, first in Ireland, then in New England. In this, we find the true beginnings of the pervasive scalping and other mutilations which are so much an aspect of “the American way.”\* The bounty placed on heads was soon transfigured into the

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\* Witness the preoccupation with “bodycount” manifested by American officers in Vietnam, a sensibility reflected in their troops’ widespread practice, each time they ventured into “Indian Country,” of cutting off ears to confirm their kills, in some units stringing them to wear as necklaces or otherwise displaying them as trophies; Drinnon, *Facing West*, *op. cit.*, p. 451. More generally, see Donald Duncan, *The New Legions* (New York: Random House, 1967); Michael Herr, *Dispatches* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977).

taking of scalps—other than in the few instances in which authorities were concerned with verifying the death of some particular Indian rather than Indians as a “species”—in order to render the whole increasingly commercialized process less cumbersome.<sup>256</sup>

To be fair, England was hardly alone in facilitating this process, or even necessarily the first to pay for scalps. Willem Kieft, the second governor of New Netherlands offered a reward for the heads of certain Raritans on Staten Island in 1641, and probably introduced the first scalp bounty at the same time.<sup>257</sup> Cornplanter, a Seneca leader, recounted in 1820 his people’s recollection that the “French offered to furnish us with instruments of every kind and sharp knives to take the skin off their enemies’ heads” at about the same time the Dutch adopted the practice.<sup>258</sup> Susette La Flesche, an Omaha leader of the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries, also attributed the first such bounty to the French, noting that it was paid for the scalps of Penobscots in what is now Maine at the beginning of the “Beaver Wars” in 1638.<sup>259</sup> By 1688, such bounties were quite regularized, with the governor of Québec offering ten beaver skins to anyone bringing him the scalp of any “enemy of France, Christian or Indian.”<sup>260</sup>

The earliest confirmed English bounty for scalps rather than whole heads dates from 1694. On September 12 of that year, the Massachusetts General Court passed an act prohibiting unattended Indians from entering the colony without permission and offering to pay for “every Indian, great or small, which they shall kill, or take and bring in prisoner,” the latter to be sold into slavery by the colonial government. Payment listed for native scalps was £50 each, regardless of age or sex, if the killer were an average civilian or professional scalp hunter; £20 each as a supplement to the meager pay of militiamen; and £10 each to regular soldiers.<sup>261</sup> These rates were modified in 1704 so that an incredible £100—*four times* the annual income of a good New England farmer—was paid per man’s scalp, £40 per woman’s, and £20 per child’s. “Men” and “women” were defined as being any Indian over ten years of age.\*

Once the English got rolling, moreover, it was like the breaking of a

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\* Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 142. Once it arrived at the idea of a scale graduated by age and sex, the colonial government proved indecisive as to what constituted a “fair rate” for the body parts of murdered women and children. Although the price on adult male scalps remained fixed at £100 until 1722 (it was revised to ensure that “men” would have to be at least twelve years of age), the price on women’s went as high as £100, and the price on children’s as low as £10; James Axtell, “The Scholastic Philosophy of the Wilderness,” in *The European and the Indian*, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

dam. In 1696, the New York Council, a bit stingy, resolved that, "Six pounds shall be given to each Christian or Indian as a Reward who shall kill a french man or indian Enemy." The proof of death to be submitted for payment was the slain "Enemy's" scalp.<sup>262</sup> By 1717, all the New England colonies had bounties in place,<sup>263</sup> as did New Jersey. \* Massachusetts rescinded its Scalp Act in 1722, on the grounds that it had become "ineffectual," but reinstated it by public demand in 1747.<sup>264</sup> Much the same occurred in Pennsylvania, where at the time of the 1763 reinstatement it was noted that "the general cry and wish is for a Scalp Act...Vast numbers of Young Fellows who would not chuse to enlist as Soldiers, would be prompted by Revenge, Duty, Ambition & Prospect of the Reward, to carry Fire & Sword into the Heart of the Indian Country."<sup>265</sup>

This pointed to a real problem, one which had been evident as early as Massachusetts' offering of bounties to prompt the formation of ranger units in 1637: Indian-killing was seen more as a lucrative enterprise than as a civic duty by the average colonist.<sup>†</sup> Indeed, in many areas it became an outright business.

The Reverend Thomas Smith of Falmouth [now Portland, Maine]...was one of a group of gentlemen who hired a squad of hardy parishioners to go on a "Scout or Cruse for the killing and capturing of the Indian enemy." In return for supplying the bounty hunters with "Ammunition and Provision," the investors received "one full third Part of fourteen fifteenths of the Province Bounty for Captive or Scalp, and of every Thing else they shall or may recover or obtain." In his journal for June 18, 1757, the minister recorded, along with pious thoughts, "I receive 165 pounds, 3-3...my part of scalp money."<sup>266</sup>

Although the bounties were in principle to be paid only for the deaths of "hostile" Indians, freebooters pursuing the trade realized very early on that

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\* Feeling rather insulated by its neighbors from Indian attack, New Jersey defined an Indian "man" as being over fifteen years of age. Not to be outdone in terms of "humanitarianism," Connecticut, also feeling secure, revised its own code to specify sixteen years as the threshold of male adulthood. Pennsylvania, however, revised its own definition downward, from twelve years to ten, in 1750; *Collections of the New Jersey Historical Society*, No. 4, 1852, pp. 305-6; J. Hammond Trumbull and C.J. Hoadly, eds., *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut*, 15 vols. ((Hartford: Connecticut State Historical Society, 1850-90) Vol. 9, p. 229; *Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania*, 10 vols. (Philadelphia & Harrisburg: Pennsylvania State Historical Society, 1851-1852) Vol. 9, pp. 191-2.

† Indeed, several colonies found it difficult to mount a militia at all, absent a scalp bounty payable to members; see, e.g., M. Halsey Thomas, ed., *The Diary of Samuel Sewall*, 2 vols. (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1973) Vol. 2, p. 691. As Axtell points out, "the quickest way to mount...an offensive with woodsmen experienced in guerrilla warfare was the scalp bounty," the "Love of Money" being the only thing that would motivate many colonists to "risque [sic] their lives in the service and defense of the country"; Axtell, "Scalping," *op. cit.*, pp. 225, 228.

there was no practical way for paymasters to distinguish the scalp of a “friendly” from that of a foe. It was usually much easier to kill the former than the latter, a circumstance which resulted in Indians—*any* Indians—being killed on sight.<sup>267</sup>

In 1756 four New Jersey men combined to murder a family of loyal Indians, long-time residents of the area, and to pass their scalps in Philadelphia as having been lifted in Pennsylvania. Armed with “Guns, Cutlasses and an Ax,” they attacked the [home] about midnight on April 12. The husband, George, escaped unharmed, but his wife Kate died when one of the men “cut her head all to pieces” with the axe and another fired a “Brace of Balls” into her stomach. An eleven-year-old girl was “much bruised about the Head, stabbed in the Shoulders and her Right hand almost cut off at the Wrist.” Her twelve-month-old twin siblings were “cut and gashed in [a] frightful Manner.”<sup>268</sup>

So common had such atrocities become by 1723 that in Maine English soldiers had to be assigned to accompany parties of Mohawks—who’d been recruited by the government to help quell raids by Abenakis, Penobscots, and others into the area—as a measure to prevent local scalp hunters and run-of-the-mill colonists from gratuitously killing these allied Indians.<sup>269</sup> In the Ohio/Kentucky region—where scalp bounties never lost their great popularity with the Angloamerican citizenry so long as there were Indians left to kill—it became something of a standing joke that a scalp tendered for payment was as apt to be that of a friendly Chickasaw, Cherokee, or Mingo as it was of a hostile Shawnee.<sup>270</sup>

The situation was made even more complicated by the terms of the so-called “French and Indian Wars,” beginning in 1688. As England and France sought to push one other off the continent, indigenous nations were increasingly solicited to act as “allies”—actually surrogates—in the fighting, and were paid premium bounties by both sides for ever-increasing numbers of enemy scalps, white and Indian alike.<sup>271</sup> For many native peoples whose economies were being increasingly undermined by colonial policies of encroachment, participation was already, or would shortly become, a virtual necessity.

The first change was the transition from a military adventure wholly dominated by the search for personal prestige, tribal honor, and familial revenge to one...subordinated to the commercial constraints and military needs of white foreigners. Once the Indians had been drawn into the English web of trade, the purchasing power to be gained by killing [those] hostile to the economic and political interests of English suppliers could not be rejected lightly. The more dependent on English clothing, food, and guns the

Indians became, the more susceptible their traditional warfare became to commercialization. Indeed, when an Indian leader asked to receive scalp bounties for his military assistance, as did King Hendrick of the Mohawks in 1747 and Teedyuscung of the Delawares ten years later, he effectively certified his dependence on the colonial economy, though not necessarily his political autonomy.<sup>272</sup>

In effect, Europeans were running the show, even when they had Indians doing the killing and scalping for them.\* There was a catch, however: neither the French nor the English could tell one of their own countrymen's scalps from that of an opponent, a matter which allowed the Indians ample opportunity to avenge relatives killed for bounty by alleged "friends." By 1757, Pennsylvania official Conrad Weiser was calling for an end to bounties, at least on whites, since the colony was ending up "paying for our own Scalps, and those of our Fellow Subjects."<sup>273</sup> In July 1759, English General James Wolfe also tried to constrain things in this regard, issuing instructions to his troops which "strictly forbade the inhuman practice of scalping, except when the enemy are Indians, or Canadians dressed like Indians."<sup>274</sup>

The spiral of violence which had been unleashed was too far gone to be reigned in at this point. By 1758, in response to General Edward Braddock's crushing 1756 defeat at the hands of a mixed force of French and Indians, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia and several other colonies all renewed and increased their scalp bounties.<sup>†</sup> The forests along the Ohio frontier were teeming with quasimilitary groups like Brady's Rangers, who killed and scalped at a professionally steady pace; one sometime member, a certifiable psychopath and a local hero of sorts named Lewis Wetzel, is believed to have taken more than four dozen scalps on his own.<sup>275</sup> At least some in the scalp trade had begun to identify themselves proudly by sport-

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\* Axtell concedes that the effect was a "disruption" of native patterns of warfare—to wit, rendering it vastly more lethal—most especially in terms of inducing a "number of adjustments" and "alterations" in scalping practices. In his usual contradictory fashion, he first claims these were "relatively minor," then, four pages later, begins deploying examples to illustrate the "magnitude" of the changes; "Scalping," *op. cit.*, pp. 214–9.

† "We must bid up the Scalps and keep the Woods full of our People hunting [Indians]," said Pennsylvania Councilman John Harris, when voting to pay \$130 per adult male killed; quoted in Leonard L. Larabee, et al., eds., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, Vol. 6 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959) p. 233, n.7. On Braddock, see Charles Hamilton, ed., *Braddock's Defeat* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959).

ing breeches made of tanned Indian skin.\* Even after the final defeat of France in 1763, when most bounties were terminated, scalp hunts continued almost unabated.<sup>276</sup>

A decade later, during the American War of Independence, with Englishman now scalping Englishman, that and other mutilations escalated even beyond the levels witnessed during the worst of the earlier Ohio fighting. They also turned, if anything, more sadistic and macabre, as when Ranger Colonel George Rogers Clark, during his celebrated siege of Vincennes in 1779, ordered his men to slowly scalp sixteen living captives—both Indian and white—in full view of the English garrison.<sup>†</sup> The same year, during the Sullivan Campaign against the Seneca, soldiers of the Continental Army weren't content with merely scalping their foes, living or dead. Not uncommonly, they skinned them from the hips down in order to make leggings from the tanned "hides."<sup>277</sup>

Nor did things improve with the rebel victory in 1787. Instead, the newly formed United States Army seems to have institutionalized orgiastic expressions of violence.<sup>278</sup> Consider the performance of troops under future-President William Henry Harrison after their November 6, 1811, defeat of Tecumseh's native alliance at Tippecanoe. While mutilating the dead, they came upon the body of the great Shawnee leader.

[The] souvenir hunters got to work, and when the warrior had been stripped of his clothing...Kentuckians tore the skin from his back and thigh... The rapacious soldiery

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\*Eckert, *That Dark and Bloody River*, *op. cit.*, p. 359. A more genteel expression of the same sensibility permeated the upper reaches of colonial society as well. For instance, well into the nineteenth century, scalps taken in the area were displayed on a walls of courthouses in Salem and other Massachusetts communities; Axtell, "Scalping," *op. cit.*, p. 231. The American Museum established in 1782 in Philadelphia by Pierre-Eugène du Simitière included the prominent display of a scalp; Young, "Scalp Bounties," *op. cit.*, p. 217. When Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Penn was presented with the scalp of a Lenni Lenâpé leader after his militia's Mystic-style massacre at Kittanning in 1758, he actively entertained the idea of having a plaque inscribed with an account of the action and sending the grisly trophy to the British Museum; Van Doren and Boyd, *Indian Treaties*, *op. cit.*, p. lxxi. English officers like General George Townsend typically took home scalps among the "souvenirs" of service in America with which they later adorned their dens; Hugh Honour, *The New Golden Land: European Images of America from the Discovery to the Present Time* (New York: Pantheon, 1975) p. 128.

†The English commander, Colonel Henry Hamilton, later described the victor, "still reeking with the blood of those unhappy victims," as being "in rapture of his...achievement"; "The Hamilton Papers," *Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections*, No. 9, 1886, pp. 501–2. Clark, whose nephew later added to the family's fame as the Clark of the Lewis and Clark expedition, became a national hero as a result of his exploits at Vincennes. He still is, being officially cited as the inspiration of elite ranger units in today's "Action Army"; Ian Padden, *The Fighting Elite: U.S. Rangers* (New York: Bantam, 1985), pp. 16–25.

so thoroughly scalped the corpse that some of them came away with fragments the size of a cent piece and endowed with a mere tuft of hair. When [one of them] was interviewed in 1886 he was still able to display a piece of Tecumseh's skin.\*

Such behavior was indicative, not exceptional. Witness the performance of troops under another future president after their slaughter of the Muskogee Red Sticks (Baton Rouge) at the Horseshoe Bend of the Tallapoosa River, in Alabama, on March 27, 1814:

Andrew Jackson...supervised the mutilation of 800 or more Creek Indian corpses—the bodies of men, women and children that they had massacred—cutting off their noses to count and preserve a record of the dead, slicing long strips of flesh from their bodies to tan and turn into bridle reins.<sup>279</sup>

A half-century later, in the aftermath of the Third Colorado Volunteer Cavalry Regiment's November 1864 massacre of Cheyenne and Arapaho noncombatants at Sand Creek, the troops—with the active encouragement of their officers—not only scalped the dead, but performed an altogether astonishing array of other mutilations, including the severing of male genitalia to be turned into tobacco pouches.<sup>280</sup> When the "Bloody Third," returned to parade triumphantly down the streets of Denver a short while later, the citizenry turned out to cheer them as they rode by, waving scalps and with other such "trophies"—female genitals stretched over hats and saddle pommels, for example—plainly in view.<sup>†</sup> Treated to this display, a local

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\* John Sugden, *Tecumseh's Last Stand* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985) p. 180. "One [soldier], more dexterous than the rest, proceeded to flay the chief's body; then, cutting the skin in narrow slips, of 10 or 12 inches long, produced, at once, a supply of razor-straps for the more 'ferocious' of this brethren" (emphasis in the original); William James, *A Full and Complete Account of the Military Occurrence of the Late War Between Great Britain and the United States of America*, 2 vols. (London: self-published, 1818) Vol. 1, p. 294.

† This is again by no means anomalous. English colonial troops, and their U.S. descendants, seem habitually to have engaged in such jubilant displays of body parts to signify the completeness of their "victories," and the citizenry seems uniformly to have turned out to applaud such representations of the "valor" of their achievements, e.g.: "[Most] memorable for the colonists was the sight of fresh scalps paraded through the streets of colonial towns such as Albany, Dover, Boston, and New York by strutting English woodsmen... Capt. John Lovewell's 'brave company' entering Boston in 1725 'in triumph' with ten hooped trophies on poles ["Indian-style"], could not have failed to stir the blood and admiration of spectators. Only Lovewell's and a Lieutenant Farwell's wearing of wigs made from enemy Indian scalps, which they did to scriptural disapproval—more of the wigs than of the scalps—of a single eccentric minister, may have won more plaudits for patriotic daring"; Axtell, "Scalping," *op. cit.*, pp. 231–2. This raises another point. Much has been made of late with respect to the fact that much of the extermination of European Jewry was carried out, not by the ideologically elite (and thus anomalous) SS, nor even by regular military units, but by average police personnel, often on a purely voluntary basis; Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992); Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's*

paper, the *Rocky Mountain News*, hailed theirs as being “a brilliant feat of arms” that would “stand in history.”<sup>281</sup>

So it would continue until the official close of the U.S. wars against American Indians at the end of the century. Meanwhile, scalp bounties were enacted in every state and territory as the “frontier” advanced across the continent. In the Dakotas, for instance, it stood at \$200 for any Lakota male over twelve years of age at the time General Sully decorated his headquarters with native skulls.<sup>282</sup> In Texas, the establishment of a bounty was one of the very first acts of the legislature, initially of the republic, then of the state after Texas was admitted to the Union. It was maintained until the 1880s, by which time the area had been all but entirely cleared of native inhabitants.\* In California, even after official bounties were ended, consortia of private businessmen established their own and continued paying until a number of peoples in the northern part of the state—the Yuki, Yahi, Yana, and Tolowa among them—were entirely extinct.<sup>†</sup>

“The Yuki [were] victims of one of the most organized and intense [private] genocidal campaigns in the state,” observes researcher Virginia P. Miller. The most illuminating statement on the number of Yuki murdered comes from Dryden Laycock, one of the settlers in Round Valley. Laycock claimed that beginning in 1856, the first year whites moved into the valley, and continuing through February 1860, parties of Round Valley settlers would...go out “two or three times a week” and kill “on an average, fifty or sixty Indians on a trip.” Taking the lower of Laycock’s figures, even if only two such trips were made each week and only fifty Indians killed on each trip, then the settlers

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*Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). The authors argue that the willing participation of random Germans in the extermination process demonstrates an “annihilatory” racial consensus across the spectrum of German society as a whole, without which the “Final Solution of the Jewish Problem” could not have occurred (in this, they are building on themes elaborated by Gerald Reitlinger in his *The SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922–1945* [New York: Viking, 1957]). If such analysis is compelling—as I think it is—it should be considered that at no point were the nazis secure enough in the pervasiveness of German exterminationist sentiments to conduct triumphal marches through the streets of Hamburg in which the body parts of butchered Jews were openly displayed.

\* “[The] facts of history are plain: Most Texas Indians were exterminated or brought to the brink of oblivion by Spaniards, Mexicans, Texans, and Americans who often had no more regard for the life of an Indian than they had for that of a dog, sometimes less”; W.W. Newcomb, Jr., *The Indians of Texas* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961) p. 334.

† E.g., “A new plan has been adopted by our neighbors opposite this place to chastise the Indians... Some men have been hired to hunt them, who are recompensed by receiving so much for each scalp, or some satisfactory evidence that they have been killed. The money has been made up by subscription”; *Maryville (CA) Weekly Express*, Apr. 16, 1859. Or, “A meeting of citizens was held a day or two ago at Haslerigg’s store, and measures taken to raise a fund to be disbursed in payment of Indian scalps for which a bounty is offered... The initial steps have been taken, and it is safe to assert that the extinction of the tribes... will result”; *Maryville Appeal*, May 12, 1861. See generally, Heizer, *The Destruction of California Indians*, op. cit.

would have killed 5,200 Indians in *one* year. And Laycock claimed that settlers' raids went on for five years.<sup>283</sup>

Plainly, the official minimum count of 8,500 Indians killed in "individual conflicts" between 1790 and 1990 was ridiculously low. The northern California tally alone accounts for more than that, and, for its part, Texas paid well over 8,000 scalp bounties between 1858 and 1878.<sup>284</sup> When one adds in all the rest of the country, the real number must exceed 100,000 during the period of U.S. suzerainty. Nor is there evidence of either state or federal prosecution of anyone plying such murderous "private sector" initiatives against even the most unoffending indigenous population in California (or elsewhere, for that matter). On the contrary, the record is replete with examples of official statements whipping up sentiments which could only have led to precisely this result.<sup>285</sup>

Overwhelmed by the sheer viciousness of the European/Euroamerican drive to extermination, and thus confronted with what Tzvetan Todorov has called "facing the extreme," many—but not all—of North America's indigenous peoples internalized much of their exterminators' bloodlust, engaging in largescale killing, scalping, and mutilating in a bitterly desperate effort to forestall their own looming eradication.<sup>286</sup> The dynamic of death imposed upon them left no viable alternative in most cases. Haudenosaunee scholar Ray Fadden thus had it exactly right, in principle if not in literal detail, when he observed that "scalping, skinning alive and burning at the stake were European barbarian inventions, forced on Indian mercenaries," and, eventually, indigenous patriots as well.<sup>287</sup>

### War Without Mercy

The entire panorama of colonial warfare in North America, not just that of the English, followed the same exterminatory impulse as was evident at Jamestown and Plymouth, albeit according to the different approaches to colonization exhibited by each colonizing power.<sup>288</sup> If there is an exception, it is the Spanish of *la Florida*, who established permanent installations only to block efforts of French Huguenots to do so in 1564.<sup>289</sup> After effectively exterminating them in 1565, Spanish troops under Pedro Menéndez de Avilés constructed the fort of Castillo de San Marcos (San Agustín) and seven other posts along the Timucuan and Guale coastlines—they called the area, which extended northward through what is now Georgia, "Chicora"—but did not undertake military operations against the natives.<sup>290</sup> Rather, the

Spaniards preferred to missionize, gradually wearing them down through disease and de facto slave labor, and ultimately replacing them with African chattel.<sup>291</sup>

Beginning in the very late seventeenth century, the Apalachees were provided with arms and encouraged to raid northward, into what is now South Carolina—the Spanish regime hoped this might discourage encroaching English colonists—but since Florida was swapped to Britain in 1763 for Caribbean concessions, the effect was minimal.<sup>292</sup> When Spain resumed control of its former colony after the British quitclaimed it at the conclusion of the American War of Independence (1787), it was again with little enthusiasm, and it was wrested away permanently by the more aggressive United States in 1812.<sup>293</sup> With respect to Indians, it had served mainly as a place of refuge for the remnants of peoples devastated by U.S. and English campaigns.

In the upper Sonora, of course, things were different. In 1599, the “last conquistador,” Juan de Oñate, pacified the Acoma Pueblo in New Mexico by slaughtering 800 of its residents, capturing another 580, and leveling the town. Oñate then made his captives an example to deter other Pueblo resistance to Spanish rule, placing all between the ages of twelve and twenty-five in slavery and handing everyone under twelve over to Franciscan priests (which, as was discussed above, amounted to the same thing). All Acomas over the age of twenty-five suffered the severing of one foot.<sup>294</sup>

Although their record demonstrates no shortage of such atrocities, usually on a smaller scale, the clearest instance of the Spanish attempting extermination by direct military means north of the Río Grande concerns the various southern Apachean peoples stretching from the Texas Gulf Coast into Arizona and northern Mexico.<sup>295</sup> In 1772, the Marqués de Rubí, Crown Inspector of Presidios, recommended that a state of “continuous offensive war” be declared against the most easterly of these “recalcitrant” groups, the Lipáns, with the goal of extirpating them.<sup>296</sup> A few years later, when Spanish troops had proven themselves inadequate to the task, Interior Minister Toleda de Croix and New Mexico Governor Juan Bautista de Anza, hatched a plan to enlist the Comanches and other native peoples in exchange for horses, weapons, and other manufactured goods, to do the job for them.<sup>297</sup>

This accomplished the objective with respect to the Lipáns—they were virtually wiped out by 1820—but the Spanish had no native takers in their plans to do the same to more westerly Apaches such as the Mescaleros,

Yavapais, and Chiricahuas.<sup>298</sup> This left the Spaniards, and later the Mexicans, to fight a bloody and protracted war of attrition—they initiated scalp bounties on Apaches, and Diné as well, as early as 1790—which they'd still not won by the time the United States seized the northern half of Mexico in 1848.<sup>299</sup> As it turned out, it would take the Americans another thirty years, using a much greater concentration of force, to bring these already badly decimated peoples to heel. By the time it was finished, the Chiricahuas would have joined the Lipáns in near extinction.<sup>300</sup>

### *The French*

More than any other colonizing power in North America, France depended upon the subversion of indigenous societies to act as its surrogates rather than upon great numbers of settlers, troops, and missionaries. At the time of its peak commitment to the New World in the early 1760s, France had fewer than 50,000 of its own people in the colonies—as compared to England's nearly one million.<sup>301</sup> The tremendous human costs of its prolonged effort to assert continental hegemony were thus incurred to a very high degree by its indigenous “allies” and their oft-times native opponents. But, because of the very mode of its manipulations, playing Indians both against one another and against competing European powers, the French have always been able to maintain an air of innocence concerning their genocidal impact and intent.<sup>302</sup>

France's attempt at colonizing the New World began poorly. On his second voyage of reconnaissance up the St. Lawrence in 1536, Jacques Cartier, who had established reasonably cordial relations with both the Micmac (Souriquois) and Laurentian Iroquois during his 1534 expedition, intervened in the internal affairs of the latter in a way he thought would produce a situation favorable to French interests. His approach was to support a leader he thought “friendly,” by kidnapping three others who were less so and taking them to France, where they died. Rather than producing the desired effect, the maneuver served to galvanize the powerful Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) confederation—the Mohawks, Senecas, Onondagas, Cayugas, Oneidas, and a number of tributary peoples, often called the “Five Nations”—against the French for the duration of that empire's stay in North America. When Cartier returned for a third time in 1541 and attempted to establish a permanent colony at Cape Diamond, he was repulsed.<sup>303</sup>

The next effort, headed by Pierre du Gua, Sieur de Monts and Samuel

de Champlain, commenced in 1604. By this time, seasonal trade in beaver pelts had allowed France to develop a relatively solid web of connections to the Micmac, Algonquin, Montagnais, Huron and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Maliseets and Abenaki.<sup>304</sup> After a pair of false starts, Champlain was able, in 1608, to set up a permanent base at Stadacona, an abandoned Iroquois town site he renamed Québec.<sup>305</sup> Within a year, he had firmed up France's relations with the Hurons, Algonquins, and Montagnais by promising them arms and other materiel to preempt the trapping territories of their traditional rivals, the Iroquois.<sup>306</sup> On July 29, 1609, he sealed the new arrangement by accompanying a group of sixty of these Indians armed with guns when they overpowered some 200 Mohawks without such weapons.<sup>307</sup> The performance was repeated the following spring.

Champlain's allies launched their second campaign without waiting for him and his four French companions. Some two hundred Algonquin and Huron warriors discovered a party of about one hundred Mohawks on the lower Richelieu River. The outnumbered Mohawk managed to build a strong, circular barricade, and defended it effectively. When the French finally arrived, delayed by their cumbersome pikesman's armor, they fired into the enclosure, and a passing group of French fur trappers added their arquebuses to the next barrage. After pulling down the barricade with ropes, the allies attacked, killing all but fifteen, who were taken prisoner.<sup>308</sup>

The regional balance of power thus disrupted, the Mohawks withdrew southward for an extended period.<sup>309</sup> During the lull, Champlain busily cultivated new relationships with peoples as far beyond Huronia as the Ottawas, Tionantis (also called "Tobaccos"), and Neutrals of southwestern Ontario. He also began making overtures to the Nipissings. In 1615, he sought to facilitate a further expansion into Haudenosaunee territory by providing advice and firepower to a large group of Hurons who laid siege to a heavily fortified Oneida—or Onondaga, it is unclear which—town. Lacking cannon, and with Champlain unable to convince the Hurons to engage in a European-style assault on their opponents' positions, the attack failed. The Iroquois, however, continued to give ground in order to stay clear of the French musketry which had been placed in the hands of their enemies.<sup>310</sup>

Things might have continued in this vein indefinitely, had it not been for a brief war in Europe between England and France. The major by-product of this in the New World was that a small English force seized Québec in 1629, evicting Champlain and holding the village until 1631.<sup>311</sup>

By the time it was restored to French control—France had to cede rights to more northerly areas to regain Québec, thereby providing a base for what would become the English Hudson's Bay Company—there had been a number of changes. Paramount was the fact that the Mohawks had forced their way into a trade relationship with the Dutch at Fort Orange (Albany), fighting a sharp little war with the Mahicans to do it, and had begun acquiring firearms of their own.<sup>312</sup> This started to swing the regional pendulum of power back towards its 1615 position, but at a far more lethal level of interaction than had previously prevailed.

A few Algonquin and Mohawk were prepared to consider intertribal peace in return for exchanging access to European traders, but the Europeans assumed that [American Indian] allies of their European enemies were automatically their enemies [as well], and helped to make it so. Champlain, returning in 1633 as “commander” of New France with a population of only one hundred, nonetheless called for the destruction of the Mohawk by invasion. Failed negotiations in 1635 inaugurated thirty years of intermittent Mohawk war against the French and their allies.<sup>313</sup>

Here is where a truly unintended incidence of disease played into—but hardly accounts for—the obliteration of a people. In their fervor to bolster the French effort in America, and fueled by Cardinal Richelieu's Catholic revitalization movement at home, Jesuit missionaries came flooding into the colony, establishing missions everywhere among their country's native friends, especially the Hurons.<sup>314</sup> In short order, recurrent waves of epidemics had reduced the Huron from about 30,000 in 1630 to fewer than 10,000 a decade later. In the panic of sudden and inexplicable mass death, the Indians cast about for some means of survival.<sup>315</sup> This, the priests gladly offered in the form of wholesale conversions. By 1640, about half of all surviving Hurons were Christians.<sup>318</sup>

This, actually, was the rub. Traditional Hurons would, at this point, have gladly arrived at some accommodation with the Haudenosaunee. The Christian converts, however, were fired with an unconstrained zeal to prove themselves more French than the French, and, provided with a greater number of muskets than ever, they undertook a fresh round of raids against the Mohawks and Senecas in hopes of fulfilling Champlain's languishing objectives.<sup>317</sup> When they violated a painfully negotiated peace agreement in 1645, the Haudenosaunees' patience finally wore out altogether.

[The] Seneca and Mohawk began recruiting their fellow Iroquois for war... Early in 1648, the Mohawk slaughtered a Huron legation to Onondaga, and a Seneca war party

equipped with firearms destroyed the well-fortified Huron frontier town of Teanaostiaie. Of its two thousand inhabitants, three hundred were killed, and seven hundred were taken captive, predominately women and children [all of whom were, following Iroquois custom, absorbed into the Haudenosaunee].<sup>318</sup>

This was followed, in March 1649, by an attack by more than a thousand Senecas and Mohawks on Taenhatentaron (St. Ignace), one of the three principal towns of the Huron. After sacking it and taking several hundred prisoners, the Iroquois force assaulted nearby Saint Louis, leveling it, too.<sup>319</sup> By then, the Hurons, who had taken to burning their own villages and food stores in the face of the advancing Iroquois—and who were getting virtually no assistance from their French “friends” now that the chips were down—were starving and beginning to break up. Some of them sought permanent refuge among the nearby Eries, Petuns, and Neutrals. Over the next year, a portion drifted far to the west, eventually becoming Wyandots. Others migrated southward to merge with the Susquehannock, and still others went all the way to the Carolinas, where they joined the Catawbias. The bulk were accepted among the Haudenosaunee themselves.\* In any event, “archeologically and anthropologically, the Huron can be regarded as exterminated in 1649.”<sup>320</sup>

The abrupt collapse of Huronia created an unprecedented power vacuum among the indigenous nations of the eastern Great Lakes region. For the next fifteen years, the Haudenosaunee were preoccupied with filling it, assuming control over what had been Huron territory and trade networks.

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\* Trigger, “The Destruction of Huronia,” *op. cit.* That the Iroquois would absorb so many of a vanquished foe—the Senecas accepted about 500, the Mohawks upwards of 700, the Onondagas about 400, the Oneidas and Cayugas approximately 250–300 apiece—as full citizens of their own polity was simply in keeping with their values and traditions. The same could be said for the other indigenous nations which took in Huron remnants. The whole process stands in stark contrast to that of all the European powers in “disposing” of prisoners; for a broader view of the Iroquoian practice, see Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with the New England Colonies* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984). Perhaps ironically, it was their largess in naturalizing the Hurons which sowed the seeds of division among the Haudenosaunee for the first time. Many of the new citizens had been converted to Catholicism and continued their allegiance to both France and the church. Ultimately, the infusion of such views led not only to political confusion within the confederation as a whole but a replication of the factionalism which had beset late Huron society among specific peoples, notably the Mohawks. In 1680 this dynamic would cause a splitting away of Catholic Mohawks from the main body and the establishment of a special mission for them, Caughnawaga, near the French village of Montréal; Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–2. As was evident in the events at that location in 1990, such things have continuing implications three centuries later; Rick Hornung, *One Nation Under the Gun: Inside the Mohawk Civil War* (New York: Pantheon, 1991).

They extended their reach by fighting a series of short, deadly wars with France's smaller native allies to the west: the Tobaccos in 1649, the Neutrals in 1650, and the Eries in 1656.<sup>321</sup> Southward, in the upper Ohio Valley, they also conducted a campaign against a group they called the Atrakwaeronons during 1651–52.<sup>322</sup> In each case, the outcome was that Iroquois opponents ceased to exist as peoples, since the Haudenosaunee adopted the great majority of their surviving members. By an almost perverse logic, the more they fought, the numerically stronger the Haudenosaunee became.\*

Another pair of wars, less severe but nonetheless substantial, were waged against the Mahicans of the upper Hudson Valley and the Sokokis of the upper Connecticut in order to secure open access to the Dutch traders of New Netherlands and, increasingly, those of New England as well.<sup>323</sup> By 1655, the Haudenosaunee had emerged from these "Beaver Wars" as the hegemonic power of their region (which kept growing; they were, by this point, already beginning to extend their influence into the Illinois River Valley).<sup>324</sup> The French, whose plan had been to use the now-extinct Hurons and others to eradicate the Five Nations, were becoming desperate. As one consequence, they sued for peace with the Iroquois in 1667 while casting about for new surrogates to equip.<sup>325</sup> As another, they undertook a crash program of bringing in troops and colonists; the European population of New France, which was barely 3,000 in 1660, nearly quadrupled over the next quarter-century.<sup>326</sup>

A problem for France, however, was that rather than simply concentrating its force along the St. Lawrence, it squandered its limited investment of resources in an apparently limitless appetite for territorial/commercial expansion. By 1685, it was pressing claims which followed the Mississippi all the way to New Orleans, and included most of the present United States north of New Spain.<sup>327</sup> It was also attempting to make inroads on a vast territory extending from Hudson's Bay westward to the Pacific, ceded to England in 1631.<sup>328</sup> In every instance, given its paucity of personnel, France relied on an ever-more-complicated web of diplomatic/military/trade

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\*It is estimated that the Five Nations took in upwards of 600 Atrakwaeronons alone. The Neutrals, who had been about 10,000 strong in 1600, were reduced to fewer than 800 at the end of 1650, and dissolved altogether thereafter (up to 1,500 joined the Haudenosaunee). Most of the surviving Tobaccos, many of whom were Hurons anyway, went west to become Wyandots. The Eries, who were proportionately most Christianized and thus most heavily motivated by French "ideals," probably suffered the greatest number of fatalities. Still, several hundred of them ended up as Iroquois; Axelrod, *Chronicle of the Indian Wars*, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–5, Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, *op. cit.*

alliances with indigenous nations to accomplish its objectives.\* This, in turn, involved it an unending series of brushfire wars on the periphery.

Frustration with this situation led the French to engage in what may be the only two instances in which they directly perpetrated genocide in North America. The first example resulted from a protracted struggle with the Mesquaki, or “Fox,” as they were called, beginning in 1712.<sup>†</sup> Finally, in September 1730, still unable to pacify this small but fiercely independent opponent, French officials determined to exterminate them altogether.<sup>329</sup> Over 1,400 troops were deployed to surround about 1,200 of the 1,600 remaining Mesquakis—about three-quarters of them noncombatants—in Mabichi, a fortified town they’d constructed on the Vermilion River, in Illinois.<sup>330</sup> After an eighteen-day siege, the starving Mesquakis offered to surrender. The French commander, Coulon de Villiers, responded that “no quarter would be given.” In the end, there were only 300 survivors, all of whom were parceled out to France’s native allies.<sup>331</sup>

The second clear example of French genocide occurred at about the same time, far to the south, in what is now the State of Mississippi, as a subpart of the so-called “Chickasaw Wars.”

The Chickasaw Resistance began in 1720, when the Chickasaws [who were at odds with the French-aligned Choctaws and Muskogees] defied French authority by maintaining trade relations with the English and allowing English traders to “invade” territory claimed by France along the Mississippi River. In an attempt to enforce control, the French incited their Choctaw allies to raid Chickasaw settlements. The Chickasaws retaliated with raids of their own, not only against Choctaw villages, but against French shipping on the river, effectively creating a trade blockade. French authorities redou-

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\*The Indians, of course, usually had their own agendas. In 1685, the French attempted to coopt the Ojibway (Anishinabe, also called “Chippewas”) of the western Great Lakes region into the same arrangement as the more northerly Cree. (see note 328) The Ojibway, having perhaps learned something from the Cree experience, demanded more guns and even better trade concessions, which the French provided. The Indians then turned their firepower on their traditional Dakota (“Sioux”) rivals, keeping them away from weapons sources altogether. Meanwhile, the Hudson’s Bay outposts went largely unscathed; M.L. Brown, *Firearms in Colonial America*, *op. cit.* Also see William S. Warren, *History of the Ojibway People* (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1984 reprint of 1885 original).

†The Mesquaki population, centering originally around Green Bay, Wisconsin, is estimated as having been no more than 4,500 in 1700. They were, however, involved in a conflict with the much more extensive Ojibways, whom France was courting as an ally. Moreover, they were positioned to seriously disrupt broader French operations emanating from Fort Michilimackinac, in the strategic strait at Sault Sainte Marie. The French therefore decided to impress the Ojibways—and preclude a Mesquaki alliance with the English, the Haudenosaunee, or both—by crushing this tiny group. The problem was that the Mesquakis, superb guerrilla fighters, had other ideas; Balesi, *The Time of the French*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 9, inclusive.

bled their recruitment of [Choctaws] fixing a bounty on Chickasaw scalps and supplying firearms and ammunition.<sup>332</sup>

Unable to defeat the Chickasaws militarily, France formally acknowledged their sovereignty in a 1724 peace accord necessary to end the blockade. Its emissaries then set out to undermine the cohesion of Chickasaw society, flooding it with missionaries and alcohol in roughly equal proportions.<sup>333</sup> Finally, on November 28, 1729, the Natchez and Yazoos, Chickasaw tributaries from the area near the present-day city of Natchez, had had enough. They attacked Fort Rosalie, a military/missionary post, and put it to the torch.<sup>334</sup> The French response, explicitly intended to make the Natchez an example which would cow the larger body of Chickasaws, was frankly exterminatory. A large force of troops was moved upriver from New Orleans and managed to surprise and butcher about half the Natchez, rather more of the Yazoos.<sup>335</sup> Survivors were mostly taken prisoner and sold into slavery in the Caribbean, a matter which led to the immediate extinction of both peoples.\*

The reaction of regional natives was exactly the opposite of what the French had hoped. Not only did the Chickasaws rise and impose a veritable stranglehold on French trade, but most Choctaws and Muskogeas declined, under the circumstances, to oppose them. The French were forced to import Illinois, Kaskaskias, and other native fighters from far to the north in an ineffectual effort to contain their enraged opponents.<sup>336</sup> In 1736, the Chickasaws defeated the best the French had to offer—a mixed force of 600 regulars and 1,000 Indian mercenaries—in open battle. A second major expedition failed in 1739, and the French gave up. Skirmishing dragged on persistently, a continuous drain on imperial resources, until New France itself was extinguished thirty years later.<sup>337</sup>

### *The Dutch*

Dutch New World colonialism was in some ways more straightforwardly exterminationist than that of the French, though it, too, typically utilized trade incentives and intricate diplomacy in pursuing its goals. It began in 1609,

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\* Steele places the number of those sold into slavery at 500, and says other survivors were incorporated into the Chickasaw and Cherokee; *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 164. Even James Axtell concedes that the French campaigns against the Mesquaki, Natchez, and Yazoo—along with the campaigns of the English against the Powhatans and Pequots, and Amherst's 1763 extirpation of the Ottawas by smallpox—qualify as genocide. He nonetheless contends that, since he himself “knows of only these five instances in which it occurred,” genocide is an “inappropriate” descriptor of colonial processes in North America; AHA Q&A, *op. cit.*

when Henry Hudson, an English navigator commissioned by the Netherlands to seek a northerly water route to Asia, sailed up the river that now bears his name.<sup>338</sup> In the vicinity of present-day Albany, he encountered representatives of the 6,400-member Mahican nation and, finding them receptive to the notion of trading beaver pelts and other furs for manufactured goods, initiated transatlantic commerce. By 1614, traders had constructed Fort Nassau, later replaced by Fort Orange, a short distance away, near the location of the first meeting.<sup>339</sup>

Things went along smoothly enough for a few years, with the steadily better-armed Mahicans becoming something of a regional power by virtue of their position as brokers of the Dutch trade to a number of peoples. The first real crisis arose in 1624, when the Mohawks, under heavy pressure from the French and Hurons, determined that their self-interest required direct access to Dutch weaponry. The Mahicans resisted both this erosion of their trade monopoly and the loss of superiority in firepower it would represent.<sup>340</sup> The Dutch backed them, and the resulting “Mohawk-Mahican War”—somehow the Europeans are always left unmentioned in these things—lasted until 1628. The Mahicans were soundly beaten, and the Dutch lost most of the men it had committed to them. The Mohawks got their trade arrangement and their musketry.<sup>341</sup>

Lesson learned, New Netherlands Governor Wouter Van Twiller determined that, as a hedge against the vagaries of the interior, it would be good if the colony were to have an English-style coastal enclave surrounded by cleared lands and settlers. Hence, the port facility of New Amsterdam was established in 1626, and its perimeter was expanded incrementally thereafter. Dutch military capacity was also steadily increased.<sup>342</sup>

By 1639, when Willem Kieft replaced...Van Twiller as governor of New Netherlands, acquisition of territory became more important to the Dutch than maintaining friendly relations with the Indians. Kieft imposed heavy taxes on the Algonquian tribes of the vicinity of Manhattan and Long Island, claiming that payment of such tribute was necessary to finance the cost of defending them from “hostiles.”<sup>343</sup>

This combination of factors led, in 1641, to some minor responses by the Raritans and other small peoples in the area of Staten Island.\* Kieft

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\*The catalyst came in the form of a group of Dutch settlers who loosed their livestock in Raritan fields as an expedient to prompting the Indians to abandon lands the settlers coveted for themselves. The Raritans retaliated by slaughtering the animals and burning several farmsteads. Then, in early 1642, a wheelright named Claes Rademaker, who seems to have murdered a Raritan for scalp bounty (and to steal a batch of beaver pelts the man was bringing in to trade), was in return killed by the victim's nephew; Trelease, *Indian Affairs in Colonial New York*, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–3.

replied by announcing his intention to “wipe the mouths” of the Indians, placing a bounty on Raritan scalps, enlisting a force of Mohawks in exchange for 400 muskets, and hiring the English mercenary John Underhill to replicate his and his countrymen’s feats against the Pequots four years earlier.<sup>344</sup> The first target was the tiny Wappinger Nation, near the mouth of the Hudson River. Attacked by the Mohawks in early February 1643, the Wappingers fled to Pavonia (present-day Jersey City) and asked for the Dutch protection their tributes had supposedly purchased. Kieft not only refused but asked the Mohawks to attack them in their new location. The result was that more than seventy fighting-age males—virtually the entirety of the Wappingers’ defensive strength—were killed.<sup>345</sup>

During the night of February 25–26, Kieft sent in Dutch soldiers to finish off the refugees, mostly women and children, whom the Mohawks had been reluctant to harm. The night of mayhem in Pavonia would become infamous as the Slaughter of the Innocents. The troops returned to New Amsterdam bearing the severed heads of 80 Indians, which soldiers and citizens used as footballs on the streets of New Amsterdam. Thirty prisoners also taken were tortured to death for the public amusement.<sup>346</sup>

The Mohawks absorbed the few Wappingers who remained alive, and that people thereupon went out of existence. Although eleven local peoples, nominally headed by the Raritans, sought to reply to this genocide militarily, they proved no match for the ferocity exhibited by Underhill’s troops.<sup>347</sup> For the rest of 1643 and much of 1644, the soldiers engaged in a concerted campaign to completely eradicate all eleven of their opponents.

The well-armed but cumbersome colonial winter expeditions ransacked and burned deserted...villages, but seldom saw the inhabitants. One important exception occurred in March 1644 [when] Underhill...led 130 men on a night attack against a major Tankiteke or Siwanoy village. Using tactics borrowed from the Pequot War, Underhill’s musketeers encircled the village, killed an estimated 180 with initial gunfire, then set fire to the buildings and slaughtered those trying to escape. The [Indians] estimated they’d lost five hundred people in this unequal battle.<sup>348</sup>

All told, at least a thousand native people were killed outright, two or three thousand died of collateral causes, and another thousand captives were shipped off as slaves to the West Indies before the decimated peoples of the New Amsterdam region capitulated in late 1644. The terms of the “peace” imposed upon the Indians were virtually total dispossession and reduction to impoverished servitude.<sup>349</sup> From then on, the Raritans and their allies died

off at a very rapid rate; by 1650, they had all joined the Wappingers among the ranks of indigenous nations which had “vanished” under the weight of European conquest and colonization.

In 1655, this extermination was followed by encroachment upon the territory of the much more populous Lenni Lenâpé. In the so-called “Peach War” of that year, Governor Peter Stuyvesant, who had replaced Kieft, called out the militia to lay waste to the Indians’ more northerly fields and villages.<sup>350</sup> Native casualties were relatively light only because the Dutch action provoked a significant response from New Sweden, with which the Lenni Lenâpé were aligned, and embroiled New Netherlands in a conflict with the Susquehannocks, an even more powerful Swedish ally.<sup>351</sup> The resulting “Esopus War,” which lasted until 1663, saw the Dutch fought to a virtual standstill by an indigenous military alliance which outnumbered, and in some instances outgunned, both the colonists and their Mohawk surrogates.<sup>352</sup> Still, the Hackensacks and Wecquaesgeek peoples of present-day New Jersey, and the Esopus, Minisinks, and Pocumtucks in what is now upstate New York were eradicated in the process.<sup>353</sup>

Although the Swedes were knocked out of North America by the fighting, victory afforded no reprieve for the Dutch, who had seriously overreached themselves. The Susequehannocks and Lenni Lenâpé shifted their alignment to England, Holland’s enemy in a costly war being fought in both the Old World and the New.<sup>354</sup> The Mohawks, meanwhile, had been considerably worn down by their effort to simultaneously fight wars with the Susequehannocks and their allies in the south and their French-aligned opponents in the north.<sup>355</sup> By 1664, stripped of both native fodder and the possibility of reinforcement from home, Stuyvesant was reduced to only 150 troops in New Amsterdam; threatened with literal annihilation by English forces, he ceded all of New Netherlands to England.<sup>356</sup>

### *The English*

The most overtly genocidal of the European powers operating in North America was England, a circumstance evinced by that country’s ultimate desire not to convert native populations into commercial subordinates or laborers, but to completely replace them on their own land.<sup>357</sup> Along the way, certain indigenous nations might prove to be lucrative (if transitory) trading partners, vital pawns in the empire’s military conflicts with its European rivals, and/or a useful pool of expendable slave labor, but there was

never really anything very ambiguous about the English goal of creating Indian-free zones of occupation for itself, as rapidly as practicable, in every locality to which it lay claim.<sup>358</sup>

Following hard on the heels of the drives to exterminate first the Pequots, and then the Narragansetts and others in New England, as well as the Tsenacommacahs and Piscataways in Virginia, the colonists of both North and South Carolina set out to eliminate the Tuscaroras, one of the more populous and powerful of the various native peoples within the boundaries of their respective charters.<sup>359</sup> Using the pretext that the Indians had committed "aggression" by repelling a group of would-be Swiss colonists in the vicinity of what is now New Bern, North Carolina, both colonies went to war. From 1711 to 1713, a combined force of colonial volunteers, rangers, and allied Indians (mostly Muskogees, Cherokees, and Catawbas) conducted a series of assaults on Tuscarora villages, perpetrating at least one wholesale massacre after sacking the principle town of Neoheroka in March of 1713.<sup>360</sup>

In this war, an estimated fourteen hundred [of 6,000] Tuscarora were killed and about one thousand enslaved [probably 2,000 more died "collaterally"]. Most of the tribal territory was confiscated, and survivors "scattered as the wind scatters smoke." Between fifteen hundred and two thousand Tuscarora survivors fled north to join the Five Nations, transforming them into the Six Nations.<sup>361</sup>

Four years later, the Yamasee War erupted in South Carolina. This was in many ways ironic, insofar as the Indians in question, a substantial Chatahoochee River people, had been staunch allies of the English in combatting raids by the Apalachees and other peoples of Spanish Florida. The problem from the native point of view was both the intensifying pressure exerted by South Carolina upon the Yamasees' shrinking territory and the increasing appetite of the Carolinian native slave trade.\* On April 15, 1715, the Yamasees seized every English trader within their territory and launched a coordinated series of attacks on encroaching farms and settlements. In short

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\* The colonists were especially interested in impressing Yamasee women and children, an expedient to preventing reproduction. Actually, the problem was endemic. Rather than immediately completing their exterminations of a number of peoples, the Virginians, for example, facilitated the temporary amalgamation of their fragments into new groups like the "Westos," whose sole basis of survival was to conduct slave raids against still-viable neighboring peoples like the Yamasee. Once their utility had passed, of course, the Westos were extinguished altogether; Sanford Winston, "Indian Slavery in the Carolina Region," *Journal of Negro History*, No. 19, 1934; Carol I. Mason, "A Reconsideration of Westo-Yuchi Identification," *American Anthropologist*, No. 65, 1963.

order, they were joined by the Guales, Catawbas, what was left of the old Cofitachiqui chiefdom, a portion of the Muskogeans, and strong elements of the Cherokees and Shawnees, all of whom had suffered at the hands of England.<sup>362</sup>

After a brief campaign in which the Indians advanced to within a dozen miles of the South Carolina capital at Charlestown, the bulk of the alliance determined that their point had been made and withdrew from the conflict. A paid force of about 1,500 troops provided by colonies as far north as Virginia then set out to exterminate the Yamasees and the Guales.<sup>363</sup> By 1717, “harried to tribal extinction,” the survivors had fled to the very southern reaches of what is now the State of Georgia, finding refuge among the Apalachees.<sup>364</sup> After England took the area from Spain in 1733,<sup>365</sup> the remnants of all three indigenous peoples moved even further south and began to combine themselves in what they called the “Seminole” Nation, strengthening themselves over the next century by admitting the last residue of Cofitachiquis and Timucuans, a portion of the Lower Creeks, and numerous escaped African slaves.\*

A number of less decisive campaigns were fought by the English during the late seventeenth and most of the eighteenth centuries, always for the purpose of usurping indigenous lands and sovereignty while eroding the physical capacity of native opponents to sustain themselves as peoples. In New England, for example, a war of attrition was fought against the Abenaki of present-day Vermont from 1688–1699, and was abandoned only when other English interests compelled its cessation.<sup>366</sup> It was resumed from 1723–1727 in what was called “Drummer’s War” (also known as “Grey Lock’s War”).† During the course of the fighting, the native peoples of Maine—notably the Penobscots, Kennebecs, and Passamaquoddies, all

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\*The Yamasees, Guales, Apalachees, Cofitachiquis, and Timucuans were thereafter categorized as extinct by European/Euroamerican ethnographers, a matter which was/is culturally if not literally true. In the late 1980s, a tiny group of Yamasee descendants was finally recognized by the U.S. government as still existing in a genetic sense, a matter which does nothing to mitigate the fact of the genocide perpetrated against them. See Peter H. Wood, “The Changing Population of the Colonial South: An Overview by Race and Region, 1685–1790,” in Wood, Waselkov and Hatley, *Powhatan’s Mantle*, *op. cit.*

†By this point, the Eastern Abenaki had been “attritted” into a sort of accommodation with the English. The Western Abenaki, however, continued to comport themselves as a completely independent nation. This was contrary to colonial contentions that they were a subject people. The war was fought with the idea of decimating them to the point of utter subjugation and eventual dissolution; Colin G. Calloway, *The Western Abenaki of Vermont, 1600–1800* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) pp. 113–31.

friendly with Abenaki—were also heavily impacted.\* The same principle pertained all along the frontier, from Canada to Florida.

### *The Anglo-French Wars*

Several outbreaks of English exterminationism occurred during, or as direct by-products of, the so-called “French and Indian Wars.” There were four of these, beginning with King William’s War (known as the “War of the League of Augsburg” or “Seven Years’ War” in Europe) from 1689 to 1697. This was followed by Queen Anne’s War (the “War of the Spanish Succession”) from 1702 to 1713, and King George’s War (the “War of the Austrian Succession”) from 1744–1748. Finally, there was the “Seven Years’ War,” which actually lasted fourteen years running from 1749 to 1763, and is usually referred to in North America as the “French and Indian War.” All were subparts of much larger conflicts, at least one of them global in scope, centering in the power relations of Europe.<sup>367</sup>

Although the configurations of alignment shifted almost continuously during the course of the fighting, the general pattern was that England relied mainly on the relatively high density of its colonizing population, along with the introduction of regiments, to pursue its interests.<sup>368</sup> During all four wars, while the Cherokees, Chickasaws, and others sometimes filled the same role, only the Mohawks sided consistently with the English (after King William’s War, the other five nations of the Haudenosaunee attempted, with varying degrees of success, to remain neutral).† The transparently exterminationist nature of England’s imperial pretensions in America served to alienate other

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\*In the fall of 1699, for example, as part of their campaign against the Eastern Abenaki, a Massachusetts militia unit swept through Penobscot and Kennebec territory, burning villages, fields, and food stores as they went. Although few Indians were killed outright by the expedition, a number died during the ensuing winter—as was planned by colonial officials—of resultant starvation, exposure, and disease. The Indians of Maine were also subject to the same exterminatory scalp bounties as the Abenakis during this entire period; Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, pp. 146–7; Kenneth M. Morrison, “The Bias of Colonial Law: English Paranoia and the Abenaki Arena of King Philip’s War,” *New England Quarterly*, No. 53, 1980.

† This was not simply the result of Mohawk Francophobia. From early on, the English began to explore the possibilities of formal diplomatic relations with the Haudenosaunee, the Mohawks in particular. By 1750, they had a permanent diplomatic mission, headed by Sir William Johnson (who broke with English practice by marrying an Indian). England’s success in the venture points to the possibilities of what might have happened had they pursued such a strategy more broadly; Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in America* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988); James Thomas Flexner, *Lord of the Mohawks: A Biography of Sir William Johnson* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).

indigenous allies, temporary or potential, almost faster than they could be attracted.\*

France, for its part, was able to employ its status as the lesser of evils to considerable advantage, consistently using a preponderance of native surrogates—each of them motivated not by fealty to the French Crown, but by the clear self-interest of eliminating or at least containing the genocidally inclined English—to prosecute its side of the struggle.<sup>369</sup> In the south, France could count on the Choctaws as well as a sizable segment of the Muskogees, and, in the Mississippi Valley, it enjoyed solid relations with the Illinois, Kaskaskias, and others.<sup>370</sup>

The Delawares and other eastern tribes, having good reason to fear dispossession from their lands at the hands of the English, were fairly reliable French allies... The Delawares were generally supported in the West by the Shawnees. In the Northeast, the Abenakis proved to be extremely reliable allies... Also reliable were the Ojibways, Ottawas, and Potawatomes, Ohio country [nations] known collectively among themselves as the Three Council Fires.<sup>371</sup>

King William's War yielded no decisive results in terms of intercolonial relations. For Indians, however, it was another matter. In 1693, for example, the Haudenosaunee were badly mauled by one of the few largescale French expeditions of the war.<sup>372</sup> Further east, the New England militias managed to batter at least three of the smaller peoples—the Pennacooks, Ossipees, and Pigwackets—to the brink of extinction.<sup>373</sup> By the time the Treaty of Ryswick ended the European conflict in September 1697, the battle lines in North America had been drawn more firmly than ever before. Fighting continued sporadically along the New England frontier until Queen Anne's War commenced exactly five years later.<sup>374</sup>

In this equally inconclusive contest, which involved Spain as well as France and England, the primary victims were the Apalachees, whom the Spaniards sought to deploy in the French manner. In response, former South Carolina governor James Moore mustered a sizable militia force, augmented it with Chickasaws and Yamasees, and marched through Apalachee territory in July 1704. All told, the marauders "killed or captured the inhabitants of

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\*The English blunder in this respect closely prefigures that of the Germans two centuries later, during the invasion of the Soviet Union. In the latter instance, the initial enthusiasm of the Ukrainians and others to fight as German allies was squandered on the shoals of the Germans' unabashed racial arrogance and openly displayed intent to clear the Slavs from their land by all available means; Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1957).

seven villages and destroyed 13 or 14 Spanish missions in the country, virtually annihilating the Apalachee."<sup>375</sup> To the north, protracted fighting seriously eroded the strength of the Eastern Abenaki and several smaller peoples before the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht brought "peace" in North America.<sup>376</sup>

The interlude between wars was marked by the earlier-mentioned English campaigns of extermination against the Tuscaroras and Yamasees, as well as Drummer's War and the French campaigns to eradicate the Mesquakies and Natchez. It was also during the latter part of this period that the English "pioneers" like Daniel Boone began to make their first serious penetrations into the French-claimed territories of the Shawnees, Mingos, Miamis, and others west of the Appalachians, in what would become Kentucky, West Virginia and Ohio.<sup>377</sup> King George's War brought the era to a close in 1744, sputtering along without much coherence until it flickered out four years later.<sup>378</sup> Basically, it comprised little more than the preliminaries to the real death-struggle, which took place mostly along the heavily contested Ohio River. By 1749, George II was prepared to follow up on this multilayered pattern of aggression by issuing a royal patent to the Ohio Company of Virginia in exchange for its pledge to finance construction of military installations.<sup>379</sup>

For almost a decade, the English suffered badly from almost continuous raiding and a series of defeats at the hands of France's array of indigenous allies.<sup>380</sup> First, an entire army commanded by General Edward Braddock was destroyed in the Battle of the Wilderness by a combined force of Shawnees, Lenni Lenâpés, and Mingos in July 1755.<sup>381</sup> Then, in September of the same year, a second army, commanded by Sir William Johnson and containing a sizable component of Mohawks, was routed.<sup>382</sup> This was followed by the fall of Fort Bull, the furthest outpost along the Ohio, and, in August 1757, a mixed group of French and Indians captured Fort William Henry, at the lower end of Lake George.<sup>383</sup>

Beginning in 1757, the English tried a different tack. William Pitt, the new colonial administrator, offered promissaries to a number of indigenous peoples in exchange for their withdrawal from the conflict, or, in some cases, their active realignment with England.<sup>384</sup> Worn down by sustained combat, several key French allies—notably, the Three Council Fires—accepted the former proposition, while the Lenni Lenâpé switched sides altogether.<sup>385</sup> The Cherokees and Catawbias, who had been neutral, were also coaxed into committing fighting forces to England for the first time.<sup>386</sup> Meanwhile, Pitt landed an army of 2,000 regular troops in Nova Scotia to carry the war into

Canada while a ranger unit led by Colónel Robert Rogers managed to surprise and virtually annihilate the principal Abenaki village at St. François Mission in October 1759.\*

By 1760, the English had taken the French bastions at Niagara, Québec, Detroit, and Michilimackinac.<sup>387</sup> The following year, a fraudulent treaty was concluded which neutralized the Micmacs, the last major indigenous ally of the French in the northeast, and New France began to disintegrate rapidly.<sup>388</sup> Although the fighting continued fitfully for another year, the end was plainly in sight. With the Treaty of Paris, signed on February 10, 1763, France capitulated, transferring its vast Louisiana Territory, west of the Mississippi River, to Spain. The rights to all remaining French holdings in North American were ceded to England.<sup>†</sup>

This was not the end of the war against the native populations, however. As early as 1759, the English, feeling confident as the French began to crumble, had turned on their Cherokee allies in the south, seeking to drive them from the more easterly portions of their territory. For three consecutive summers, large forces of English regulars and colonial militia ravaged the Cherokees' well-established towns, burning them along with adjoining fields, and clear-cutting the Indians substantial orchards.<sup>389</sup> While native casualties from direct killing were relatively light—not more than 500 in total—the campaign aimed at destroying the basis of the Cherokee economy resulted in about 2,000 collateral fatalities (about a quarter of all Cherokees in the impacted region).<sup>390</sup> The “peace” which was finally declared in December 1761 involved a forced Cherokee cession of huge strip of land along the western frontiers of the Carolinas.<sup>391</sup>

The motives underlying England's pursuit of the “Cherokee War” were also evident in the Ohio River country.<sup>392</sup> Following the advice of a Lenni Lenâpé known as the “Delaware Prophet,”<sup>393</sup> the Ottawa leader Pontiac

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\*What was left of the Abenakis were virtually destroyed as a people, and were declared extinct by the English. The United States still declines to recognize the existence of survivor descendants in Vermont; Calloway, *The Western Abenaki of Vermont*, *op. cit.*, pp. 175–81. Also see Gordon M. Day, “Rogers' Raid in the Indian Tradition,” *Historical New Hampshire*, No. 17, 1962; John R. Cuneo, *Robert Rogers of the Rangers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

†It should be noted that such transfers did not convey title to the territories at issue, *per se*. Rather, what was passed along was the “discovering” power's monopolistic right to acquire land from indigenous owners, free of interference from other European competitors. The international legal construction of “Discovery Doctrine” was thus, more than anything else, a restraint-of-trade mechanism imposed upon native peoples by European colonizers; Williams, *The American Indian in Western Legal Thought*, *op. cit.*

assembled a strong force of these two peoples, as well as Potawatomes, Wyandots, and Ojibways, in a determined effort to drive the encroaching colonists out of their mutual territories in 1763.<sup>394</sup> Only the resort to bacteriological extermination by the English commander, Lord Jeffrey Amherst, prevented their success. Their decimation by smallpox effectively eliminated the Ottawas, Potawatomes, Wyandots, and Lenni Lenâpés as significant military factors in the events which would shortly follow, placing each of them well along the road to virtual extinction.<sup>395</sup>

### *The War for Independence*

Although Pontiac did not consent to a formal peace until July 1766 — he was then assassinated — George III had already undertaken to assuage native grievances in order to relieve the British Empire from the crushing expense of further Indian fighting.\* On October 7, 1763, he signed a proclamation repudiating English claims to direct ownership over lands west of the Allegheny and Appalachian mountain chains.<sup>396</sup> In exchange, Crown emissary John Bradstreet was able to negotiate treaties with a number of indigenous nations in which they pledged loyalty to Britain and renounced ties to any other European power.<sup>397</sup>

The colonists, many of whom had considerable speculative interests in the legally proscribed area,<sup>398</sup> reacted with barely restrained hostility, a sentiment compounded by the imposition of substantial tax levies meant to retire debts incurred during England's defeat of France. While these dynamics would eventually spark open revolt against the Crown itself, the initial response was a marked escalation of violence against Indians, especially those who were weakest, most proximate, and friendliest to whites.<sup>399</sup>

In December 1763, for example, a mob of Scotch-Irish immigrants called the "Paxton Boys" vented their rage over the proclamation by slaughtering all remaining members of the tiny and thoroughly Christianized Conestoga people in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.† At about the same time, their neighbors in the Delaware Valley began killing a breakaway group

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\* Pontiac entered into an armistice with the English at Detroit on October 3, 1763. His actual agreement to a treaty of peace and friendship, engineered by Sir William Johnson, did not occur until July 24, 1766. He was murdered in March 1769 at Cahokia, Illinois, by a Kaskaskia named Black Dog. Evidence suggests the assassin was hired by the English; Axelrod, *Chronicle of the Indian Wars*, *op. cit.*, pp. 99–101.

† The Conestogas were a dwindling fragment of the once-powerful Susequehannocks. For a reasonably factual—but altogether apologist—account, see Alden T. Vaughan, "Frontier Banditti and the Indians: The Paxton Boys' Legacy, 1763–1775," *Pennsylvania History*, No. 51, 1984.

of Lenni Lenâpés who had converted to the Moravian faith. So extreme was the violence directed against these “Moravian Indians,” that the government of Pennsylvania removed them for their own protection to Province Island, in Philadelphia. There, more than fifty of them quickly died of disease, so they were allowed to return to their original settlement, only to find their homes had been burned in their absence.<sup>400</sup> The killing then resumed, and continued sporadically until the survivors were finally exterminated altogether by a militia company commanded by Colonel David Williamson on March 8, 1782.\*

By 1773, things were coming to a head. Lord Dunmore, governor of Virginia, defied the Crown by announcing he would begin issuing land patents on both sides of the Ohio River, in areas to which his colony had long laid claim.<sup>401</sup> He then took to the field at the head of 3,000 troops, intent upon clearing the Shawnees from their homeland by “extirpating them, root and branch.” When the Shawnee leader Cornstalk attempted to avert war through negotiations, Dunmore used the opportunity to try and murder him. Cornstalk then led a force of his own people, as well as smaller contingents of Mingos, Wyandots, and Lenni Lenâpés, in defeating the Virginians on October 10.<sup>402</sup> A truce was effected two weeks later, but the colonists’ exterminationist intentions had once again been made abundantly clear.<sup>403</sup>

“Lord Dunmore’s War” served as a warmup for the heavier fighting which occurred three years later, during the American War of Independence. At first, the British were fairly successful in replicating the French strategy of mobilizing indigenous nations along the frontier to join it in fighting the rebellious colonists.<sup>404</sup> The latter, after all, had not only continued swarming into Indian territory after 1763, but were obviously fighting the Crown in large part to enable themselves to take even more. For the Indians, it was as always a choice of the lesser evil, and they availed themselves of the opportunity to try and rid themselves of the more imminent threat to their survival.<sup>405</sup>

In short order, five of the six Haudenosaunee nations and allied Munsees were raiding illegal settlements along the Mohawk River in New York, and in the Wyoming and Cherry Valleys of Pennsylvania.<sup>406</sup> The Shawnees, together with the Mingos, Ojibways, and what was left of the

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\*The Pennsylvania government officially repudiated the massacre, but failed to prosecute Williamson or anyone else. Indeed, the colonel was again commanding troops on behalf of the colony within a month; Eckert, *That Dark and Bloody River*, *op. cit.*, pp. 314–22.

Lenni Lenâpés, Ottawas, Wyandots, Potawatomes, Miamis, and Tawas were pushing hard throughout the Ohio/Kentucky region.<sup>407</sup> To the south, the Cherokees, Muskogeas, and Chickasaws performed much the same function against Georgia and the Carolinas.<sup>408</sup> In addition to inflicting severe damage in outlying areas, thus tying up thousands of militia troops which might otherwise have been deployed against the British, the Indians were decisive in winning two major battles—Oriskany (New York, 1777) and Sandusky (Ohio, 1782)—against rebel armies.<sup>409</sup>

The response of the colonies was extraordinarily brutal, even by Euroamerican standards. In the south, three columns totaling more than 6,000 men were sent against the Cherokees in 1776, leveling more than two dozen towns, destroying crops, inflicting serious casualties on noncombatants, and sweeping much of the population into Florida.<sup>410</sup> Only the cession of about a third of what remained of Cherokee territory and agreement to the rebel occupation of the Cherokee capitol of Echota brought the annihilatory campaign to a halt.<sup>411</sup> A similar offensive was conducted against the Muskogeas and Chickamaugas in 1780, resulting in comparable damage to the former and almost total extermination of the Chickamaugas.<sup>412</sup>

In 1779, rebel commander George Washington ordered 4,000 troops under Major General John Sullivan, assisted by future New York governor James Clinton, to undertake an invasion into the heart of Haudenosaunee territory. Simultaneously, a force of 600 under Colonel Daniel Brodhead was sent against the Mingos, Munsees, and more southerly Seneca towns. Washington's orders were that not only was the Indians' military capacity to be utterly obliterated, but the very basis of their socioeconomic existence.<sup>413</sup> By the time Brodhead was finished with the Munsees, they were virtually extinct.<sup>414</sup> Sullivan also complied enthusiastically with his instructions, implementing what has been called "the most ruthless application of scorched earth policy in American history."<sup>415</sup>

By October 15, Sullivan considered his work completed and wrote home to John Jay, then President of Congress, that he had destroyed forty towns, 160,000 bushels of corn, and an unknown but vast quantity of vegetables. In all the country of the Six Nations, he reported, one town remained standing. The only part of his assignment he had failed to carry out was the collection of prisoners as hostages. There were [some] he might have taken, but their mutilated bodies lay in the dead villages.<sup>416</sup>

In Ohio, things were more difficult for the exterminators. Although regular troops under Colonel John Bowman were able to burn the Shawnee cap-

ital of Chillicothe in 1779, and George Rogers Clark managed the same feat a year later at Piqua, another principal town, the Indians simply rebuilt their communities and, if anything, escalated their own offensive against rebel settlements.<sup>417</sup> Still, the continuous fighting wore the Shawnees and their allies down to the point that, when Britain signed the preliminary articles of peace in November 1782, Clark was in the process of successfully conducting a Sullivan-style campaign against them.<sup>418</sup> Ultimately, it would take the freshly minted United States another generation to finish the Shawnees off altogether.

### Nits Make Lice

At the point of its inception, the United States institutionalized the illegitimacy and duplicity which had always marked its leaders' attitudes towards native people. In late 1782, future president George Washington, who "had been feathering his own personal nest with Indian lands ever since his family first became involved with the Ohio Land Company in 1748"—and who had reputedly become the wealthiest man in America in the process—submitted a plan to Congress which he felt might solve certain immediate problems and also serve as a basis for federal policy over the longer term.<sup>419</sup> In many ways, it replicated the prerevolutionary dynamics evident since the Proclamation of 1763: "[Washington's] plan...was in reality no less than a monumental conspiracy, by which the western lands belonging to the Indians could now most easily...and least expensively be wrested from them."<sup>420</sup>

Since the expense of a major war could not be shouldered by the young and still newly shaping United States government, he recommended that all efforts be made to implant as many new settlers as possible on Indian lands. In order to do this, his plan went on, grants of land should be made to veterans of the Revolutionary War from such parcels in Indian territory as the Virginia Military Lands and the Western Reserve Lands... [He] went on to make mention of the fact that these settlers, being largely veterans of the war and experienced soldiers, might tend to awe the Indians. Even if they did not, his plan continued, and the Indians rose up in arms, these settlers would make excellent militia to protect United States claims in the Ohio country.\*

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\*Eckert, *That Dark and Bloody River*, *op. cit.*, p. 440. Like Dunmore before him, Washington was in some ways building a principle out of an accomplished fact. Unable to pay their troops during the war, the colonies—Virginia, in particular—had taken to issuing warrants for land in Indian territory, redeemable only if victory were achieved; *Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty-and-Warrant Application Files* (Washington, D.C.: National Archives). Once Britain had agreed to U.S. independence, first Virginia, then Connecticut and other states conveyed title to their claims to areas beyond the 1763 Proclamation line (void under Crown law) to the Continental Congress. They then requested—and received—federal grants of the same land. This shell game supposedly vested Virginia with legitimate title to 4,000,200 acres of unceded Indian territory (the "Military Lands"), Connecticut with title to

In order to cut the costs, both human and financial, which might otherwise attend this wholesale takeover of what was unquestionably native territory, Washington borrowed liberally from another English tradition which had been evolving since Jamestown, advising that a series of treaties be negotiated with indigenous nations. The purpose of these was to convince the Indians, people by people, to cede strategic localities to the United States in exchange for solemn guarantees of their remaining landbases.\* Thus outpositioned as well as outnumbered and outgunned, they could be eliminated one after another, either by “voluntary” relocation to areas beyond the claimed boundaries of the United States or through liquidation by force.<sup>421</sup>

Apart from the fact that it was immoral, unethical and actually criminal, this plan placed before Congress by George Washington was so logical and well laid out that it was immediately accepted practically without opposition and immediately put into action. There might be—certainly *would* be—further strife with the Indians, new battles and new wars, but the end result was, with the adoption of Washington’s plan, inevitable: Without even realizing it had occurred, the fate of all the Indians in the country was sealed. They had lost virtually everything.<sup>422</sup>

Such a characterization of Washington’s stance is neither moralistic nor rhetorical. Rather, given that Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution establishes treaties, “once ratified,” as the “Supreme Law of the Land,” to describe their deliberate and systematic violation as “criminal” is to be precise within the

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3,500,000 acres (the “Western Reserve”), and so on. Of course, the entire legal house of cards depended upon the contention made by Washington, John Adams, and others that Great Britain had actually owned the land in question at the time it ceded its non-Canadian territorial rights in North America to the United States. The problem was that Britain never pretended to such ownership (as opposed to the Discovery Right of acquiring it at such point as the native owners decided to sell), a matter of which U.S. officials were well aware. Hence, the entire edifice of U.S. “Indian Law” was from the outset what it is today: an elaborate subterfuge designed to cast an appearance of formal legality to a process of naked and sustained aggression from which even a modicum of adherence to genuine legal principle is conspicuously absent; Reginald Horsman, *Expansion and American Policy, 1783–1812* (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967).

\*“In such negotiations, the plan continued, treaty commissioners could promise [Indians] that the United States government ‘will endeavor to restrain our people from hunting or settling’ on their reserved territories”; Eckert, *That Dark and Bloody River*, *op. cit.*, p. 440. In other words, since he had just advocated that the government should in reality facilitate the exact opposite, the “Father of His Country” was proposing that U.S. diplomacy with Indians be anchored in deceit—indeed, in boldfaced lies—even before it began. The idea, plainly, was to gain whatever advantage could be gained at the bargaining table, promising whatever was necessary, in full knowledge that such promises would not be kept. In order for this to work out, it was necessary that “commissioners who handled treaties...always deal with tribes on an individual basis and reject any attempt on their part to deal with the government as a unified body.” That such a posture serves as a direct precursor to Hitlerian diplomacy, à la Munich, is, or should be, self-evident.

parameters of American legal vernacular.<sup>423</sup> The situation was compounded at the statutory level when, in 1787, Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance, legally binding itself to conduct its relations with Indians on the basis of “utmost good faith” even, as it was engaging—and has continued to engage through the present moment—in an exactly contrary course of action.<sup>424</sup>

The legal posture of U.S. Indian policy during the country’s formative years was so at odds with itself that it took Chief Supreme Court Justice John Marshall—one of America’s brightest legal minds (and recipient of 10,000 acres of Indian land for services rendered during the revolution)—until 1832 to finish contriving the pretense of a reconciling doctrine.<sup>425</sup> Problematically, even this concoction was rejected in practice by the federal executive as being overly restrictive upon the implementation of Indian policy.<sup>426</sup> Hence, the United States has remained, by the standards of its own domestic laws concerning the rights of indigenous peoples, as well as the relevant international legal canons, an outlaw state in the truest sense of the term.\*

### *Clearing and Extirpation*

In his 1782 plan, Washington advanced the unequivocal belief that, after all was said and done, the objective of federal policy should be to force the entire indigenous population east of the Mississippi River into the “illimitable regions of the West” to which the United States was not yet pressing claims.<sup>427</sup> Those who physically resisted such a fate in any way would have to be broken by force, or, as Thomas Jefferson bluntly put it, “exterminated.”<sup>428</sup> This “removal policy” was in keeping with a sense of “Manifest Destiny”—an outlook founded in precisely the same matrix of virulent Anglo-Saxon supremacism that would later give rise to nazi Aryanist ideology—already pronounced among American leaders and citizens alike.<sup>429</sup>

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\*To be absolutely clear on this point, the only manner in which the United States could ever become a “legitimate” country would be for it to systematically reconstruct its relationships with indigenous peoples in accordance with the requirements of legality, both international and domestic, which it has violated at every step along the way of its expansion and consolidation. Until it does so, it will remain an entirely illegitimate entity, with the power to sustain itself, perhaps, but absent the right. The same principle pertains to Canada, although that country’s treaty obligations to Indians were negotiated by—and are therefore inherited from—Great Britain. The fact that Canada accomplished its continental consolidation in a manner relatively free of violence—its only two “Indian Wars” after 1790, were actually fought against Métis insurgents led by Louis Riél, and weren’t especially bloody by U.S. standards—does nothing to redeem the situation in a legal sense. On the 1869 and 1885 “Riél Rebellions,” see Joseph Howard, *Strange Empire: Louis Riél and the Métis People* (Toronto: James Lewis & Samuel, 1974).

Probably the first to suffer it were the once-powerful Haudenosaunee. Although their rights to about half the present state of New York were recognized in the superficially honorable Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1784, they were quickly defrauded of the entire area by James Clinton, newly elected governor of the state.\* Thoroughly exhausted by nearly two centuries of continuous warfare, and facing what they recognized as the most ruthless foe they'd yet encountered, the Six Nations declined to fight.<sup>430</sup> Instead, they resigned themselves to destitution on postage-stamp-sized reservations within their former homeland, or fled as refugees to Canada, where the British made land available to them.<sup>†</sup>

The Shawnees were another matter entirely. While the much-battered Wyandots and Lenni Lenâpés agreed to cede the remainder of their territory east of the Ohio in exchange for assurances that tracts to the west would remain free from encroachment, the Shawnees declined even to meet with U.S. negotiators until January 1786.<sup>431</sup> Then, it was only to inform the American commissioner, William Butler, that they had no interest in giving up any land at all. A force of 800 militia under Colonel Benjamin Logan therefore sallied forth in 1787, burning more than a dozen communities and an estimated 15,000 bushels of corn, in an effort to convince them to "reconsider."<sup>432</sup> Instead, the Shawnees, led by Blue Jacket and Tecumseh (Tekamthi), joined briefly with the Cherokees and the remaining handful of Chickamaugas, replying in kind along the Cumberland River in Kentucky during much of 1788.<sup>433</sup>

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\* Henry M. Manley, *The Treaty of Fort Stanwix, 1784* (Rome, NY: Rome Sentinel, 1932). Clinton circumvented constitutional prohibitions on state (rather than federal) acquisition of Indian lands by convincing the Six Nations to lease their territories to New York for 999 years, a matter he said—following Washington's recommended strategy—would "protect" it from white settlement; Georgiana C. Nammack, *Fraud, Politics, and the Dispossession of the Indians: The Iroquois Frontier and the Colonial Period* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969); Jack Campisi, "From Stanwix to Canandaigua: National Policy, States' Rights and Indian Land," in Christopher Vecsey and William Starna, eds., *Iroquois Land Claims* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1988). It should be noted that Edward A. Everett, an expert commissioned by the State of New York in 1914 to "dispel the myth" of Haudenosaunee land rights, reached the exact opposite conclusion, confirming the continuing validity of the Indians' title to half the state. His employer promptly suppressed Everett's report, and has proceeded to conduct itself as though it were completely unaware of the document's contents and conclusions; Helen M. Upton, *The Everett Report in Historical Perspective: The Indians of New York* (Albany: New York State Bicentennial Commission, 1980).

† The true nature of U.S. attitudes towards Indians is perhaps best revealed in the fact that the Oneidas—the rebels' staunchest indigenous ally during the War for Independence—were left entirely landless by Clinton's illegal manipulation, and the federal government did absolutely nothing to correct the situation. When the Oneidas were finally granted a parcel on which to try and reconstitute themselves, it was not in New York, but far to the west, near Green Bay, Wisconsin; Arlinda Locklear, "The Oneida Land Claims: A Legal Overview," in Vecsey and Starna, *Iroquois Land Claims*, *op. cit.*

Meanwhile, the Miamis, under Little Turtle (Michikiniqua), were equally adamant in refusing to relinquish their homeland in Ohio. By early 1789, they and the Shawnees had forged a firm alliance to fight a new war of resistance against the Americans, and had attracted small but noticeable contingents of Wyandots, Lenni Lenâpés, Ottawas, Mingos, Ojibways, and Kickapoos to their cause.<sup>434</sup> In 1790, over the protests of Secretary of War Henry Knox (who felt it would be unnecessarily expensive), an army of more than 1,100 militia and 350 regular troops commanded by General Josiah Harmer was dispatched to put down the “insurrection.” The column was routed with heavy casualties by Blue Jacket’s fighters on October 21 and sent scurrying for safety.<sup>435</sup>

The following spring, General Arthur St. Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory, was sent forth at the head of 2,300 troops by President Washington to “punish” the Indians for the “insolence” of defending their homes. On November 4, 1791, St. Clair was handed a defeat along the banks of the Wabash River which, in “proportion to the number of men fielded that day, stands as the worst loss the United States Army has ever suffered.”<sup>436</sup> At that point, the United States effectively sued for peace. At the peace talks, which were held on July 31, 1793, American arrogance was conspicuously lacking.

The commissioners recanted the previous position of the United States, that the western Indians were a conquered people by virtue of their alliance with the defeated British; they also announced that the government would relinquish all claim to lands north of the Ohio except in the immediate vicinity of Cincinnati and the Scioto and Muskingum rivers. For these lands, the government would pay the Indians.<sup>437</sup>

The Shawnees rejected the latter proposition, suggesting that the government should take the money it was proposing to pay for their land and divide it among the illegal settlers located there, to compensate them for whatever loss they’d incur by leaving Indian Country altogether.\* Thus

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\* The Shawnee response to the American admissions was that, “You agree to do us justice, after having long, and injuriously, withheld it. We mean in the acknowledgment you now have made, that the King of England never did, nor never had a right to, give you our Country by the Treaty of Peace, and you want us to make this act of Common Justice a great part of your concessions, and seem to expect that, because you have at last acknowledged our independence, we should for such favor surrender our country... Money, to us is of no value...and no consideration whatever can induce us to sell the lands on which we get sustenance for our women and children; we hope to point out a mode by which your settlers may be easily removed, and peace thereby obtained... [Divide] this large sum of money, which you have offered us, among these people...and we are persuaded, they would most readily accept of it, in lieu of the lands you sold them... If you add also, the great sums you must expend in raising and paying Armies, with a view to force us to yield to your Country, you will certainly have more than sufficient for the purposes of repaying these settlers for all their labor and improvements”; quoted in Axelrod, *Chronicle of the Indian Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

thwarted in his effort to gain even a toehold in Shawnee territory through diplomacy, an enraged George Washington spent the next year putting together still another army, this one composed of nearly 4,000 men and commanded by one of the best American generals, Mad Anthony Wayne. On August 20, 1794, at a place called Fallen Timbers, along the Maumee River in what is now Toledo, Ohio, Wayne was finally able to bring a much-larger force to bear against the Shawnees and Miamis.<sup>438</sup>

In the aftermath of its victory, the United States contented itself with taking “only” the territory lying east of the present Ohio-Indiana line (then called the “Greenville Boundary”). The rest, U.S. representatives claimed, would remain “permanent” Indian territory.<sup>439</sup> The lie imbedded in this promise was already apparent, albeit unknown to the Shawnees at the time, in that William Henry Harrison, governor of the Indiana Territory and another future president, had been assigned as a condition of his appointment to secure American title to the very land in question. Between “1803 and 1806, Harrison acquired 70 million acres west of the ‘permanent’ Greenville Treaty boundary, trading or negotiating for it with the Sac and Fox and various smaller [peoples], most of which had been broken and impoverished by years of Indian-white warfare.”<sup>440</sup>

Predictably, many of these instruments of cession were misrepresented by U.S. negotiators, and were therefore fraudulent. Concerning the largest single purported transfer of property rights, that of fifty million acres in what is now Illinois signed by the Sac leader Black Hawk (Makataimeshekiakiak) in 1804, the Indians had been led by Harrison to believe “that it conveyed nothing more than hunting rights.”<sup>441</sup> By 1807, the pattern of expropriation had become so blatant that when the Shawnee leader Tecumseh and his brother Tenskawatawa (“The Prophet”) established a resistance center at Tippecanoe (“Prophet’s Town”), not only their own people, but Potawatomies, Wyandots, Ottawas, Winnebagos, Lenni Lenâpés, Miamis, Menominees, and Ojibways began to assemble there to plan a joint response.<sup>442</sup> The Sac and Fox also sent delegates, with the result that, from 1808–1811, Black Hawk mounted a sustained effort to contain the settlers moving into the area of Fort Madison, near St. Louis.<sup>443</sup>

In 1808, as the United States and Britain began to drift toward war, Tecumseh, who was attempting to put together an indigenous politicomilitary confederation extending from Canada to Florida, entered into a new alliance with the English.<sup>444</sup> Although there was no raiding outside the reserved Indian territories, the U.S. rejoinder to this “dangerous develop-

ment” was to send Harrison at the head of 1,000 militia and 350 regulars to invade Shawnee country while Tecumseh was away seeking to bring the Muskogeans, Cherokees and Chickasaws into his alliance.<sup>445</sup> Using the pretext of a demand that Tenskawatawa surrender any warriors at Prophet’s Town who had participated in raids, “Harrison planned to wipe out the brotherhood’s ‘capitol’ [*sic*] once and for all.”<sup>446</sup> This, he accomplished on November 7, 1811, after a brief battle with about 600 native defenders.<sup>447</sup>

The War of 1812 officially began at this point, with a U.S. invasion of Canada from Detroit.<sup>448</sup> Although the political aspects of the alliance Tecumseh had forged offered the potential of a far more coherent native military strategy than had ever been achieved, the fighting strength of the northern nations had been severely depleted.<sup>449</sup> With the exception of the Red Sticks faction of the Muskogeans, the powerful peoples of the south declined to become involved in the fighting, and the British by and large failed to deliver promised weapons, munitions, and other supplies.<sup>450</sup> Hence, despite a few bright spots—as when a combined force of Indians roundly whipped the army of General James Winchester at Frenchtown (Michigan) in 1813—U.S. forces were able to engage in miniature Sullivan-style expeditions almost at will. The damages suffered by the Indians, “houses burned, crops destroyed and populations displaced...were terrible.”<sup>451</sup>

By the time Tecumseh was killed and his fighters decisively defeated at the Battle of the Thames in 1813, the remaining indigenous societies of the north had suffered their final devastation.<sup>452</sup> Fewer than a thousand of the once-populous Miamis remained alive, while entire subgroups like the Weas had disappeared altogether.<sup>453</sup> The Lenni Lenâpé were equally decimated, as were the Wyandots, Ottawas, Kickapoos, and Potawatomes.<sup>454</sup> Although the Shawnees remained somewhat stronger numerically, their capacity for resistance had finally been broken.<sup>455</sup> By 1820, the remnants of all these peoples had been cleared from their homelands and deported en masse to locales west of the Mississippi.

In the south, the Red Sticks, struggling to repel invaders from their homeland in Georgia, Tennessee, and the Mississippi Territory, had a moment of triumph, destroying Fort Mimms, on the lower Alabama River, on August 30, 1813.\* It was the last major win by native people east of the

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\*The “massacre” of troops and settlers at Fort Mimms is usually considered the first engagement of the “Creek War.” The attack on the fort, however, was itself a Red Stick response to the unprovoked (and unsuccessful) ambush of a party of Creeks at Burnt Corn Creek a short time earlier; James Atkins Shackford, *David Crockett: The Man and the Legend* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994

Mississippi. In the aftermath, the Tennessee legislature appropriated the relatively vast sum of \$300,000 for purposes of “exterminating the hostiles.” General Andrew Jackson then took to the field at the head of an army of 5,000 militiamen and more than a thousand Indian auxiliaries—by far the largest such force mustered before 1850—marching through the heart of Red Stick country, destroying everything in his path.<sup>456</sup> An untold number of noncombatant Muskogees were killed directly,\* many more died of collateral causes, and native fighting strength was reduced by about half.<sup>†</sup>

Then, reinforced by another 800 militia and 600 regular troops, Jackson moved in for the kill. Striking with overwhelming strength against the principal Red Stick bastion at Horseshoe Bend in March 1814, his troops slaughtered all but 150 of the remaining Muskogee combatants, plus a substantial number of women, children, and old men.<sup>457</sup> Virtually obliterated by the offensive, the surviving Red Sticks had no alternative but to surrender (although some escaped to join the Seminoles in Florida). The price of “peace” was their immediate cession of some 23 million acres of land—instructively, this included most of the territory of the White Stick faction of Muskogees, who had fought *with* the Americans<sup>458</sup>—and deportation as a people to points west of the Mississippi after Jackson became president in 1830.<sup>459</sup> By 1840, other U.S. native allies against the Red Sticks—the Cherokees, for instance, had committed nineteen companies of fighters to assist Jackson—had also

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reprint of 1956 original) p. 18. This is acknowledged in earlier histories, such as H.S. Halbert's and T.H. Ball's *The Creek War* (Chicago: Donohue & Hennebury, 1895). The Mississippi Territory, created by Congress in 1798, was composed of what are now the states of Alabama and Mississippi; Rohrbough, *The Trans-Appalachian Frontier*, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

\*The killing of noncombatants during the November 3, 1813, attack on the Red Stick town at the Tallussahatchee River, for example, is depicted as being “without intention” by Davy Crockett, one of Jackson's best scouts, in his autobiography. A paragraph later, however, Crockett describes a “squaw” being riddled by twenty musket balls, a fate which hardly sounds unintentional. He also acknowledges that the 186 Red Stick fighters who were trapped by more than 900 Americans at the Tallussahatchee attempted to surrender, but were killed “to the last man.” The account of this battle concludes with the troops eating potatoes fried in the fat of their fallen foes; Shackford, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–5; also see James A. Shackford and Stanley J. Folmsbee, eds., *A Narrative of the Life of David Crockett of Tennessee* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1973 reprint of 1834 original).

†The Red Sticks could put fewer than 3,000 warriors in the field at their peak. In addition to the 186 lost at the Tallussahatchee, another 291 were killed at Talladega later the same month. A further 311 were lost during battles at Emuckfaw and Enotachopo Creek in December (Jackson's men were under orders to cut off noses to confirm bodycounts throughout the campaign). Plainly, losses of this magnitude would quickly result in complete annihilation. The remainder of the “war” consisted of the Indians attempting to find safety deep within their own country, while Jackson and his men pursued them with an unabashed intent to attain their total eradication; Axelrod, *Chronicle of the Indian Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

been cleared from their southeastern homelands, force-marched with catastrophic results to the new “Permanent Indian Territory” of Oklahoma.<sup>460</sup>

While most of the eastern Indians were by now too decimated and demoralized to physically resist, the Seminoles were an exception. Consequently, two campaigns were mounted—in 1816–17 and 1835–42—to either compel their “removal” or extinguish them altogether.<sup>461</sup> The second of these proved to be the most proportionately expensive conflict in American history, and it ended inconclusively: while the Seminoles suffered extensive casualties and a number of them eventually submitted to removal, a sizable segment withdrew into the Everglades swamp country, from whence they were never dislodged.<sup>462</sup>

One other “war of removal” was fought in 1832 and ’33, this one against the Sac and Fox in Illinois. By 1830, these peoples had in large part followed the almost-extinct Peorias and Kaskaskias, withdrawing, along with the Winnebagos and Kickapoos, into adjoining areas of what are now the states of Iowa and Wisconsin.\* The reasons are illuminating:

As settlers flooded in with the end of the war [against Tecumseh], they pillaged Sac and Fox villages, fenced cornfields, and even plowed up cemeteries. Black Hawk protested to the U.S. Indian agents at Rock Island, who told him to move west, across the Mississippi. In 1829, Black Hawk returned from a hunt to find that a white family had settled in his lodge. Through an interpreter, he told them to leave, explaining that there was plenty of unsettled land available. They ignored his demand. Soon, more whites were settling in Black Hawk’s village. Next came an announcement from the General Land Office that the area would be offered for public sale.<sup>463</sup>

In 1832, appalled at their displaced circumstances, Black Hawk attempted to take his people back into a small portion of their home territory, along the Rock River. The response of Illinois Governor John Reynolds was to muster 1,700 militia—future president Zachary Taylor served as an

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\*Most of the remaining Kickapoos—less than a thousand—abandoned Illinois in 1819 when confronted with a war of annihilation by the United States. They drifted southwest, establishing themselves briefly in Texas in 1852, before settling finally in Mexico (where they remain). Two much smaller groups, under the leaders Kennekuk and Mecina, situated themselves in Missouri, from whence they engaged in regular raids into their evacuated Illinois homeland until they merged with Black Hawk’s Sacs and Foxes in 1831; Gibson, *The Kickapoos*, *op. cit.* The much-depleted Winnebagos, who had withdrawn from northern Illinois by 1820, also raided briefly into their former territory in 1827, and promised to ally with Black Hawk in 1832. They reneged on that pledge in the mistaken belief that service to the Americans might assure them a reservation in Iowa or Wisconsin. Instead, their reward was to be pushed all the way into Nebraska; Paul Radin, *The Winnebago Tribe* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of American Ethnography, Smithsonian Institution, 37th Annual Report, 1923).

officer on this expedition, and Abraham Lincoln, another one-day White House occupant, as a common soldier—to repel the “invasion” by exterminating the 2,000-odd Indians.<sup>464</sup> Confronted by this force, the Sac and Fox retreated, leading the troops on a grueling chase which finally ended on August 3, 1833, when—subsisting on bark and roots, utterly exhausted and reduced by that point to barely 500 survivors—they were trapped by a force of more than 1,300 near the juncture of the Mississippi and Bad Axe Rivers.<sup>465</sup>

The Indians who had remained on the east bank of the Mississippi attempted to surrender, but the troops, frustrated by weeks of fruitless pursuit...stormed their position in an eight-hour frenzy of clubbing, stabbing, shooting [and] scalping.<sup>466</sup>

Although about 200 of Black Hawk’s followers did escape to the west bank, most were later tracked down and killed, completing the Fox extermination initiated by the French a century earlier.<sup>467</sup> The Sac leader was imprisoned for a year, then shipped about as a traveling exhibit illustrating the ability of the government to “humble and humiliate even the most arrogant of savages” (after his death, Black Hawk’s bones were disinterred by local whites and displayed as trophies in a “museum” in Iowaville, Iowa).<sup>468</sup> As for the pitifully few remnants of the Sacs and Foxes who survived the “Black Hawk War,” they were given a tiny piece of land in central Iowa, but only in exchange for their legitimization by treaty of the seizure of their last six million acres.<sup>469</sup>

### *Manifest Destiny*

By 1840, with the exception of a handful of tiny Iroquois reservations in upstate New York and the remaining Seminoles in the Florida Everglades, the eastern third of what would become the continental United States had been cleared of its indigenous population.<sup>470</sup> The idea that America west of the Mississippi was ever seriously intended to be the exclusive domain of the continent’s native peoples was belied—even before their removal was achieved—by the creation of the territories of Missouri (1816), Arkansas (1819) and Iowa (1838).<sup>471</sup> In 1837, Anglo invaders in Texas fought a war of secession from Mexico, creating a temporary republic which became a state in December 1845.<sup>472</sup> Six months later, on June 15, 1846, the United States acquired the Oregon Territory (present-day Oregon, Washington, and Idaho) from Great Britain.<sup>473</sup> Two years after that, in 1848, the northern half of Mexico—California, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, and southern Colorado—was taken by force.<sup>474</sup>

Thomas Jefferson had made the [1803] Louisiana Purchase in large part to acquire seemingly endless space into which white settlement, always moving west, could push the Indian. Andrew Jackson's policy of removal was also a matter of pushing tribes westward. Neither Jefferson, Jackson, nor the other presidents who contemplated or enacted removal considered the possibility that white settlement of the American West might someday proceed from the west as the United States rapidly evolved into a continental nation.<sup>475</sup>

Native North Americans were now caught in a vise from which there was truly no escape. As Maine Senator Lot Morrill would put it to Congress in 1867, "As population has approached the Indian we have removed him beyond population. But population now encounters him from both sides of the continent, and there is no place on the continent to which he can be removed beyond the progress of population."<sup>476</sup> As pronouncements of Angloamerica's "Manifest Destiny" to enjoy limitless expansion intensified, so too did calls for the outright eradication of Indians, or at least large numbers of them, *wherever* they might be encountered.<sup>477</sup>

Aside from the Mandans and other Missouri Valley peoples exterminated by smallpox in 1837,<sup>478</sup> the first victims of this change were the natives—especially Apaches—of western Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. By the 1880s, not only a number of Apachean bands but other peoples—the Tonkawas, for instance, and the Karankaras—had been totally liquidated, the various Anglo governments involved having depended largely on "free enterprise" rather than troops to accomplish their exterminatory policies.\* In this, they drew upon their own heritage as well as the example offered by the Mexican regime they'd displaced.

[They offered] generous bounties for Apache scalps. "Backyard barbering" became a gruesome industry...which became so lucrative that its practitioners did not limit themselves to Apache warrior scalps...Scalp hunters would storm whole villages and kill every man, woman and child. A special examination committee had to be established to certify the authenticity of the scalps, but it soon became evident to the bounty hunters that there was no way to distinguish between the scalps of friendly Indians and those of hostiles. So the harvest of death widened...[T]he examination committee was incapable not only of distinguishing friendly scalps from hostile, but could not tell the difference between Indian hair and Mexican. Remote Mexican villages...now fell victim to bounty hunters.<sup>479</sup>

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\*The once populous Lipán Apaches—the Lipanjenne, Lipanes de Arriba, and Lipanes Abajo—of Texas were reduced to virtually nothing by the 1870s. The last nineteen survivors were absorbed by the more westerly Mescalero Apaches in 1905; Thomas F. Schilz, *The Lipan Apaches in Texas* (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1987). On the disappearance of the Tonkawas, Karankaras, and others, see Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust and Survival*, *op. cit.*

A Colorado militia unit mounted a campaign against the Jicarillas in 1854, and the army fought actual wars against the Mescaleros, Chiricahuas, and other western Apache peoples in 1872–73, 1877–80 (the “Victorio Campaign”) and 1881–86 (the “Geronimo Campaign”), each of them extraordinarily brutal. But it was the process of “private citizen actions,” occurring under state sanction over a sustained period, which ultimately did the job.<sup>480</sup> By 1890, the Apaches had been reduced to less than 10 percent of their original number. More or less the same was true of the other peoples of southern Arizona—the Pimas, Maricopas, and Tohono O’odams (Papagos).<sup>481</sup>

In California and Oregon things got under way a bit later but followed much the same course. Consider a May 1852 “incident,” when a peaceful “*ranchería* of 148 Indians, including women and children, was attacked, and nearly the whole number destroyed,” by a mob of whites led by the sheriff of Weaverville, California.<sup>482</sup>

Of the 150 Indians that constituted the *ranchería*, only 2 or 3 escaped, and those were supposed to be dangerously wounded; so that probably not one...now remains alive. Men, women and children all shared the same fate—none were spared except one woman and two children, who were brought back as prisoners.<sup>483</sup>

Or, to take another example, there was a “horrible massacre of 200 Indians in Humboldt County,” California, in January 1860:

The attack was made at night, when [the Indians] were in their little settlements or villages at some sort of merrymaking. The men were known to be absent... Under these circumstances, bands of white men, armed with hatchets—small bands, but sufficiently numerous for the purpose—fell on the women and children, and deliberately slaughtered them, one and all. Simultaneous attacks were made on different *rancherías* or encampments... Regularly organized bodies of armed men attacked the settlements of friendly Indians [and] murdered them in like manner.<sup>484</sup>

That the genocidal implications of these slaughters—just two of several hundred comparable atrocities perpetrated during the period—were well understood is readily evident in editorial commentary: “The perpetrators seem to have acted with a deliberate design to exterminate the Indian race.”<sup>485</sup> Such butchery was not “official” policy only in the most technical sense. The massacres were well reported in the local press, and the “vigilantes” who carried them out were paid bounties by the government for the scalps of their victims.<sup>486</sup> Although the military was quite aware of what was being done, as its commanders’ own dispatches make clear, no effort was

made to intervene or punish the offenders.<sup>!</sup>\* Indeed, the process of extermination was often carried out under color of—if not direct participation by—“martial authority.”<sup>487</sup>

When the army did take to the field, it was to eliminate whatever capacity the peoples of California had to defend themselves. Thus, in the so-called “Mariposa War” in northern California, troops were used in 1851 to “subdue and disarm” the Miwoks, Tulareños, and Yokuts, who, consequently defenseless, were quickly annihilated by local whites.<sup>488</sup> Much the same pattern prevailed in southern California, where separate campaigns were mounted against the Yumas, Mohaves, Cocopas, and Cahuillas.<sup>489</sup> The final mop-up operation in California was in the north, where in 1872 the army engaged in an especially ugly campaign against the last fifty-or-so Modocs, a peaceful people whose main “offense” was to refuse removal to Oregon.<sup>†</sup> Small wonder the bulk of all indigenous peoples in California were declared extinct before the end of the nineteenth century—more followed in the twentieth—while the remainder were “pushed into the rocks.”<sup>490</sup>

In the Oregon Territory, where “settlers loudly demanded” that the army “annihilate” the region’s native peoples, several campaigns for such purposes were undertaken. The first of these, a short 1848 offensive against the Cayuses, set the stage.<sup>491</sup> In 1855, the “Rogue River War” left the the Takelama and Tutuni so decimated that the handful of survivors were lumped together under the heading “Siletz Indians” and confined to a tiny parcel of land near the present-day city of Newport.<sup>492</sup> The same year, an arbitrary declaration by Governor Isaac Stevens that opened the entire territory to white settlement resulted in the so-called “Yakima War,” waged not only against the Yakimas, but

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\*E.g., a report from General E.A. Hitchcock, commanding the U.S. Army’s Pacific Division, to the adjutant General, dated March 31, 1853: “A party of citizens under the conduct of [militia] Captain Ben Wright last fall massacred over 30 Indians out of a group of 48 who had come into Captain Wright’s invitation to make ‘peace’... Captain Wright returned to Yreka, which place the papers state he entered in triumph, his men bearing on their rifles the scalps of the Indians, and was received with a general welcome by the citizens of the town”; quoted in Heizer, *Destruction of the California Indians*, *op. cit.*, pp. 247–8.

†As was all too typical of the army’s conduct vis-à-vis native opponents, the Modoc leadership—“Captain Jack” and three colleagues—were executed upon surrender; Murray, *The Modocs and Their War*, *op. cit.* Also see Jeff C. Riddell, *The Indian History of the Modoc War and the Causes That Led to It* (Medford, OR: Pine Cone, 1973). Somewhat less commonly, their heads were severed after their deaths and shipped to Washington, D.C., for “study” by phrenologists. “These relics, symbols of Manifest Destiny’s dark side, remained in the nation’s capital until 1984, when the Smithsonian Institution returned them to the Modoc people for burial”; Herman J. Viola, *After Columbus: The Smithsonian Chronicle of the North American Indians* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 1990) pp. 178–9.

the Walla Wallas, Umatillas, Palouses, and the remains of the Cayuses as well.\*

This was followed, in 1857, by the “Coeur d’Alene War,” which pitted that people and allied Spokanes, along with a combination of Yakima, Palouse, Umatilla, and Cayuse “recalcitrants,” against “a superior force...each man having been issued brand-new long-range rifles.”<sup>493</sup> In the aftermath, the leaders of the Indians were executed for the “crime” of having resisted dispossession of their homelands.<sup>494</sup> Thoroughly “dispirited, the tribes of the Columbia Basin waged no more war, but resignedly marched to the reservations prescribed by Governor Stevens’ treaties, which the Senate hurriedly ratified on March 8, 1859.”<sup>495</sup>

For the next two decades, the army conducted a series of mop-up operations throughout eastern Oregon and most of what is now Idaho, beginning with the “Snake War” of 1866–68, in which the Yahuskin and Walpapi bands of Northern Paiutes were all but obliterated.<sup>496</sup> In 1877, there was the famous and devastating pursuit of the Nez Percé—about a third of whom were killed—driven from their ancestral territory and frantically trying to reach sanctuary in Canada.<sup>497</sup> The Bannocks, as well as remnants of the Cayuses and Northern Paiutes, were mauled in an 1878 campaign.<sup>498</sup> Finally, in 1879, regional warfare died out after troops were dispatched to pacify the “Sheepeaters,” a small group of Bannock and Shoshoni holdouts whose name derived from their willingness to subsist almost entirely on mountain sheep rather than surrender their way of life.<sup>499</sup>

### *The Way West*

For a time it appeared that the indigenous population might actually be left with a vast expanse of the continental interior—the “Great American Desert” consisting of the plains region as well as most of the present states of

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\*The Indians perhaps fought longer and with more bitterness, and thereby sustained far more damage than might have been the case, because of a specific crime committed by Colonel James Kelley of the Oregon militia early in the war. This occurred during the first week of December, 1855, when the Walla Walla leader Pue Pue Mox Mox led a delegation into Kelley’s bivouac to discuss peace terms. Kelley ordered the delegates held hostage against a Walla Walla capitulation. When infuriated Indians attacked the militia instead, Pue Pue Mox Mox was killed, his scalp and ears thereafter displayed as a “trophy of war”; Axelrod, *Chronicle of the Indian Wars*, op. cit., p. 173; Glassley, *Pacific Northwest Indian Wars*, op. cit., p. 122. Also see Lucius McWhorter, *Crime Against the Yakimas* (North Yakima, WA: Republic, 1913); Robert H. Ruby, *The Cayuse Indians: Imperial Tribesmen of Old Oregon* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972); Clifford E. Trafzer and Richard D. Scheuerman, *Renegade Tribe: The Palouse Indians and the Invasion of the Inland Pacific Northwest* (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1986).

Utah and Nevada—in which to maintain themselves.<sup>500</sup> Since the land at issue was deemed to be without value to whites, it was considered an ideal dumping ground for peoples displaced from more useful locales. At the outset, all that was required of those native to the region was that they admit such transplants along the fringes of their territories, engage in some limited amount of trade with whites, and allow safe passage to columns of Euroamerican migrants making their way from the East to California and Oregon.<sup>501</sup>

In theory, the overall framework for this was constructed in 1851 through a series of treaties negotiated at Fort Laramie—just west of the Black Hills, in present-day Wyoming—with a number of nations, including the Lakotas, Cheyennes, Arapahos, Crows, Shoshonis, Comanches, Kiowas, and Kiowa Apaches.<sup>502</sup> In the Fort Laramie treaties, the United States formally acknowledged every square inch of the Great Plains as being the sovereign territory of one or another of these counterpart nations and pledged itself to prevent the establishment of permanent communities of its citizens within their domains.<sup>503</sup> Early encounters with these peoples (whom Colonel George Armstrong Custer would later describe as being “the best light cavalry in the world”) had convinced the United States that to do otherwise would not be worth the cost of taking a more bellicose stance.<sup>504</sup>

Things more or less worked out for a time, although there were ominous precursors of what would follow.\* By the late 1850s, however, gold had been discovered in the Rocky Mountains, leading large numbers of white prospectors and other speculators to establish illegal mining camps in the

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\*One of these, the so-called “Case of the Mormon Cow,” is instructive. The terms of the 1851 Fort Laramie treaties with the Lakotas, Cheyennes, and Arapahos allowed for white passage along the Platte River Road in Nebraska. On August 18, 1854, a group of young Lakotas killed and ate a dying cow abandoned by a Mormon wagon train. This “theft” was reported to the army at Fort Kearney. The matter was taken up with Conquering Bear, leader of the band of which the young men were members. Although he offered compensation for the animal, the Mormons demanded that arrests be made. A thirty-man force under Lt. John L. Grattan was dispatched for this purpose. When the Indians refused to turn over the “criminals,” Grattan attacked their camp with a cannon, killing Conquering Bear and others. Enraged, the Lakotas promptly wiped out Grattan’s entire detachment—there was one survivor, who died of his wounds shortly thereafter—and departed the area. General William S. Harney was then ordered into the field at the head of 600 men to “punish” the “hostiles.” On September 3, Harney piled into the peaceful encampment on the Blue Water River of Brûlé Lakota leader Little Thunder—who had had nothing to do with the Grattan fight—and massacred a good portion of it (Harney would thereafter be referred to as “Woman Killer” by the Lakotas). The sequence of events cast the die for U.S./Lakota relations for the rest of the nineteenth century. One of the best accounts is in the early chapters of Mari Sandoz’s *Crazy Horse: Strange Man of the Oglalas* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942). Also see Gerald Baydo, “Overland from Missouri to Washington Territory in 1854,” *Nebraska History*, Vol. 52, No. 1, 1971.

western reaches of Cheyenne/Arapaho territory, at places like Denver.<sup>505</sup> Not only did the government not attempt to uphold its treaty commitments to the Cheyennes and Arapahos by preventing this, it engineered a completely fraudulent “supplanting treaty” in 1861, by which the unknowing Indians supposedly ceded more than 90 percent of their central plains homelands.\* When the Cheyennes refused to acknowledge the validity of this travesty they were declared to be “aggressors,” and military preparations for their outright extermination commenced.<sup>506</sup>

Gold, silver, and other minerals were also discovered in the mountains of western Montana at about the same time. One result was that a new wagon route, the “Bozeman Trail” was cut diagonally through the heart of prime Lakota hunting territory in Wyoming, another direct violation of the 1851 treaty.<sup>507</sup> Since the influx of traffic greatly disrupted the buffalo herds upon which they depended for subsistence, the Indians had little alternative but to respond militarily to this invasion, and the army quickly began building a string of forts along the route in order to secure it.<sup>508</sup> Although eradication was not at that time considered a viable option with regard to the Lakotas, who were much more populous than the Cheyennes, it was believed they might be “chastised” into acquiescence.<sup>†</sup>

Meanwhile, on the southern plains, Texas cattle interests had begun what was to become a concerted effort to breach the “Comanche Wall,” which had prevented all but the most transient white penetration of the Llano

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\*Treaty of Fort Wise, February 18, 1861. The 1851 treaty terms had been ratified by most Cheyennes. Its 1861 “successor” relied upon the ostensible agreement of a handful of “chiefs.” Of these, several said they had neither been present during negotiations nor signed the document (suggesting their signatures were forged). The rest maintained the terms of the treaty were radically different than those explained to them during negotiations. This seems due to deliberate misinterpretation of treaty provisions by U.S. representatives during the negotiations, and the fact that the Senate unilaterally altered the terms of the treaty—without consulting the Cheyennes, much less obtaining their consent—before ratifying it. This exceedingly bogus instrument was then pronounced “law” by the United States, and allegedly forms the basis of U.S. title to what is now the eastern two-thirds of the State of Colorado; Hoig, *Battle of the Washita*, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–7; Thomas F. Dawson, “Colonel Boone’s Treaty with the Plains Indians,” *The Trail*, Vol. XIV, 1921.

†A preliminary expedition into the Powder River Country of southeastern Montana was mounted in 1865, in an effort to exterminate—or at least intimidate—“every male over twelve years of age” among the Lakotas and allied northern Cheyennes and Arapahos. When the force of nearly 2,000, commanded by General Patrick Connor (fresh from his slaughter of Shoshonis at Bear River) was soundly thrashed and sent scurrying back to Fort Laramie in September of that year, the army temporarily abandoned such ambitious plans; LeRoy R. Hafen and Ann W. Hafen, *The Powder River Campaign and Savyers’ Expedition of 1865* (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, 1961). Also see James C. Olson, *Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965).

Estacado—the “Staked Plains” or “Texas Panhandle” region—for generations.<sup>509</sup> A special unit, the Texas Rangers, had been assembled to deal with the “menace” presented by Comanche, Kiowa, and Kiowa Apache defense of their treaty-guaranteed homelands.<sup>510</sup> However, the Comanches and their allies proved more than a match for such adversaries. By the late 1850s, Texans were demanding with increasing shrillness that regular troops be used to clear these indigenous nations from their homelands, preferably by annihilation.\*

In all probability the federal government would have accommodated local exterminationist sentiments on at least one of these three fronts during the early 1860s, had its ability to do so not been dissolved by the start of the Civil War in 1861. From then until the war between the states ended in 1865, both the regular army and most militia units, both North and South, were completely tied up in fighting one another.<sup>511</sup> Indian fighting in the West was thus consigned mainly to happenstance or to ad hoc units formed by the territories after official troop levies had been met.<sup>512</sup> This slowed but by no means halted the process of obliterating the peoples of the plains.<sup>513</sup> Indeed, it is fair to say that the pattern by which it would proceed was well established by 1864, catalyzed not by events in the region itself, but by examples set elsewhere, in Minnesota and Utah, by regiments of volunteers.

In 1862, the final “Woodlands” conflict—with the Santee Dakotas in Minnesota—was provoked by the United States through the simple expedient of cutting off the Indians’ food supply while white settlers illegally overran their remaining landbase.<sup>†</sup> When the starving Santees erupted in a

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\* Upon its entry into the Union in 1845, “the Texas government made it clear that it would not, then or later, agree to set aside [any] territory for an Indian reservation. In fact, the state was already busily granting and selling Indian lands to encourage immigration and development. Meanwhile, both the state government and a horde of land speculators demanded that the federal government do its duty and remove [by whatever means] the ‘squatting’ Indians” whose land it actually was; T.R. Fehrenbach, *The Comanches: The Destruction of a People* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974) p. 379. There is ample indication that the army would have complied with the wishes of the Texans—and of the manner in which this compliance would have accrued—had the Civil War not intervened. In late 1858, the so-called “Wichita Expedition” was mounted out of Fort Belknap, Texas, under command of Captain (Brevet Major) Earl Van Dorn. Its main “accomplishment” was to attack a small Kotsoteka Comanche encampment on Crooked Creek, slaughtering 49 Indians, on May 13, 1859. The event understandably hardened Comanche attitudes against the United States; William Y. Chalfant, *Without Quarter: The Wichita Expedition and the Fight on Crooked Creek* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

† The Dakotas—composed of the Sisseton, Wahpeton, Santee, and Mdewakanton bands—may have numbered more than 40,000 at their peak, and originally occupied most of southern Minnesota. Two deceptive treaties during the 1850s resulted in their loss of about 90 percent of their land, leaving them constrained to a narrow strip along the Minnesota River, insufficient to provide subsistence for the 5,000 or so who remained alive at that point. Engulfed by an influx of more than 150,000 whites who clamored ever more loudly for dissolution of the reservation, the Santees, who were by then

desperate “revolt,” they were immediately targeted for total elimination under the premise, voiced by Governor Alexander Ramsey, that “the Sioux Indians must be exterminated or driven from the state.”<sup>514</sup> General Henry H. Sibley—called the “Long Trader” by the Santees because of his practice of cheating them in commercial relations—then led several thousand militia troops against the Indians, quickly killing more than a quarter of their fighting men and as many as a thousand noncombatants.\*

When the bedraggled survivors surrendered—a scalp bounty was proclaimed against all who did not—they were herded into cattle pens at Mankato. The roughly 600 men among the 2,000 captives were chained together, subjected to summary court martial (without benefit of defense counsel), and 303 of them condemned to death. On December 26, thirty-nine of them were hanged in the largest mass execution in U.S. history, and the remainder imprisoned, all for the “crime” of having tried to feed their starving families.<sup>†</sup>

Sibley [also] decided to keep the remaining 1,700 Santees—mostly women and children—as prisoners, although they were accused of no crime other than having been born Indian. He ordered them transferred overland to Fort Snelling, and along the way they too were assaulted by angry white citizens. Many were stoned and clubbed; a child was snatched from its mother’s arms and beaten to death.<sup>515</sup>

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totally dependent upon the government to feed them, found their rations withheld by officials who wished to compel them to leave. This was the basis of their “revolt”; William W. Folwell, *History of the Santee Sioux* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967); C.M. Oehler, *The Great Sioux Uprising* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959); Duane Schultz, *Over the Earth I Come: The Great Sioux Uprising of 1862* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).

\*One reason the Santees were starving was that Sibley had levied a claim of \$145,000 for “back debts” they supposedly owed because of his notoriously unscrupulous dealings against a \$475,000 federal payment for their lands. Although dubious in the extreme, Sibley’s claim was paid as a priority by his business partner, future Minnesota Governor Alexander Ramsey, at the time the federal Indian agent on the Santee Reservation. Another of Sibley’s (and Ramsey’s) partners, Andrew Myrick, was the trader selected to handle most of the Indians’ rations during the early 1860s. Instead of distributing the food to the hungry Santees, he adopted the lucrative practice of selling this windfall inventory at a discount to local whites. When the Indians inquired as to what *they* were supposed to eat, he suggested that grass might be appropriate. This indignity was perhaps the last straw. In any event, one of the Santees’ first acts during their revolt was to behead Myrick, leaving the grisly trophy, its mouth stuffed with grass, in front of the storehouse in which he’d kept their food; “Big Eagle’s Story of the Sioux Outbreak of 1862,” *Collections, Vol. VI* (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1894) p. 390; Gerald T. Henig, “A Neglected Cause of the Sioux Uprising,” *Minnesota History*, Vol. 45, No. 3, Fall 1976.

†The hanging of the 39 Santees at Mankato—including two men executed by mistake—would have been far larger, had the military had its way. Of the 303 men condemned by Sibley’s drumhead courts-martial, President Lincoln, who asked to review the records, commuted the sentences of 265 to varying terms of imprisonment; Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970) p. 58–61. Also see David A. Nichols, *Lincoln and the Indians* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1978).

The killing continued. On July 3, 1863, when Little Crow, the principal Santee leader, attempted to return to his people from asylum in Canada, he was ambushed and shot to death. His murderers were paid a \$25 bounty for his scalp, plus a \$500 bonus, given the identity of their prize. Little Crow's scalp and skull were then placed on public display for the edification of the gentle souls of St. Paul.<sup>516</sup> Six months later, Minnesota violated Canadian neutrality in order to bring two other Santee leaders, Shakopee and Medicine Bottle, back into U.S. jurisdiction, where they were promptly hanged.<sup>517</sup> Those Santees who escaped the scalping knives were deported en masse, and their remaining lands in Minnesota were impounded as a "reparation" for expenses incurred by the state in annihilating them.<sup>518</sup>

Crow Creek on the Missouri River was the site chosen for the Santee reservation. The soil was barren, rainfall scanty, wild game scarce, and the alkaline water unfit for drinking. Soon the surrounding hills were covered with graves; of the 1,300 Santees brought there in 1863, less than a thousand survived their first winter.<sup>519</sup>

Meanwhile, far to the west, in Utah, Colonel Patrick E. Connor took to the field at the head of about a thousand California volunteer cavalrymen. His target was the Shoshonis, who had grown increasingly "restive" over Salt Lake City and other Mormon communities recently—and quite illegally—established on their lands.<sup>520</sup> On January 27, 1863, about a third of this force slammed into a sizable village in southern Idaho, along the Bear River. Of the approximately 700 Indians living there as many as 500 were slaughtered with all the savagery customary to such assaults.\*

Soldiers reported...that Indians who were so incapacitated they could not move "were killed by being hit in the head with an axe"... [A] soldier found a dead woman clutching a little infant still alive. The soldier "in mercy to the babe, killed it"... [Numerous women] "were killed because they would not submit quietly to being ravaged, and other squaws were ravaged in the agony of death."<sup>521</sup>

After systematically mutilating the dead, Connor's men loaded their own fourteen casualties of the "battle" aboard sleds and returned to their base camp.<sup>522</sup> Many of them then returned to civilian life in northern California,

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\*The number of Indians killed at Bear River is a matter of some controversy. Connor reported 224 bodies counted on the field, plus another 50 estimated as having washed away after being shot while trying to swim to safety on the far bank. James H. Martineau, an area settler, placed the figure at 368. Another local resident, Richard J.M. Bee, later claimed that the total reached 1,200. Contemporary Park Service personnel have placed the true figure at a little over 500; see generally, Brigham M. Madsen, *The Shoshoni Frontier and the Bear River Massacre* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1985) pp. 189–92.

where they immediately resumed the relentless slaughter of the indigenous population in that region.<sup>523</sup> For their part, the Mormons celebrated the colonel's frankly genocidal "victory"—Connor was soon promoted in recognition of his "achievement"—as "an intervention of the Almighty," a sentiment the Puritan Fathers of Plymouth Colony would have expressed neither differently nor better.<sup>524</sup>

### *Nits Make Lice*

In 1864, inspired by the success of Sibley's and Connor's butchery, the government of Colorado Territory, whose two regiments of volunteer troops were fully committed to fighting Confederates further east, mustered in a whole new unit—the Third Colorado Volunteer Cavalry Regiment—exclusively for the purpose of killing Cheyennes, Arapahos and any other native people they might encounter over a 100-day period.\* This was done in a climate which was exterminationist in the extreme: "Of twenty-seven stories concerned directly or indirectly with Indians [published in the Denver press during 1863], ten overtly favored 'extermination' of Indians."† By mid-1864, the paper's rhetorical advocacy of genocide—mostly written by its publisher, William N. Byers—had, if anything, escalated.

Eastern humanitarians who believe in the superiority of the Indian race will raise a terrible howl over this policy [of extermination], but it is no time to split hairs nor stand

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\* As the matter was put in an editorial entitled "Exterminate Them," published in Denver's *Rocky Mountain News* on March 24, 1863, shortly after the Bear River Massacre: "A few such men as Col. Connor could do more to quiet the Indians than a thousand Indian agents with immense trains of annuities to back them." Much was made in the *News* of supposed "depredations" by Cheyennes and Arapahos during this period, although it is clear from the record that noticeably more Indians were being killed by whites than the other way around. Indeed, until "the spring of 1864, more Whites were injured or murdered within the Denver city limits [by other whites] than Whites harmed by Cheyennes or Arapahos during the same period"; Svaldi, *Sand Creek and the Rhetoric of Extermination*, *op. cit.*, p. 142. Also see George Bird Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955 reprint of 1915 original) p. 127; Lilian B. Shields, "Relations with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes in Colorado to 1861," *Colorado Magazine*, Aug. 1927. On the Colorado volunteer regiments, see J.H. Nankivell, *History of the Military Organizations of Colorado, 1860–1935* (Denver: W.H. Kistler, 1935).

† Svaldi, *Sand Creek and the Rhetoric of Extermination*, *op. cit.*, pp. 149–50; e.g., in the above-cited editorial, "Exterminate Them," *News* publisher William N. Byers sided with the editors of the Santa Fe *New Mexican* in advocating "extermination of the Indians... as the most effective method for life and security." On April 2, 1863, the *News* followed up by declaring emphatically that "we hope [the Cheyennes and Arapahoes] will be exterminated." Two days later, Byers observed that the "feeling" had become "general" among Colorado whites that the "only way" to deal with Indians was to "wage upon them a war of extermination (emphasis in the original)." As by far the leading newspaper in the territory, the *Rocky Mountain News* was, of course, also the leading opinion-shaper.

upon delicate compunctions of conscience. Self preservation demands decisive action, and the only way to secure it is [through a] few months of active extermination against the red devils.\*

On the day this was written, the publisher was joined by Colorado Governor John Evans who, after announcing—on the basis of no discernible evidence—that the Cheyennes had “declared war on the United States,” pronounced his judgment that “Any man who kills a hostile Indian is a patriot!” A day later, the governor clarified his stance, publishing a proclamation in the *News* in which he claimed “the evidence [was] now conclusive” that most Indians on the Plains were “hostile,” calling upon area whites to “organize [themselves] to pursue, kill and destroy” Cheyennes and Arapahos wherever they might be found.<sup>525</sup> As the Colorado Third was being formed, Byers chimed in again, inquiring of his readers: “Shall we not go for them, their lodges, squaws and all?”

The answer was shortly announced by Colonel John Milton Chivington, a former Methodist minister with political ambitions, who commanded the unit. “My intention is to kill all Indians I may come across,” he explained.<sup>526</sup> The colonel elsewhere elaborated that this included everyone from the most elderly and infirm to newborn infants, the latter for no reason other than that they would one day grow up to become adult Cheyennes. “Nits make lice,” Chivington asserted, echoing H.L. Hall, a rather notorious mass-murderer of Indians in northern California.<sup>†</sup> “I long to be wading in gore,” Chivington put

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\* *Rocky Mountain News*, Aug. 10, 1864. That Byers’ formulations constitute a direct prefiguration of Hitlerian rhetoric should be obvious; for comparison, see Hermann Rauschnig, *The Voice of Destruction* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940). The Denver publisher also prefigured Goebbels to a noticeable extent; e.g., on April 24, 1864, he whipped up anti-Indian sentiment among Colorado whites by reporting as “news” the “fact” that of 28 persons who had set out for new mine sites that month, “twenty-five have been murdered on the road by the Indians.” In actuality, as the *News*’s own stories reveal, this represented a 500-percent inflation of the data; Svaldi, *Sand Creek and the Rhetoric of Extermination*, *op. cit.*, p. 152. In June, he was still at it, claiming on the 24th that the number of white deaths inflicted by Indians “in recent months” was “daunting,” although his own paper’s records showed nine dead whites and 69 dead *Indians* as the toll of hostilities by that point in 1864 (this tally included Lean Bear, a prominent Cheyenne peace advocate); for cogent analysis of such techniques, see Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965); Murray Edelman, *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence* (Chicago: Markham, 1971); and, most specifically, James Morgan Read, *Atrocity Propaganda, 1914–1919* (New York: Arno Press, 1972).

† Hall’s formulation, which drew on a view articulated in North America at least as early as King Philip’s War, was that native babies should be killed without exception because, “a nit would make a louse”; Carranco and Beard, *Genocide and Vendetta*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 4. It should be noted that, eighty years after Chivington and Hall, SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler would also refer to his extermination of Gypsies, Jews, Slavs, and others as being “the same as delousing”; quoted in Robert Jay Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 1986) p. 477.

# ATTENTION! INDIAN FIGHTERS

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Having been authorized by the Governor to raise a  
Company of 100 day

## U. S. VOL CAVALRY!

For immediate service against hostile Indians. I call upon all who wish to engage in such  
service to call at my office and enroll their names immediately.

**Pay and Rations the same as other U. S.  
Volunteer Cavalry.**

Parties furnishing their own horses will receive 40c per day, and rations for the same,  
while in the service.

The Company will also be entitled to all horses and other plunder taken from the Indians.

**Office first door East of Recorder's Office.**

**HAL SATR.**

**Central City, Aug. 13, '64.**

Poster for the 3rd Colorado Volunteers. Courtesy of Colorado Historical Society

it on another occasion.<sup>527</sup> Such statements quickly became rallying cries for his troops and were enthusiastically embraced by the Colorado citizenry at large.\*

The problem for Chivington was that his men came across almost no Indians to kill.<sup>†</sup> Aside from an incident on October 10, when forty men led by Captain David Nichols managed to surprise a small Cheyenne hunting camp near Buffalo Springs and slaughter everyone in it—six men, three women, and a fourteen-year-old boy<sup>528</sup>—the only “savages” the colonel and his volunteers had seen by the time the troops’ hundred-day enlistments had begun to run out were a group of “peace chiefs”—notably the Cheyennes Black Kettle and White Antelope, and Left Hand (Niwot), an Arapaho—escorted by Major Edward Wynkoop of the First Colorado into Camp Weld, near Denver, in mid-September.<sup>529</sup> Under Wynkoop’s watchful eye, these Indians had been allowed to place themselves and their people—about 750 in all—under the protection of the military. In exchange for official recognition of their noncombatant status, they were required to surrender their weapons and accept de facto internment under Wynkoop’s supervision at a specified site along Sand Creek, near Fort Lyon in the 1861 reservation area.<sup>‡</sup>

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\* Even after Chivington had made his meaning absolutely clear by perpetrating the massacre at Sand Creek, a U.S. Senator who posed the question at a public meeting of Denver citizens as to whether it might not be better to try and “civilize” the Indians than to exterminate them, was confronted with “a shout almost loud enough to raise the roof of the opera house [in which the meeting was held]—‘EXTERMINATE THEM! EXTERMINATE THEM!’”; Letter of Senator Doolittle to Mrs. L.F.S. Foster, March 7, 1881, Notes and Documents,” *New Mexico Historical Review*, No. 26, Apr. 1951. Such performances place Colorado’s Euroamerican citizenry of 1864 squarely within the ideological/psychological framework attributed to the Germans during the Holocaust.

† The reason for this is that there *was* a war going on between the Cheyennes and white settlers. But it was mainly in western Kansas, not Colorado. Hence, the great bulk of the Indians—and *all* of their combatants, the so-called “Dog Soldiers”—were based along the Smoky Hill and Solomon rivers, well east of Chivington’s operational area. In effect, despite all the hoopla in the *News*, Colorado was in no danger at all; Hoig, *Battle of the Washita*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 6, esp. map at p. 93. Also see Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, *op. cit.*; Captain Eugene F. Ware, *The Indian War of 1864* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1960).

‡ There is considerable indication that Black Kettle and White Antelope wished to establish residence for their noncombatants in Colorado, not simply because this was the locality of the 1861 reserved area, but because both they and the Cheyenne combatants considered the whole territory to be more or less outside the theater of war. The record is clear that Evans was highly uncomfortable that these representatives of a “race” he and his cohorts had depicted as “bloodthirsty savages” should be so obviously desirous of avoiding war. He officially declined to grant peace, inverting U.S. law—which vests such powers exclusively in civil authority—by arguing that “only the military” could do so. General S.R. Curtis, commander of the entire military district of which Colorado was a part, stated flatly that he wanted “no peace until the Indians suffer more.” Both Evans and Chivington did, however, make personal guarantees that, if the peace faction were willing to accept what amounted to prisoner-of-war status at Sand Creek, they would be safe from harm until hostilities ended. Black Kettle and his colleagues agreed, and complied with the military’s instructions from then until they were massacred, less than three months later; Hoig, *Sand Creek Massacre*, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, 116–7, 120.

By early November, Chivington's fearless "Indian fighters" had become a laughingstock, derisively referred to by Coloradans as the "Bloodless Third."<sup>530</sup> At some point mid-month—prompted by a visit by Connor—both the embarrassed officers and their men agreed to serve beyond the expiration of their terms of service in order to make a full-scale assault upon the peace chiefs' immobilized and defenseless village.<sup>531</sup> Moving under cover of a blizzard, the regiment suddenly appeared at Fort Lyon on November 27, and to preserve the secrecy of their arrival—Chivington was determined to preserve the "element of surprise" against his unarmed and woefully outnumbered opponents—"threw a cordon of pickets around the post with orders that no one would be allowed to leave, under penalty of death."<sup>\*</sup>

At 8 p.m. that night, the colonel led about 900 soldiers out of the fort and headed for the village, about thirty miles away. He instructed his troops to "use any means under God's heaven to kill [the] Indians" and to be sure to "kill and scalp all, little and big."<sup>532</sup> The volunteers struck at dawn, despite the fact that both American and white flags were flown over the sleeping encampment. When 75-year-old White Antelope, hands open to show he bore no weapons, attempted to halt the attacking cavalrymen, he was unceremoniously shot to death.<sup>†</sup> A soldier who was visiting the village at the time also tried to head off the attackers. Although waving another white flag of surrender, he too was fired upon.<sup>533</sup>

The Indians fled in all directions, but the main body of them moved up the creek bed, which alone offered some protection from the soldiers' bullets. They fled headlong until they came to a place above the camp where the banks of the river were cut back by

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\*Hoig, *Sand Creek Massacre*, *op. cit.*, p. 140. Wynkoop, to Chivington's knowledge, had left Fort Lyon a day earlier, en route to meet with General Curtis in Kansas. Another officer at the post, Captain Silas S. Soule, tried to intervene with Chivington on the Indians' behalf, explaining that they were not dangerous and considered to be prisoners. Chivington responded that, "They won't be prisoners after we get there." Still another officer, Lt. Joseph A. Cramer, "stated to [Chivington] that I believed [the planned attack] to be 'murder,' and stated the obligations that we of Major Wynkoop's command were under to those Indians... Chivington's reply was... 'damn any man that was in sympathy with Indians,' and such men as Major Wynkoop and myself had better get out of the United States service"; quoted in U.S. Dept. of War, "Sand Creek Massacre," *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 47. Soule refused to allow his company to participate in the massacre and later stated a willingness to testify against Chivington and other officers in open court. He was murdered on the streets of Denver prior to taking the stand. No one was ever prosecuted for his death.

†Afterwards, his corpse was badly mutilated: "The body of White Antelope, lying solitarily in the creek bed, was a prime target. Besides scalping him, the soldiers cut off his nose, ears and testicles—the last for a tobacco pouch... Some of the men later tried to blame this on Lieutenant Autabee's Company H Mexican troops, but there is much evidence Major [Hal] Sayr and Lieutenant [Harry] Richmond were guilty"; "Sand Creek Massacre," *op. cit.*, p. 153.

breaks. Here, the Indians frantically began digging in the loose sand with their hands to make holes in which to hide. The larger percent of these were women and children...<sup>534</sup>

As the scene was later described by Robert Bent, the mixed-blood son of a local trader and a Cheyenne woman who had guided the attackers from Fort Lyon to the village:

I saw five squaws under a bank for shelter. When the troops came up to them they ran out and showed their persons, to let the soldiers know they were squaws and begged for mercy, but the soldiers shot them all... There were some thirty or forty squaws collected in a hole for protection; they sent out a little girl about six years old with a white flag on a stick; she had not proceeded but a few steps when she was shot and killed. All the squaws in the hole were afterwards killed... The squaws offered no resistance. Every one I saw dead was scalped. I saw one squaw cut open with an unborn child, as I thought, lying by her side... I saw quite a number of infants in arms killed with their mothers.<sup>535</sup>

Other soldiers were running down Indians who had fled in different directions, killing some as far as five or six miles from the village. By then, mutilation of the dead and dying had begun in earnest, and the few prisoners taken were being summarily executed.\* As a lieutenant in the New Mexico Volunteers who'd ridden along "to gain experience," would later testify:

Of from five to six hundred souls [who were killed], the majority of which were women and children... I did not see a body of man, woman, or child but was scalped, and in many instances their bodies were mutilated in a most horrible manner—men, women, and children's privates cut out, &c; I heard one man say that he had cut out a woman's private parts and had them for exhibition on a stick; I heard another man say he had cut off the fingers of an Indian to get the rings on the hand... I also heard of numerous instances in which men had cut out the private parts of females and stretched them over the saddle bows and wore them over hats while riding in the ranks... I heard one man say that he had cut a squaw's heart out, and he had it stuck up on a stick.<sup>†</sup>

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\* The best known example is that of Jack Smith, mixed-blood Cheyenne son of army scout John Smith, who was murdered while being held as a prisoner on November 30. Several women prisoners were also shot on the 30th, presumably after suffering gang rape. An infant was kept alive a while longer, but was later discarded as a "nuisance," its throat slit. Chivington's response was simply that he'd ordered that no prisoners be taken in the first place; U.S. Senate, "The Chivington Massacre," *op. cit.*, p. 155.

† "The Chivington Massacre," *op. cit.*, p. 53. The number of Indian dead is again controversial. In his after-action report, Chivington claimed a bodycount of "400 to 500," an estimate he later raised to "500 or 600" during congressional testimony. Major Jacob Downing also later testified that there were "five hundred or six hundred Indians killed," that he had personally "counted two hundred and odd [bodies] within a very short distance from where their village stood," and that the dead were strung out as far as "five or six miles" from there. A trooper named Asbury Bird testified he judged "that between 400 and 500 Indians were killed," that "about half were women and children," and that he'd personally "counted 350 lying up and down the Creek." Sergeant Stephen Decatur placed the number of dead at 450; all quoted in Hoig, *Sand Creek Massacre*, *op. cit.*, pp. 177–92. It seems probable that

Or, to quote from the testimony of John Smith, a frontiersman who served as a scout:

All manner of depredations were inflicted on their persons. They were scalped, their brains knocked out; the men used their knives, ripped open women, clubbed little children, knocked them in the head with their guns, beat their brains out, mutilated their bodies in every sense of the word... worse mutilated than any I ever saw before... [C]hildren two or three months old; all lying there, from sucking infants up to warriors.<sup>536</sup>

In the aftermath of the massacre the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers, joined by several hundred Lakotas, finally gave Colorado a genuine dose of the “war” its officials had been prattling on about.<sup>537</sup> Denver was virtually sealed off from the east for some months,<sup>538</sup> and it soon became apparent that, however proficient they might be in slaughtering the helpless, outfits like Chivington’s “Bloody Third”—as the *News* now proudly dubbed the “bold sojer boys”<sup>\*</sup>—couldn’t begin to cope with the response they’d provoked. Infuriated that regular army troops would be required to resolve the situa-

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these counts were highly inflated. Many other estimates—most importantly, the Cheyennes’ own—placed the real toll at less than 200; see, e.g., Simon J. Ortiz, *From Sand Creek* (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1981).

<sup>\*</sup>The verbiage accrues from coverage of the Third’s triumphal march through the streets of Denver, displaying Cheyenne body parts before an admiring citizenry: “Headed by the First Regiment band, and by Colonels Chivington and Shoup, Lieut. Col. Bowen and Major Sayr, the rank and file of ‘bloody Thirdsters’ made an imposing procession, extending, with the transportation trains, from the upper end of Ferry street, through Latimer, G and Blake, almost back to Ferry again. As the ‘bold sojer boys’ passed along, the sidewalks and corner stands were thronged with citizens saluting their old friends”; *Rocky Mountain News*, Dec. 22, 1864. Pride in what was done to the Cheyennes in 1864 has never abated in Colorado; see, e.g., Lt. Col. William R. Dunn, *“I Stand by Sand Creek”: A Defense of Colonel John M. Chivington and the Third Colorado Cavalry* (Ft. Collins, CO: Old Army Press, 1985). Streets all over Denver are named in honor of those responsible, and a town near the massacre site—marked as a “battlefield” by its current owner, Judge William Dawson—is named for Chivington himself. A monument on the grounds of the state capitol commemorates the Third Colorado Volunteers. Until 1988, the University of Colorado at Boulder had a building named after David M. Nichols, perpetrator of the mini-massacre at Buffalo Springs, and a standout performer at Sand Creek; Patricia Nelson Limerick, “What’s in a Name? Nichols Hall: A Report” (Boulder: unpublished study commissioned by the Regents of the University of Colorado, 1987). A few years earlier, the same campus was barely prevented from naming a second building after such a figure; Ward Churchill, “A Summary of Arguments Against Naming a University Dormitory After Clinton M. Tyler” (Boulder: unpublished report commissioned by the Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs, University of Colorado, 1981). It took until late 1995 for the *News*—grudgingly, in limited fashion, and only after years of pressure by the American Indian Movement and other groups—to concede that there might have been anything in the least wrong with Byers’ open celebration of genocide; “Siding with the Killers,” *Rocky Mountain News*, Dec. 3, 1995. On handling of the subject matter by professional historians, see M.A. Sievers, “The Shifting Sands of Sand Creek Historiography,” *Colorado Magazine*, No. 49, 1972; Ward Churchill, “It Did Happen Here: Sand Creek, Scholarship and the American Character,” in my *Fantasies of the Master Race: Literature, Cinema and the Colonization of American Indians* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1991).

tion, the federal government convened three separate investigations of Sand Creek—one each by the House, Senate, and War Department—all of them concluding that a hideous crime had been committed, and that Chivington, Evans, and other whites were entirely responsible.\*

Armed with these conclusions, and promising reparations (which were never paid), federal negotiators attempted unsuccessfully to effect an accommodation with the Dog Soldiers through the Treaty of the Little Arkansas during the fall of 1865. Another effort was made via the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge, following a spectacularly unsuccessful military campaign headed up by General Winfield Scott Hancock.† This was followed, a year

\* The hype attending these investigations was such that even Colonel Kit Carson, who'd just wrapped up his own campaign against the Diné (see notes 90–93, above)—and whose troops were known to have engaged in recreational activities as playing catch with breasts hacked off living native women—was prepared to denounce the massacre as a “foul deed”; Congress of the United States, *Report of the Joint Special Committee Appointed Under Resolution of March 3, 1865* (Washington, D.C.: 39th Cong., 2d. Sess., 1867) Appendix III, pp. 5–6. Chivington, whose after-action report stated that a single white scalp had been recovered from the Cheyenne lodges at Sand Creek, changed his story during the first hearing, anchoring his defense in the claim that there had been “several scalps of white men and women in Indian lodges.” During the second hearing, he revised the facts still further, testifying that “nineteen” scalps were found. By 1883, the fable had evolved to the point that he reminisced about “capturing...an Indian blanket, fringed with white women’s scalps”; quoted in Hoig, *Sand Creek Massacre*, *op. cit.*, pp. 161, 166, 176. In actuality, as Wynkoop and others testified, there had been no scalps found at all (and the massacre would not have been justified, even if such items had been found); Duane Schultz, *Month of the Freezing Moon: The Sand Creek Massacre, November 1864* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990) p. 173. A better line of argument was offered by Evans and Byers, who asserted—accurately enough—that “Eastern humanitarians” had no moral standing from which to condemn Coloradoans, since they themselves were comfortably ensconced in Indian-free states made that way by employment of precisely the same methods used at Sand Creek; Svaldi, *Sand Creek and the Rhetoric of Extermination*, *op. cit.* That the Easterners could make no viable reply to this postulation is probably best evidenced by the fact that, after ostentatiously proving Chivington and numerous others guilty of crimes against humanity, they opted to penalize no one at all. Chivington and the others, it was said, were not subject to prosecution in civilian courts because they’d been in the military at the time their crimes were committed; conversely, the military claimed prosecution could not occur, since the perpetrators’ commissions had expired prior to the massacre, meaning they were technically civilians at the time it occurred. On the other hand, while thus finessing such charges as mass murder, federal prosecutors did seriously consider filing charges against several officers they believed to have engaged in the illegal sale of Indian horses taken at Sand Creek (the principle being that such monies were due the government). Hence, while expressing “outrage” at the massacre, the government not only did nothing about it, but sought to profit from it; Hoig, *Sand Creek Massacre*, *op. cit.*, p. 169. Also see Patrick J. Mendoza, *Song of Sorrow: Massacre at Sand Creek* (Denver: Willow Wind, 1993).

† The campaign, conducted mostly in western Kansas by some 4,000 troops was an utter failure. Hancock’s crack unit, Custer’s elite Seventh Cavalry—much like Chivington’s volunteers—floundered around for months on the endless Plains without ever coming to grips with their opponent. Frustrated and exhausted, the army finally gave up the chase and agreed to a treaty preserving much of Cheyenne territory and providing them with much-needed arms and ammunition; Douglas C. Jones, *The Treaty of Medicine Lodge: The Story of the Great Indian Council as Told by Eyewitnesses* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966); William E. Connelley, “The Treaty Held at Medicine Lodge,” *Collections of the Kansas State Historical Society*, Vol. XVII, 1928.

later, with an offensive commanded by General Phil Sheridan, a leading proponent of “total war.”\* Pursuing a strategy which combined winter campaigning—to catch the Indians in camp, during the period of their least mobility—with wholesale massacre, Sheridan was at last able to drive the Cheyennes virtually out of existence.<sup>539</sup>

If [a winter campaign] results in the utter annihilation of these Indians... I will say nothing and do nothing to restrain our troops from doing what they may deem proper on the spot, and will allow no vague general charges of cruelty and inhumanity to tie their hands.<sup>540</sup>

The primary instrument of the general's campaign was the newly formed Seventh Cavalry Regiment, commanded by Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer.<sup>541</sup> On November 27, 1868, almost four years to the day after Sand Creek, Custer's men attacked an unsuspecting winter encampment on the big bend of the Washita River, in western Oklahoma. The village was again that of Black Kettle, who'd survived Sand Creek and was still vainly seeking to avoid conflict while securing some kind of sanctuary for native noncombatants.<sup>542</sup> Of the 103 people killed in Custer's dawn assault, “93 were women, old men, and children—as well as Black Kettle, who had been cut down with his wife as they were riding double on a pony in a desperate attempt to forestall the attack.”†

The Washita Massacre took the heart out of most of the remaining Cheyennes in the south. Although a group of Dog Soldiers made their way to the Powder River Country of Montana to merge with their Northern

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\*“Sheridan... was convinced that winter would handicap the Indian and benefit the trooper. Indian ponies would be weak and thin and much slower in winter, while the grain-fed army animals would be stronger. Also, he looked to the element of surprise, since the Indians would be around their lodge fires, not expecting the troops to be out. It was obvious that his troops could not catch and defeat the Indians in the field. As he admitted... it would be necessary to hit their home villages even as Chivington had done at Sand Creek”; Stan Hoig, *The Battle of the Washita* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976) p. 74. Also see DeB. Randolph Keim, *Sheridan's Troopers on the Borders: A Winter Campaign on the Plains* (Philadelphia: David McKay, 1885).

†Axelrod, *Chronicle of the Indian Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 209. Custer burned the lodges, clothing, and food stores—and had his men slaughter an estimated 900 ponies—intending that any survivors should freeze to death in the bitter cold. He had misjudged the situation, however. Having failed to reconnoiter before he attacked—an habitual failing that would cost him his life at the Little Big Horn eight years later—he was unaware that Black Kettle's was only the most southwesterly of a closely spaced string of winter encampments along the Washita. As substantial numbers of Dog Soldiers and other combatants from these other villages began to appear on the scene, he withdrew in such haste that he abandoned a fifteen-man detail under Major Joel Elliott he'd earlier sent upriver to run down fleeing victims. Elliott's group was consequently annihilated; Don Turner, *Custer's First Massacre: The Battle of the Washita* (Amarillo, TX: Humbolt Gulch Press, 1968).

Cheyenne cousins, the bulk of the survivors surrendered to the army at Fort Sill during the spring and summer of 1869.<sup>543</sup> Thus confined, and with many of their remaining leaders sent to prison at Fort Marion, Florida, a few years later—a policy which led to the Sappa Creek Massacre in 1875\*—they had declined to near-extinction by the early twentieth century.<sup>544</sup>

The “Conquest of the Southern Plains” was not yet complete, however.<sup>545</sup> Sheridan’s campaign in particular had embroiled the Comanches, Kiowas, and Kiowa Apaches. Although these peoples accepted an uneasy “peace” for about three years after the Cheyenne decimation, the army’s unofficial policy of fostering the extermination of their traditional “commissary,” the buffalo, forced an all-out counteroffensive against white hunters operating in their territory in 1874.<sup>546</sup> Although early victories were won at places like Adobe Walls, none was decisive, and a campaign headed by General Nelson A. Miles was soon mounted to subdue them once and for all.<sup>547</sup>

Miles brought in the Fourth Cavalry, under Colonel Ranald Mackenzie, fresh from a “limited invasion” of Mexico to “punish” a group of long-suffering Kickapoos who had found sanctuary there.<sup>548</sup> Another practitioner of total war, Mackenzie conducted a brutal winter campaign inaugurated by a September 28, 1874, surprise attack on the main body of Comanches and Kiowas, who had withdrawn to what had always been an inaccessible joint refuge in the Palo Duro Canyon, far out on the Llano Estacado. Although few Indians were killed—the various bands quickly scattered when the assault began—the soldiers were able to capture and kill almost all their horses, and to destroy virtually everything else they possessed.<sup>549</sup> Starving, freezing, and harried relentlessly by Mackenzie’s patrols during the coldest months, the fragments of each people shortly began to surrender.

By May 25, 1875, the “hard core”—a small group of Kiowas led by Satank, and Quannah Parker’s Quahadi Comanches—had laid down their arms. With that, all military resistance by the plains nations south of the Dakota Territory finally ceased.<sup>550</sup> Thereafter, like the Arapahos and

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\*The army’s policy of more or less arbitrarily sending fighting-age Cheyenne males to the Florida prison caused yet another small group to flee northward in 1875. They were tracked by a group of forty soldiers under Lt. Austin Henely, who managed to locate them in a temporary encampment on the Sappa Creek, in northwestern Kansas, near the Colorado line, on April 20. Making the customary dawn attack, Henely’s men were able to trap a group of 27 people—reportedly nineteen men, eight women, and children—and they killed them all. The others, estimated at about thirty, escaped to join the Northern Cheyennes; William D. Street, “Cheyenne Indian Massacre on the Middle Fork of the Sappa,” *Transactions of the Kansas State Historical Society*, Vol. X, 1907–1908; G. Derek West, “The Battle of Sappa Creek, 1875,” *Kansas Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 2, 1968.

Cheyennes (a small number of whom, led by Grey Beard, had joined in the "Buffalo War"), both the Kiowas and Comanches, as well as their Kiowa Apache allies, were stripped of what little land remained to them, rendered absolutely dependent upon their conquerors for subsistence, and rapidly declined to nadir population (by 1900 the Kiowas, for example, who numbered more than 6,000 in 1800, had fewer than 1,300 survivors; there were less than 500 Kiowa Apaches by that point, and the Comanches were reduced by about 90 percent, overall).<sup>551</sup>

### *Death Song*

The northern plains proved a more difficult proposition for the United States. In the summer of 1866, Red Cloud (Mahpiya Luta), a preeminent Oglala political leader, was able to bring all seven bands of his people together, along with the Northern Cheyennes and Arapahos, as well as some refugee Santees, and lay siege to Fort Phil Kearny, most northerly of the posts thus far completed along the Bozeman Trail.<sup>552</sup> With more than 3,000 warriors, the Indians constituted a formidable opponent for the army, especially since the bulk of its available resources were tied up in Kansas and Colorado, trying to contain the indigenous response to Sand Creek.<sup>553</sup>

The situation was greatly exacerbated on December 21, when a unit under Captain William J. Fetterman was annihilated near Fort Kearny.<sup>554</sup> As the months dragged on it became apparent that the Indians were becoming steadily stronger. Unable to muster anything approaching the number of troops needed to defeat Red Cloud's alliance, and in constant danger of suffering even more catastrophic losses in its undermanned Wyoming garrisons, the army began sending out peace feelers during the late summer of 1867.<sup>555</sup> Red Cloud's response was that he would not be interested in negotiating until all U.S. forces had been withdrawn from Lakota territory and the Bozeman Trail posts destroyed. After procrastinating for several months, the army complied with these terms and Red Cloud finally agreed to a treaty, signed at Fort Laramie in November 1868.<sup>556</sup>

This new instrument reaffirmed much of what had been established by its 1851 predecessor with respect to the Lakotas and allied Cheyennes and Arapahos. It defined their territory as extending from the east bank of the Missouri River westward to the Big Horn Mountains, and southward from the upper Missouri to the North Platte River (an area, centering on the Black Hills, totaling about 5 percent of the 48 states). Under the 1868 treaty,

the army could not build forts in Indian Country and was required to patrol the borders to prevent U.S. nationals from trespassing therein. No portion of the treaty territory could be sold or otherwise alienated without the express written consent of at least three-quarters of all adult male Lakotas.\*

The treaty was actually honored to a large extent for several years while the army concentrated on winning its “Buffalo War” on the southern plains. With the end of that conflict in sight by 1874, however, things began to change in the north. During the summer of that year, Custer’s Seventh Cavalry was ordered to make a “reconnaissance in force” into the Black Hills for purposes of assessing potential mineral wealth there.<sup>557</sup> Although it is dubious whether anything was actually found, Custer, writing under a pseudonym, reported in the Eastern press that he’d discovered “gold at the grass-roots.”† In short order, whites were pouring into Paha Sapa—as the Lakotas called this, their most sacred area—and the army was doing nothing to fulfill its treaty obligation to prevent their coming.<sup>558</sup>

Indeed, after a follow-up expedition in 1875 (during which gold *was* found), the United States demanded that the Lakotas sell the entire region.<sup>559</sup> When the Indians refused, it was announced in Washington that they’d “declared war on America,” and a huge three-pronged invasion of their territory—the so-called “Centennial Campaign”—was set in motion during the spring of 1876.<sup>560</sup> Although the offensive itself fared rather poorly—some 1,200 Lakotas and Cheyennes led by Crazy Horse (Tesunke Witko) defeated a 1,500-man column under General George Crook at the

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\*The Lakota/Cheyenne/Arapaho landbase was divided into three components: everything in present-day South Dakota west of the east bank of the Missouri was designated a “Great Sioux Reservation.” All of Nebraska north of the North Platte was designated as a permanent hunting territory, at least “so long as there [was] sufficient game to warrant the chase.” All of Wyoming east of the Big Horn Mountains and of Montana and North Dakota south of the upper Missouri were declared “Unceded Indian Territory,” for exclusive use and occupancy of the three indigenous nations. This last area included the Bozeman Trail route and the Powder River Country; Kappler, *Indian Treaties*, *op. cit.*, pp. 998–1007; Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, *The Great Sioux Nation: Sitting in Judgment on America* (San Francisco/New York: International Indian Treaty Council/Moon Books, 1978).

†The false reports were sent out via Custer’s favorite scout, “Lonesome” Charlie Reynolds, who was assigned the dangerous mission of carrying them through hostile territory to Fort Laramie (from whence they were posted by telegraph). Reynolds later admitted that he himself had seen no gold. The expedition’s chief geologist, Newton H. Winchell, said the same thing. Custer, however, insisted that he’d found the “New Eldorado” in a letter to the *New York World*, this time using his own name, published Dec. 13, 1874. How frequently the “Boy General” indulged in such deceptions is unclear, but was certainly often. He was, for instance, assigned the code name “Alta” for purposes of submitting whatever stories he chose on “the Black Hills situation,” whether “signed or unsigned,” to James Gordon Bennett, publisher of the *New York Herald* (letter dated April 1, 1875; Elizabeth Bacon Custer Collection, Little Big Horn National Monument, Package 31).

Rosebud Creek on June 17,<sup>561</sup> and Custer's regiment, overconfident and expecting to perpetrate another Washita-style massacre, was shredded in the valley of the Little Big Horn, on the 25th<sup>\*</sup>—the writing was on the wall.

As early as 1867, General of the Army William Tecumseh Sherman had opined that, "We must act with vindictive earnestness against the [Lakotas], even to their extermination, men, women and children."<sup>†</sup> During the winter of 1876–77, Ranald Mackenzie was brought to Wyoming to duplicate his success against the Comanches and Kiowas a year earlier. Beginning in mid-October, the colonel's command, as well as forces under Generals Crook and Miles, scoured the Powder River Country, attacking each village they came across.<sup>562</sup> Mackenzie's November 25 assault on the camp of Dull Knife, a noted Cheyenne leader, was indicative:

It was the month of the Deer Rutting Moon, and very cold, with deep snow in the shaded places and ice-crusted snow in the open places. Mackenzie had brought his troops up to attacking positions during the night, and struck the Cheyennes at first daylight. . . . They caught the Cheyennes in their lodges, killing many of them as they came

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\*Custer had definite presidential ambitions by 1876, and felt that one more "great victory" over the Indians would enhance his chances. He therefore disobeyed orders to locate but not to attack the Lakotas on his own. Unaware of the size of the force arrayed against him—nobody knew of Crook's defeat on the Rosebud at this point—and trusting to his fabled "luck," he then repeated his mistake at the Washita by not conducting a proper reconnaissance of his adversary before attacking. Believing he'd encountered merely one more defenseless encampment, he iced the cake by dividing his regiment into three parts in order to trap all who might attempt to escape his intended massacre. The result was that the body of troops under his personal command was completely wiped out, while a second, under Major Marcus Reno, was very nearly so. The Lakotas and Cheyennes, again led by Crazy Horse, then pinned the survivors down for two solid days; Connell, *Son of the Morning Star*, *op. cit.*; Van de Water, *Glory Hunter*, *op. cit.*; Edgar I. Stewart, *Custer's Luck* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955); Mari Sandoz, *The Battle of the Little Big Horn* (New York: Curtis, 1966); Steven E. Ambrose, *Crazy Horse and Custer: The Parallel Lives of Two American Warriors* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975).

†Quoted in Axelrod, *Chronicle of the Indian Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 203. A glimpse of what Sherman had in mind was offered on January 23, 1870, when a cavalry force under Major Eugene M. Baker—who had been instructed by General Sheridan to "strike them hard"—attacked a peaceful Piegan village along the Marias River in northern Montana. Of the 173 Indians killed and mutilated, only fifteen were fighting-age males, while fifty or more were children under twelve. Lt. Gustavus Doan, who had served as a scout on the expedition, later described what had happened as a "complete slaughter." Sheridan—and, by extension, Sherman, who supported him fully—defended Baker's action on the basis that the Cheyennes had been raiding settlements in southern Kansas, more than 600 miles away; Athearn, *William Tecumseh Sherman*, *op. cit.*, pp. 278–9; Wesley C. Wilson, "The Army and the Piegans: The Baker Massacre on the Marias, 1870," *North Dakota History*, No. 32, 1965; Robert J. Ege, "Tell Baker to Strike Them Hard!": *Incident on the Marias, Jan. 23, 1870* (Bellevue, NB: Old Army Press, 1970). The impact of the massacre on the Piegans, already much-reduced by the smallpox pandemic unleashed at Fort Clark a generation earlier, is discussed in James Welch, *Killing Custer: The Battle of the Little Big Horn and the Fate of the Plains Indians* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994). Also see John Canfield Ewers, *The Blackfeet: Raiders of the Northern Plains* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958).



Big Foot's band of Miniconjou Sioux, before and after. Above, assembled on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation in August 1890; below, after being massacred by the 7th Cavalry at Wounded Knee on December 29, 1890. Top photo: National Archives and Records Administration. Bottom photo: U.S. Army



awake. Others ran out naked into the biting cold, the warriors trying to fight off... the onrushing soldiers long enough for their women and children to escape... Some of the best warriors of the Northern Cheyennes sacrificed their lives in those first furious moments of fighting; one of them was Dull Knife's oldest son. Dull Knife and Little Wolf [another prominent leader] finally managed to form a rear guard along the upper ledges of a canyon, but their scanty supply of ammunition was soon exhausted. Little Wolf was shot seven times before he and Dull Knife broke away to join their women and children in full flight toward the Bighorns. Behind them Mackenzie was burning their lodges, and after that was done he herded their captured ponies against the canyon wall and ordered his men to shoot them down...<sup>563</sup>

More than a hundred Cheyennes, two-thirds of them women, children and elders, had been killed before the survivors managed to get away. Their ordeal, however, was just beginning.

During the first night of flight, twelve infants and several old people froze to death. The next night, the men killed some of the ponies, disemboweled them, and thrust small children inside to keep them from freezing... For three days they tramped across the frozen snow, their bare feet leaving a trail of blood, [before reaching Crazy Horse's Oglala encampment on the Box Elder Creek].<sup>564</sup>

On January 8, Miles's troops located and attacked this village as well, and so the whole process was repeated.<sup>565</sup> And so it went, month after month. By the end of April 1877, even Crazy Horse's people had surrendered, and the last "Sioux recalcitrants"—a handful of Hunkpapas led by Sitting Bull (Tatanka Yatanka) and Gall (Pizi)—had fled to sanctuary in Canada.\* In short order, disarmed, dismounted, and dispirited, the Northern Cheyennes were deported to the reservation of their southern cousins in Oklahoma.<sup>566</sup> In the fall, Crazy Horse was assassinated,<sup>567</sup> and rations to the captive Lakotas were suspended until a scattering of leaders finally agreed to sign a document allegedly transferring ownership of the Black Hills to the United States.<sup>†</sup>

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\*Crazy Horse was promised a reservation in the Powder River Country—a pledge the United States never had any intention of honoring—in exchange for laying down his arms; Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*, *op. cit.*, pp. 308–10. On those who went to Canada, see Stanley Vestal, *Sitting Bull: Champion of the Sioux* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1932).

†Ranald Mackenzie suspended rations to captive Lakotas, pending agreement to a cession of the Black Hills, in September 1876. Ultimately, about 15 percent of all adult male Lakotas signed the transfer instrument—a far cry from the 75 percent required to legitimate such cessions under provision of the still-binding 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty—in order to feed their families. Despite the transparent illegality of the proceedings, Congress passed a law taking formal possession of the Hills in February 1877. At about the same time, contrary to the promises made to Crazy Horse, the Unceded Indian Territory was stripped away, and General Sheridan called for extermination of what remained of the northern buffalo herds, partly to confirm Lakota economic dependency, partly to negate their treaty

In September 1878, about half the remaining Northern Cheyennes, horrified at the attrition they were suffering under the conditions imposed upon them in Oklahoma, broke out of their confinement and attempted to return to their Powder River homeland.<sup>568</sup> Led by Dull Knife and Little Wolf, they were stalked by more than 15,000 troops as they struggled northward, and the initial body of “renegades” was again ground down to about half its size.<sup>569</sup> Finally, in utter exhaustion, Dull Knife’s group of some 150 people—composed, as usual, almost exclusively of women, children, and old men—gave themselves up at Camp Robinson, Nebraska. Confined to an unheated guardhouse in the dead of winter, without rations, the prisoners were informed they would be shipped back to the south.<sup>570</sup> At that point, more desperate than ever, they tried to escape again on the night of January 9, 1879.

[The] soldiers began overtaking scattered bands of women and children, killing many of them before they could surrender... When the morning came, the soldiers herded 65 Cheyenne prisoners, 23 of them wounded, back into [Camp] Robinson... Only 38 of those who had escaped were still alive and free; 32 were together, moving north through the hills and pursued by four companies of cavalry and a battery of mountain artillery... For several days the cavalymen followed the 32 Cheyennes, until at last they were trapped in a deep buffalo wallow. Charging to the edge of the wallow, the cavalymen emptied their carbines into it... Only nine Cheyennes survived.<sup>571</sup>

By this point, fewer than 500 Northern Cheyennes—less than 10 percent of their original number—remained alive.<sup>572</sup> Although the Lakotas never came this close to outright extermination, they experienced considerable population losses during the early reservation years. By the late 1880s, nearly 90 percent of their treaty territory had been taken from them, their sociopolitical and spiritual life had been abolished under penalty of law, and they were being deliberately starved.<sup>573</sup> One response to these circumstances was an increasingly widespread adoption of the Ghost Dance—a belief that if certain rituals were performed with sufficient devotion, the whites would disappear, while the buffalo and other dead relatives would be reborn, making life as it had once been.<sup>574</sup>

While it is obvious that this forlorn practice presented absolutely no threat to the United States or its citizens, the army seized upon it as an

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claim to their Nebraska hunting territory. This history is well-handled in Inouye, “1986 Black Hills Hearing,” *op. cit.* Also see Ward Churchill, “The Earth Is Our Mother: Struggles for American Indian Land and Liberation in the Contemporary United States,” in my *Since Predator Came*, *op. cit.*

opportunity to simultaneously break the last traces of native resistance, and to extract another measure of revenge for the humiliations it had experienced at the hands of the Lakotas in 1868 and 1876.<sup>575</sup> More than 3,000 troops were fielded to put down the Ghost Dance “insurrection,” Sitting Bull—who had returned from Canada in 1881—was murdered on December 15, 1890,<sup>576</sup> and the reconstituted Seventh Cavalry captured a terrified group of about 350 Minneconjous, led by Big Foot, on the Wounded Knee Creek on December 28.\* On the morning of the 29th, the troops proceeded to massacre their unarmed prisoners, using both rifles and Hotchkiss guns carefully placed on surrounding hills for the purpose.

[All] witnesses agree that from the moment it opened fire, [the Seventh] ceased to be a military unit and became a mass of infuriated men intent on butchery. Women and children attempted to escape by running up a dry ravine, but were pursued and slaughtered—there is no other word—by hundreds of maddened soldiers, while shells from the Hotchkiss guns, which had been moved to allow them to sweep the ravine, continued to burst among them. The line of bodies afterward was found to extend more than two miles from the camp—and they were all women and children. A few survivors eventually found shelter in brushy gullies here and there, and their pursuers had scouts call out that women and children could come out of hiding because they had nothing to fear... Some small boys crept out and were surrounded by soldiers who then butchered them. Nothing Indian that lived was safe.<sup>577</sup>

The dead—more than 300 in all—were buried in a mass grave on New Year’s Day 1891,<sup>578</sup> while editorialists like L. Frank Baum of the *Aberdeen Saturday Pioneer* (who would later attain fame as the gentle author of the *Wizard of Oz*) called for the army to “finish the job” by exterminating *all* remaining Indians. “The nobility of the Redskin is extinguished... The Whites, by law of conquest, by justice of civilization, are masters of the American continent, and the best safety of the frontier settlements will be secured by the total annihilation of the few remaining Indians. Why not annihilation? Their glory has fled,

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\* The commander of the Seventh Cavalry at this point was Colonel George A. Forsyth, who, aside from any desire he might have had to “even the score” for the Little Big Horn debacle, had more personal motives for seeking revenge. In September 1868, he had been head of an elite fifty-man ranger unit sent out by Sheridan to track and kill Cheyennes. He had succeeded too well, finding a large group of Dog Soldiers led by Roman Nose on the Beaver Creek, just across the Kansas line in Colorado. The Indians had besieged Forsyth and his erstwhile Indian-killers on a tiny sand spit in the creek for several days, killing or wounding nearly all of them before they suffered the additional indignity of being rescued by a company of Tenth Cavalry troopers (an African American regiment, also called the “Buffalo Soldiers”). Forsyth finally settled accounts for his humiliating ordeal at “Beecher’s Island”—so-named in honor of Lt. Frederick Beecher, who died there—on December 29, 1890; Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*, *op. cit.*, pp. 164–6, 401–2.

their spirit broken, their manhood effaced; better that they should die than live the miserable wretches that they are.”<sup>579</sup> Thus ended the “Indian Wars.”

### Digestion and Domination

It is true that the United States did not follow through on calls such as Baum’s to effect the total physical extirpation of indigenous people within its borders. Then again, there was really no need for the country to absorb the expense entailed in doing so. With the native population reduced to not more than 2.5 percent of its original size, the United States had expropriated 97.5 percent of the aboriginal landbase.<sup>580</sup> The fragments of geography left to the Indians by 1900 were considered worthless, unfarmable, arid patches of dust deemed remote enough to allow for the steady die-off of survivors, conveniently out of sight and mind of the dominant society. And there were, of course, federal policies designed to help the process along.<sup>581</sup>

At least as early as the administration of Ulysses S. Grant in the mid-1870s, there was an influential lobby which held that the final eradication of native cultures and population could be achieved more cost-effectively—and with a far greater appearance of “humanitarianism”—through a process of “assimilation” than by force of arms.<sup>582</sup> By the first years of the twentieth century, officials like Indian Commissioner Francis Leupp were explaining that the objective was to “kill the Indian, spare the man,” to which end the government’s policy of assimilation constituted a “great pulverizing engine for breaking up the tribal mass.”<sup>583</sup> A decade later, Leupp’s successor, Charles Burke articulated the same principle: “It is not consistent with the general welfare to promote [American Indian national or cultural] characteristics and organization.”<sup>584</sup> In effect, it was the express goal of federal policy to bring about the “digestion” of what little remained of Native North America as rapidly and efficiently as possible.

Leupp and Burke were making specific reference to the effects of the 1887 General Allotment Act which voided the customary collectivity of land holdings still prevailing among American Indians during the early reservation period, imposing in its stead the supposedly more “civilized and enlightened” Anglo-Saxon model of individual property ownership.<sup>585</sup> Under provision of the Act, Indians were universally defined on the basis of “blood quantum”—that is, genetic rather than national-political criteria—for the first time under U.S. law.<sup>586</sup> Once each Indian eligible to be considered one under this new definition had been allotted his or her individual 160-acre

parcel, the balance of reserved territory was declared “surplus” and opened to corporate use, homesteading by non-Indians, or conversion into national parks, forests, or military reservations. Not only were most indigenous societies thoroughly atomized by the process, which continued until 1934, but about 100 million of the approximately 150 million acres remaining in native hands at the outset were stripped away.<sup>587</sup>

Several other components were attached to this centerpiece of federal assimilationism. By 1894, virtually the entire range of indigenous spiritual practices had been outlawed, a measure expressly intended to eradicate all vestiges of the traditions which afforded cohesion and continuity to native cultures.<sup>588</sup> Meanwhile, the bulk of all American Indian children were forcibly removed from their communities at the earliest possible age and sent to remote boarding schools where they were systematically deculturated. Kept in these institutions for years on end, they were prohibited not only from practicing their religions, but from speaking their languages, dressing or wearing their hair in the customary manner, and often from having even cursory contact with friends and families as well. Meanwhile, they were subjected to sustained indoctrination in Christianity and Western values, in combination with the rudimentary skills which would allow them to serve as laborers and functionaries for the dominant society.<sup>589</sup>

As of 1924, under provision of the Indian Citizenship Act, all indigenous people within U.S. boundaries were unilaterally declared to be citizens of the United States—with all the obligations attending such status—while retaining mere “membership” in their own “tribes.”<sup>590</sup> Most likely, this was intended to be the culminating gesture of assimilation in its original form, with all remaining reserved areas to be dissolved and the residual native population dispersed over the next few years.<sup>591</sup> To all appearances, it was only the entirely unforeseen circumstance of certain reservations proving to be extraordinarily mineral-rich which prevented this consummating process of sociocultural digestion from occurring.<sup>592</sup>

By the late 1920s, two belated discoveries had been made. First, it was becoming clear that the “useless” tracts of real estate left to Indians actually contained vast quantities of coal, oil, natural gas, copper, and other minerals (later it was found that about two-thirds of all U.S. “domestic” uranium deposits are also located in reservation areas).<sup>593</sup> Second, as the experience of the Oklahoma oil boom had amply demonstrated, placing these resources in public domain was not the most efficient, or even profitable, manner in which to exploit them.<sup>594</sup>

Only by continuing to hold reserved native lands in trust could the federal government retain its prerogative to engage in centralized planning—which resources would be “developed” at what pace, by whom, and at what royalty rates—with respect to disposition of the minerals within them.<sup>595</sup> It thus became necessary to preserve the reservations and at least some of the peoples resident to them, albeit in a perpetually destitute and subjugated condition.

Almost overnight, the more directly annihilatory aspects of assimilationism were abandoned in favor of a relatively permanent internal colonial model.<sup>596</sup> Under provision of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), the remains of traditional indigenous forms of governance were supplanted by “more democratic” structures designed in Washington and patterned after the sorts of puppet regimes already perfected in Africa and Asia by the European imperial powers (variations of which would shortly be deployed in Europe itself by the nazis).<sup>597</sup> These served—and continue to serve—as the essential apparatus of control by which native resources might be consumed on an almost cost-free basis while providing the illusion of indigenous endorsement of and participation in the process of exploitation.<sup>598</sup>

The most obvious by-product of this arrangement has been that contemporary Native North Americans, given their resource profile and per capita land holdings, should be the wealthiest sector of the continent’s populace, but are instead the most impoverished. Indians incur by far the lowest annual and lifetime incomes of any group on the continent, and the highest rates of unemployment. We also experience, by a decisive margin, the highest rates of infant mortality, death by malnutrition, exposure, and plague disease.<sup>599</sup> Such conditions produce the sort of endemic despair that generates chronic alcoholism and other forms of substance abuse among more than half the native population—factors contributing not only to further erosion in physical health but to very high accident rates—as well as rates of teen suicide up to 14.5 times the national average.\*

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\*The effects of alcohol, consciously used by Europeans/Euroamericans since colonial times as a sort of “chemical weapon” to dissipate indigenous societies, has received inexcusably short shrift in this essay. The author apologizes for this deficiency and refers readers to Joy Leland’s *Firewater Myths: American Indian Drinking and Drug Addiction* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Center for Alcohol Studies, 1976). For comparable data on Canada, see, e.g., N. Geisbrecht, J. Brown, et al., *Alcohol Problems in Northwestern Ontario: Preliminary Report on Consumption Patterns, and Public Order and Public Health Problems* (Toronto: Addiction Research Foundation, 1977). An excellent case study of the effects of the complex of factors at issue will be found in Anastasia M. Shkilnyk’s *A Poison Stronger Than Love: The Destruction of an Ojibwa Community* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

The upshot is that, during the late twentieth century, reservation-based American Indian men have a life expectancy of only 44.6 years, as compared to a longevity among general-population males of 71.8 years. Reservation-based women can expect to live about three years longer than their male counterparts, as compared to general-population females, who live an average of eight years longer than men. Put another way, every time a reservation Indian dies—or, conversely, every time one is born—approximately one-third of a lifetime is lost.<sup>600</sup> The data among urbanized Indians, at this point about 55 percent of all federally recognized native people, is only marginally better. Hence, the net impact of the modern North American internal colonial order on the indigenous population is something on the order of 30 percent attrition, generation in, generation out.\*

“Genocidal” is the only reasonable manner in which to describe the imposition, as a matter of policy, of such physiocultural effects upon any target group.<sup>601</sup> This is all the more true when one factors in specific initiatives undertaken by federal authorities to control the size of the native population, both locally and overall. These include, beginning in the late 1940s—partly to cut the already minimal costs associated with “supporting” them on the reservations, partly to clear portions of the reservation for purposes of mining—the resumption of assimilationism’s program of coerced removal of indigenous people from their lands and societies.<sup>†</sup> During the 1950s and early ’60s, this effort was coupled to the outright termination of recognition of the existence of some 108 indigenous nations—none of them possessing substantial mineral wealth—whose reserved landbases were then simply dissolved.<sup>602</sup>

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\* *Chart Series Book*, *op. cit.* This is not to say that sectors of other population groups—e.g., Latino migrant workers and inner-city blacks—do not share the degree of impoverishment, attendant maladies, and truncated life spans suffered by Native Americans. In these examples, however, it is a portion of the overall population which is at issue. With American Indians, the data derives from the entire population aggregate; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *General Social and Economic Characteristics: United States Summary* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983). Also see Alan L. Sorkin, *The Urban American Indian* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1978); M. Belinda Tucker, Waddell M. Herron, Dan Nakasai, Luis Ortiz-Franco, and Lenore Stiffarm, *Ethnic Groups in Los Angeles: Quality of Life Indicators* (Los Angeles: UCLA Ethnic Studies Centers, 1987).

† Donald L. Fixico, *Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945–1960* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986). Another aspect concerns the fact that when the Indian landbase was fixed through allotment during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was pegged to the approximately 250,000 eligible individuals alive at the time. Given the official anticipation that Indians would shortly die out altogether, no provision was made to accommodate a resurgence in the numbers of native people. Hence, when federal policy shifted to internal colonialism, and the indigenous population consequently began to rebound from its 1890 nadir, the reservation landbase was quickly outstripped; Ethel J. Williams, “Too Little Land, Too Many Heirs: The Indian Heirship Land Problem,” *Washington Law Review*, No. 46, 1971.

A decade later, even more draconian methods were employed when the so-called “Indian Health Service” (IHS) of the Bureau of Indian Affairs administered a secret program resulting in the involuntary—and frequently completely uninformed—sterilization of about 42 percent of all American Indian women of childbearing age before it was allegedly halted in 1976.\* At about the same time, an ongoing program was initiated to disperse and destroy the largest remaining enclave of traditional Indians in the United States—the approximately 13,000 Diné of the Big Mountain region in Arizona—in order to make way for the draglines of the Peabody Coal Company.<sup>603</sup>

A decade later still, in the mid-to late 1980s, Inuit children on Alaska’s oil-rich North Slope were forced to serve as guinea pigs in the “field testing” of hepatitis vaccines which had been banned from international distribution by the World Health Organization (WHO) because of a presumed link to the transmission of HIV microbes. When the WHO report was discovered by Alaska natives, who then refused to allow further inoculation of their offspring, the tests were shifted southward, targeting reservation children in the lower 48 states.<sup>604</sup> Although the WHO’s suspicions are as yet unconfirmed, it is undeniable that the federal government demonstrated its willingness to sacrifice an entire generation of several indigenous groups in an effort to challenge the data, primarily to enhance the profitability of at least two major pharmaceutical corporations.†

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\* The government essentially conceded the allegations after hearings on the matter were forced in Oklahoma, and affected an “administrative remedy” by removing the IHS from the BIA and situating it in the Department of Health and Human Services. Needless to say, no one was prosecuted for this perpetration of a genocidal program. Indeed, so far as is known, no one even lost a job; Brint Dillingham, “Indian Women and IHS Sterilization Practices,” *American Indian Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Jan. 1977; Janet Larson, “And Then There Were None,” *Christian Century*, Jan. 26, 1977; “Women of All Red Nations, Native American Women” (New York: International Indian Treaty Council, 1978); Robin Jarrell, “Women and Children First: The Forced Sterilization of American Indian Women” (undergraduate thesis, Wesley College, 1978). The same sorts of programs were also aimed during this period against other communities of color, e.g.: the forced sterilization of about one-third of the women of child-bearing age in Puerto Rico, 44 percent of the Puertorriqueñas in New Haven, and 51 percent in Hartford, Connecticut; Margarita, *Política Sexual y Socialización Política de la Mujer Puertorriqueña la Consolidación del Bloque Histórico Colonial de Puerto Rico* (Río Piedras, P.R.: Ediciones Huracán, 1989); Committee for Abortion rights and Against Sterilization Abuse, *Women Under Attack: Abortion, Sterilization Abuse, and Reproductive Freedom* (New York: CARASA, 1979).

† Such medical experimentation is actually nothing new for the natives of the North Slope. In 1995, it was disclosed on the *60 Minutes* TV news program that, during the early to-mid-1950s, the Department of Defense secretly fed doses of refined uranium to unsuspecting Inuits in order to study the long-term effects of such nuclear contamination on the human organism. It was fully expected that the test subjects would suffer all manner of physical maladies as a result, produce defective offspring (if they were not sterilized by internalized radiation), and mostly suffer miserable deaths from cancer. The mentality which considered this to be acceptable practice is obviously quite consistent

Such priorities correspond perfectly with those evident in federal policymakers' practice, from 1952 onward, of situating U.S. mining and milling of uranium—and with these processes, the highly radioactive waste by-products which attend them—almost exclusively in reservation areas, despite the fact that substantial ore deposits were known to be available elsewhere.<sup>605</sup> The results of this practice are a maximization of profits for energy corporations with increasingly severe carcinogenic/mutogenic effects on the Diné, Lagunas, and other indigenous peoples.<sup>606</sup> This couples readily to federal plans to locate nuclear-waste storage facilities and accompanying contamination on reservations such as that of the Mescalero Apaches in New Mexico, and in predominately native-occupied environments such as Yucca Mountain, in New Segobia, the much-bombed Nevada treaty territory of the Western Shoshoni.<sup>607</sup>

The situation of Native North Americans thus remains much as it has been since the moment the Old World predator landed in the hemisphere. Liquidated to the extent deemed necessary or convenient by the invader—in precisely the fashion, and at exactly the pace the invader's capacity to inflict liquidation has allowed—we are maintained alive at all primarily as a matter of utility by our colonizers, and then only in a form considered acceptable to them. No amount of humanitarian rhetoric, demographic sleights of hand, or deformity and denial of history can alter the substance of these essential realities. The genocide which has been perpetrated against the indigenous peoples of this continent is an experience unparalleled in its scope, magnitude, and duration (other than that of the native peoples of Ibero-America). Moreover, it is a process which is ongoing.\*

## Alternatives

To paraphrase Karl Marx, the purpose of studying history is not so much to understand it—although that is certainly important enough in its own

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with that analyzed by Robert Jay Lifton in his book, *The Nazi Doctors* (*op. cit.*). Also see Arthur L. Caplan, ed., *When Medicine Went Mad: Bioethics and the Holocaust* (Ottawa, NJ: Humana Press, 1992); George J. Annas, *The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human Rights in Medical Experimentation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

\*This statement is in no way intended to diminish the significance of genocides suffered by other peoples throughout the world, historically or presently, in places like Rwanda and East Timor. One genocide is as horrible as another. Each has its own uniquely awful attributes. The point is that what occurred, and is occurring, in the Americas is indeed as bad as anything that happened to anyone, anywhere, ever, and that there are substantial lessons to be learned from this fact.

right—as it is to acquire the conceptual/intellectual tools with which to change it.<sup>609</sup> This is as true with regard to the perpetration of genocide as it is with anything else. “To identify the relevant parameters is the first step in the prevention of future genocides,” observe Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn in an important comparative study of the phenomenon.<sup>609</sup> The identification of these parameters is, however, largely contingent upon the willingness of scholars to call things by their right names, inculcating among people of conscience everywhere an ever-increasing consciousness of what genocide actually is, how and why it has occurred historically, and the ways in which its legacy has shaped our contemporary sociopolitical, cultural, and economic environments.<sup>610</sup>

This is the only way in which we are ever going to be able to arrive at situation in which genocide is not only “unthinkable” for most people, but impossible or at least much more difficult to perpetrate than it has been for a very long time. It is also the only way in which those who have or do engage in genocidal practices can ever be held accountable for their crimes, both figuratively and literally. We are speaking here not merely of a matter of simple justice, but of the question of sheer survival for millions of human beings.<sup>611</sup>

Of course, the myriad horrors recounted in this essay can never be undone. The outcomes deriving from their cumulative effect can, however. The course of future history *is* alterable. Not only can the continuing genocide of North America’s native peoples at last be halted, but the benefits of that genocide—real, potential, and perceived—can ultimately be revoked.<sup>612</sup> Absent the tangible or imaginary attainment of profit, racial/ethnic/national/religious supremacy, and ideological purity which has always motivated genocidal activity, and the incentive to engage in it for the most part disappears. If such lack of likely gain were coupled to the prospect of punishment—whether directly or even indirectly—through the assessments of posterity, we would begin to achieve some degree of genuine disincentive to genocidal behavior.\* This last can be made to stand as a barrier against those who would seek to commit genocide against other peoples, in other places, in the years ahead.

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\*The question of “indirect punishment, through the assessments of posterity,” may be confusing. This is to say that in heroicizing people like Columbus and Cortés, George Washington and Andrew Jackson, Kit Carson and Custer, society strongly reinforces the notion that their genocidal conduct was/is an appropriate and acceptable manner in which to attain fame and “immortality.” Conversely, placing them where they belong in the historical lexicon—alongside the likes of Attila the Hun and Heinrich Himmler—would tend to convey the opposite message. Historical villification is, after all, a form of punishment *not* aspired to by many people.

Creation of such circumstances comprises an agenda truly worthy of pursuit and fulfillment. It can be actualized, however, only through an unflinching willingness to recognize things for what they have been—and, by extension, for what they are—and then to act accordingly. Any such posture entails not only an unstinting and rigorous effort to apprehend the essential meanings of historical processes, but to confront, unmask and thoroughly debunk those who seek, whether individually or institutionally, to obfuscate, degrade, or deny such meanings. If the present essay can be said to have contributed in any way to such an endeavor—and that has been the sole purpose of preparing it—then the effort will have been well warranted.

## Notes

1. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930: The Indian Population of the United States and Alaska* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937) esp. Table II, "Indian Population by Divisions and States, 1890–1930," p. 3. The Canadian counts are taken from James M. Mooney, *The Aboriginal Population of America North of Mexico* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections LXXX, No. 7, Smithsonian Institution, 1928) p. 33.

2. See, e.g., B.O. Flower, "An Interesting Representative of a Vanishing Race," *Arena*, July 1896; Simon Pokagon, "The Future of the Red Man," *Forum*, Aug. 1897; William R. Draper, "The Last of the Red Race," *Cosmopolitan*, Jan. 1902; Charles M. Harvey, "The Last Race Rally of Indians," *World's Work*, May 1904; E. S. Curtis, "Vanishing Indian Types: The Tribes of the Northwest Plains," *Scribner's*, June 1906; James Mooney, "The Passing of the Indian," *Proceedings of the Second Pan American Scientific Congress, Sec. 1: Anthropology* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1909–1910); Joseph K. Dixon, *The Vanishing Race: The Last Great Indian Council* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1913); Stanton Elliot, "The End of the Trail," *Overland Monthly*, July 1915; Ella Higginson, "The Vanishing Race," *Red Man*, Feb. 1916; Ales Hrdlicka, "The Vanishing Indian," *Science*, No. 46, 1917; J.L. Hill, *The Passing of the Indian and the Buffalo* (Long Beach, CA: n.p., 1917); John Collier, "The Vanishing American," *Nation*, Jan. 11, 1928.

3. This is handled well in Wilber R. Jacobs, "The Tip of the Iceberg: Precolumbian Demography and Some Implications for Revisionism," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Ser., No. 31, 1974.

4. The concept and its application are well articulated by Boyce Richardson in his *People of Terra Nullius: Betrayal and Rebirth in Canada* (Seattle/Vancouver: University of Washington Press/Douglas McIntire, 1993). More broadly, see L.C. Green and Olive P. Duncan, *The Law of Nations in the New World* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1989); Robert A. Williams, Jr., *The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

5. See, e.g., the treatment in James Kirby Martin, Randy Roberts, Steven Mintz, Linda O. McMurtry and James H. Jones, *America and Its People, Vol. 1: To 1877* (New York: HarperCollins College, [2nd. ed.] 1993). This is a standard text used in undergraduate American history courses. For analysis of media interface, see my *Fantasies of the Master Race: Literature, Cinema and the Colonization of American Indians* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1992).

6. Kirby Martin, et al. (*America and Its People*, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–19), for example, manage to extol the disease theme three times in three pages.

7. James Axtell, probably the leading U.S. "ethnohistorian"—funny how "history" itself is reserved for matters of specific Euro-derivation while the record of everyone else requires a prefix—of the North American colonial period, made these representative characterizations during a public lecture at the University of Florida, April 1, 1991 (tape on file).

8. See, e.g., Mooney, *Aboriginal Population*, *op. cit.*; John Reed Swanton, *The Indian Tribes of North America* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of American Ethnography, Smithsonian Institution, 1952).

9. The new orthodoxy was first enunciated by Douglas H. Ubelaker in his "Prehistoric New World Population Size: Historical Review and Current Appraisal of North American Estimates," *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*, No. 45, 1976. The number he eventually arrives at is precisely 2,171,125 (1,850,011 in the 48 contiguous states area; 73,326 in Alaska; 237,798 in Canada; 10,000 in Greenland). Also see his "The Sources and Methods for Mooney's Estimates of North American Indian Populations" in William H. Deneven, ed., *The Native Population of the Americas in 1492* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), and "North American Indian Population Size: Changing Perspectives," in John W. Verano and Douglas H. Ubelaker, eds., *Disease and Demography in the Americas* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1992).

10. Mooney died in 1921. His draft manuscript was then edited by John Reed Swanton, and published in 1928: *The Aboriginal Population of America North of Mexico*, *op. cit.* As Jennings points out, the "estimates were listed in tabular form, by region and tribe, without specific documentation. Discussion of the figures was general, and authority rested on a rather sketchy bibliography"; Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism and the Cant of Conquest* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975) pp. 16–7. It should be noted that Colonel Garrick Mallery of the Smithsonian Institution had long argued—and quite vociferously—that the "official" estimate should be far lower still: "Investigation shows that the aboriginal population within the present United States at the beginning of the Columbian

period could not have exceeded much over 500,000"; see his "The Present and Former Number of Our Indians," *Proceedings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science*, No. 26, 1877, p. 365.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 17. The reference is to John Gorham Palfrey, *History of New England* (Boston: Stine, 1858–1890).

12. Jennings, *Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 20; at p. 17, he notes that "Palfrey's virulent bias against Indians appears without disguise whenever he mentions them." The emergence of actual "scientific racism" in America—and it was the American prototype which served as a model for the rest of the world, including Germany—can probably be dated from Samuel George Morton's *Crania Americana, or, A Comparative View of the Skulls of Various Aboriginal Nations of North and South America* (Philadelphia: John Pennington, 1839); see generally, William Stanton, *The Leopard's Spots: Scientific Attitudes Towards Race in America, 1815–1859* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Steven Jay Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981).

13. See, e.g., Mooney, *Aboriginal Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

14. Jennings, *Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

15. J.H. Spinden, "The Population of Ancient America," *Geographical Review*, No. 18, 1928; "Population of Ancient America," in *Anthropological Report* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1929).

16. A.L. Kroeber, "Native American Population," *American Anthropologist*, N.S., XXXVI, 1934.

17. A.L. Kroeber, *Cultural and Natural Areas of Native North America* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology XXXVIII, 1939) p. 177.

18. Jennings, *Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–9. He is citing A.L. Kroeber, *Cultural and Natural Areas*, *op. cit.*, pp. 148, 149.

19. See, e.g., A.L. Kroeber, "Evolution, History and Culture," in Theodora Kroeber, ed., *An Anthropologist Looks at History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

20. A.L. Kroeber, *Cultural and Natural Areas*, *op. cit.*

21. See, e.g., Carl Ortwin Sauer, *The Early Spanish Main* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966) and *Sixteenth Century North America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Woodrow W. Borah, "New Demographic Research on the Sixteenth Century in Mexico," in Howard F. Cline, ed., *Latin American History, Vol. II: Essays on Its Study and Teaching, 1898–1965* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); Sherburne F. Cook and Woodrow W. Borah, *The Population of Mixteca-Alta, 1520–1960* (Berkeley: University of California Ibero-Americana L, 1968); Sherburne F. Cook and Leslie B. Simpson, *The Population of Mexico in the Sixteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Ibero-Americana, No. 31, 1948).

22. A.L. Kroeber, *Cultural and Natural Areas*, *op. cit.*, pp. 177, 181. As may be seen in the preceding note and those following, the work of the "Berkeley dissidents" didn't really begin to see print until after Kroeber's death, and then only through the press of their home institution.

23. The method is explained most clearly in Henry F. Dobyns, "Estimating Aboriginal American Population: An Appraisal of Techniques and a New Hemispheric Estimate," *Current Anthropology*, No. 7, 1966.

24. Woodrow W. Borah and Sherburne F. Cook, *The Aboriginal Population of Central Mexico on the Eve of the Spanish Conquest* (Berkeley: University of California Ibero-Americana No. 43, 1963).

25. The estimate was surfaced in Woodrow W. Borah, "America as Model: The Impact of European Expansion on the Non-European World," *Actas y Memorias, XXXV Congreso Internacional de Americanistas, Mexico, 1962: Vol. III* (Mexico City: Editorial Libros de Mexico, 1964). Also see Woodrow W. Borah and Sherburne F. Cook, "Conquest and Population: A Demographic Approach to Mexican History," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, CXIII, 1969.

26. Dobyns, "Estimating Aboriginal Populations," *op. cit.*

27. Bruce Trigger, "The Destruction of Huronia: A Study in Economic and Cultural Change, 1609–1650," *Transactions of the Royal Canadian Institute*, XXXIII, 1960. Also see Trigger's *The Huron: The Farmers of the North* (New York: Case Studies in Cultural Anthropology, 1969), and John A. Dickinson, "The Pre-Contact Huron Population: A Reappraisal," *Ontario History*, No. 72, 1980.

28. Jennings, *Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 29. He relies mainly on the records of Daniel Gookin, dating from 1674, lodged in the Massachusetts State Historical Society Collection (1st Ser., I). Other

references include a 1634 manuscript by William Wood, published under the title *New Englands Prospect* in Boston in 1865.

29. Editors, *The World Almanac*, 1973 (New York: National Geographic Society, 1972) p. 470.

30. Dobyns, "Estimating Aboriginal Populations," *op. cit.* The print elements of Dobyns' research base are thoroughly elaborated and analyzed in his *Native American Historical Demography: A Critical Bibliography* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976). It was in this period that Jacobs ("The Tip of the Iceberg," *op. cit.*) weighed in with his important essay on the implications of revised demography.

31. Henry F. Dobyns, *Their Number Become Thinned: Native American Population Dynamics in Eastern North America* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983) pp. 34–45.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 42. In a public lecture delivered at the University of Florida in April 1988, Dobyns indicated his continuing research had led him to conclude that the hemispheric estimate should be revised upward to 145 million. The basis for this determination remains unpublished, however.

34. See, e.g., David Henige, "If Pigs Could Fly: Timucuan Population and Native American Historical Demography," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, No. 16, 1985–1986; "On the Current Devaluation on the Notion of Evidence: A Rejoinder to Dobyns," *Ethnohistory*, No. 36, 1989. Also see Russell Thornton, "But How Thick Were They? A Review Essay of *Their Number Become Thinned*," *Contemporary Sociology*, No. 13, 1984. Dean R. Snow and Kim M. Lamphear, "European Contact and Depopulation in the Northeast: The Timing of the First Epidemics," *Ethnohistory*, No. 35, 1988.

35. Russell Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust and Survival: A Population History Since 1492* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987) pp. xvii, 242. The higher end of the range is expressed in his "American Indian Historical Demography: A Review Essay with Suggestions for the Future," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal*, No. 3, 1979.

36. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick Sale, *The Conquest of Paradise: Christopher Columbus and the Columbian Legacy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990) p. 316.

37. For the paleoconservative response, see, e.g., David Henige, "Their Numbers Become Thick: Native American Historical Demography as Expiation," in James A. Clifton ed., *The Invented Indian: Cultural Fictions and Government Policies* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1990). For analysis of the book itself, which includes not only Henige's masterpiece of reactionary stupidity but another by attorney Allan Van Gestel arguing that Indians never existed at all, see my essay "The New Racism: A Critique of James A. Clifton's *The Invented Indian*" in *Fantasies of the Master Race*, *op. cit.*

38. A readily accessible estimate of sixteen million for the area north of the Río Grande was published by Emmanuel Henri Dieudonné Domenech in his book *Seven Years Residence in the Great Deserts of North America* (London: Green, Longman & Roberts) in 1860. An even earlier, but perhaps less credible, rendering of exactly the same estimate was given by George Catlin in his 1844 *Letters and Notes on the Manners, Customs and Conditions of the North American Indians* (New York: Dover, 1973 reprint). For analysis, see Russell Thornton, "Implications of Catlin's American Indian Population Estimates for Revision of Mooney's Estimate," *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*, No. 49, 1978.

39. Jennings, *Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

40. A.L. Kroeber, *Cultural and Natural Areas*, *op. cit.*, p. 145. One example: far from challenging it, Smithsonian-aligned luminaries Harold E. Driver and William C. Massey endorsed this antilogical notion, unsupported by any evidence at all, as a "notable" conclusion; *Comparative Studies of North American Indians* (New York: American Philosophical Society, *Transactions*, N.S., XLVII, pt. ii, 1957) p. 214.

41. Vance Haynes, "Elephant-hunting in North America," *Scientific American*, Vol. 214, No. 6, 1966; Paul S. Martin and H.E. Wright, eds., *Pleistocene Extinctions: The Search for a Cause* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967); Paul S. Martin and J.E. Moisan, "Simulating Overkill by Paleo-Indians," *American Scientist*, Vol. 63, No. 3, May–June 1975. Smithsonian dioramas and literature consistently depict such drivel as fact.

42. R. Douglas Hurt, *American Indian Agriculture: Prehistory to the Present* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987) pp. 38–9, 55.

43. Jacobs, "The Tip of the Iceberg," *op. cit.*

44. Jennings (*Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 30) aptly describes North America as a "widowed" rather than "virgin" land.

45. Paul Rassinier, *Le Drame des Juifs Européens* (Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1964), published in English translation as *The Drama of the European Jews* (Silver Springs, MD: Steppingstones, 1975); Richard Harwood *Did Six Million Really Die?* (Richmond, Surrey: Historical Review Press, 1974); Arthur R. Butz, *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century: The Case Against the Presumed Extermination of European Jewry* (Torrance, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1976) esp. pp. 13–8.

46. See, e.g., Alfred W. Crosby, Jr., “Virgin Soil Epidemics as a Factor in Aboriginal Depopulation in America,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, No. 33, 1976.

47. Kirby Martin, et al., *America and Its People*, op. cit., pp. 17–9.

48. Steven T. Katz, *The Holocaust in Historical Context, Vol. 1: The Holocaust and Mass Death Before the Modern Age* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) p. 20.

49. This is quite well documented; see, e.g., Percy M. Ashburn, *The Ranks of Death: A Medical History of the Conquest of America* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1947).

50. Letter of Luís de Quiros and Jean Baptista de Segura to Juan de Hinistrosa, Sept. 12, 1570; quoted in Clifford M. Lewis and Albert J. Loomie, eds., *The Spanish Jesuit Mission in Virginia, 1570–1571* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Virginia Historical Society, 1953) pp. 89–90.

51. Quoted epigrammatically in Nobel David Cook and W. George Lovell, eds., “Secret Judgments of God”: *Old World Disease in Colonial Spanish America* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992).

52. Quoted in Ashburn, *The Ranks of Death*, op. cit., p. 19.

53. Quoted in Alexander S. Salley, Jr., ed., *Narratives of Early Carolina, 1650–1708* (New York: Original Narratives of American History, 1911) pp. 284–5.

54. Jennings, *Invasion of America*, op. cit., pp. ix–x.

55. Any of a number of works would be adequate to establish this point; see, e.g., J.H. Parry, *The Age of Reconnaissance: Discovery, Exploration and Settlement, 1450–1650* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

56. The argument is subtly but exceedingly well developed in William McNeill’s *Plagues and Peoples* (New York: Doubleday, 1976) and two books by Alfred W. Crosby, Jr., *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972) and *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

57. See, e.g., Thomas F.T. Plucknett, *A Concise History of the Common Law* (Rochester, NY: The Lawyers Co-operative, 1936).

58. To the contrary, the relevant legal understandings in the supposedly benighted period of the conquest were in many respects quite sophisticated. As they theoretically applied to Indians, see Lewis Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949); Charles Gibson, ed., *The Spanish Tradition in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968); Robert A. Williams, Jr., *The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Also see the relevant sections of Klaus E. Knorr, *British Colonial Theories, 1570–1850* (London: Frank Cass, 1963).

59. See generally, Michael V. Gannon, *The Cross in the Sand: The Early Catholic Church in Florida, 1513–1870* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, [2nd. ed.] 1983); Mardith Keithly Schuetz, *Indians of the San Antonio Missions, 1718–1821* (Austin: University of Texas, Dept. of History, Ph.D. dissertation, 1980); Frances V. Scholes, *Church and State in New Mexico, 1610–1650* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1942).

60. This was always the rationalization for the *encomiando* system—in which individual Indians were parceled out as laborers to his *hidalgos*—installed by Columbus on Española in 1495, and the later *repartimiento*—doing the same with entire communities, including their land—perfected by Cortés and Alvarado; see Hanke, *Spanish Struggle for Justice*, op. cit., pp. 182–3, 189. Also see J.H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain, 1469–1716* (New York: Penguin, 1975) pp. 59–63.

61. The missive is dated July 16, 1865; quoted in Frank McNitt, *Navajo Wars: Military Campaigns, Slave Raids, and Reprisals* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990) p. 441.

62. Sherburne F. Cook, *Indians versus the Spanish Mission* (Berkeley: University of California Ibero-American No. 21, 1943) pp. 89–90; V.M. Golovin, *Around the World on the Kamchatka, 1817–1818* (Honolulu: Hawaiian Historical Society, 1979) pp. 147–8.

63. Golovin (*ibid.*) noted that, under these circumstances, “cleanliness and tidiness [were] out of the question” and that “a thrifty peasant has a better-kept...barnyard” than the degraded environment in which the mission Indians were forced to live. Such conditions, entirely absent from indigenous tradition—and from the more sanitary facilities enjoyed by priests and troops at the missions—were obvious incubators of all manner of infectious diseases.

64. On caloric intake, see Cook, *The Indian versus the Spanish Mission*, *op. cit.*, p. 37, Table 2. On nutrients—or lack of them; the diet was markedly deficient in highgrade proteins, vitamins A and C, and riboflavin—see Ann Lucy W. Stodder, *Mechanisms and Trends in the Decline of the Costanoan Indian Population of Central California* (Salinas: Coyote Press, 1986).

65. See the quotes in Cook, *The Indian versus the Spanish Mission*, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

66. Stannard, *American Holocaust*, *op. cit.*, p. 138. He is quoting from Golovin, *Around the World*, *op. cit.*, pp. 150, 147.

67. Richard Sutch, “The Care and Feeding of Slaves,” in Paul A. David, Herbert G. Gutman, Richard Sutch, Peter Temin and Gavin Wright, *Reckoning with Slavery: A Critical Study in the Quantitative History of American Negro Slavery* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).

68. One indication of the impact of the missions may be found in the fact that the California Indian population, conservatively estimated to have been about a third of a million in 1492 had declined to about 85,000 by 1852; Sherburne F. Cook, “Historical Demography,” in Robert F. Heizer, ed., *Handbook of the North American Indians*, Vol. 3: *California* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978). For a more recent, comprehensive and detailed study, see Robert H. Jackson, *Indian Population Decline: The Missions of Northwestern New Spain, 1687–1840* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995).

69. Fray Francisco Palóu, *Historical Memoirs of New California* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966) pp. 171–213.

70. Stannard, *American Holocaust*, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

71. To the contrary, even Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, who took the moral high ground in his famous debate in 1550–51 with the nobleman Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda over the intrinsic humanity and consequent rights of Indians, held that blacks were essentially subhuman and thus “natural slaves”; see Lewis Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959) p. 9. Also see Robert E. Quirk, “Notes on a Controversial Controversy: Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and Natural Servitude,” *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XXXIV, 1954.

72. Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, *Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974). Although there is no comparable study of the political economy of the North American mission system per se, it was undoubtedly illuminated by the earlier and more southerly Spanish practices upon which it was based; see William L. Sherman, *Forced Native Labor in Sixteenth Century Central America* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979). Also see Almon Wheeler Lauber’s pioneering 1913 study, *Indian Slavery in Colonial Times Within the Present Limits of the United States* (Williamstown, MA: Corner House Social Science Reprints, 1979) and L.R. Bailey’s much more recent, but very partial, *Indian Slave Trade in the Southwest* (Los Angeles: Westernlore, 1973).

73. Probably the best overview is provided in Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880–1980: Seasonal Workers/Forced Laborers/Guest Workers* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990). More specifically, see Edward L. Homze, *Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967) and “Nazi Germany’s Forced Labor Program,” in Michael Berenbaum, ed., *A Mosaic of Victims: Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis* (New York: New York University Press, 1990); Peter Black, “Forced Labor in the Concentration Camps, 1942–1944,” in Berenbaum, *A Mosaic of Victims*, *op. cit.* Of additional interest, see generally, Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs* (New York: Macmillan, 1970); *The Slave State: Heinrich Himmler’s Master Plan for SS Supremacy* (London: Widenfield and Nicholson, 1981).

74. Albert Speer, *Spandau: The Secret Diaries* (New York: Macmillan, 1976). For solid if overly sympathetic analysis of Speer’s complicated efforts to redeem himself by assuming responsibility for certain of his own and his countrymen’s crimes, even while flatly denying all knowledge of the nazi extermination campaign against the Jews, see Gitta Sereny, *Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995). A much harsher view is expressed in Matthias Schmidt, *Albert Speer: End of a Myth* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984).

75. Wilbur Zelinsky, *Cultural Geography of the United States* (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973); Charles H. Langham, "From Condemnation to Praise: Shifting Perspectives on Hispanic California," *California Historical Society Quarterly*, No. 61, Winter 1983.

76. Fray Francisco Palóu, *Life and Apostolic Labors of the Venerable Father Junípero Serra* (Pasadena, CA: G.W. James, 1913), pp. 86–7. Also see Omer Englebert, *The Last of the Conquistadors: Junípero Serra (1713–1784)* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956); Daniel Fogel, *Junípero Serra, the Vatican, and Enslavement Ideology* (San Francisco: ism press, 1988).

77. James A. Santos, "Junípero Serra's Canonization and the Historical Record," *American Historical Review*, No. 93, 1988.

78. See, e.g., California AIM circular, "Junípero Serra: Mass Murderer as Saint" (San Francisco, March 1996); statement of California AIM representative Bobby Castillo on Cable News Network, May 27, 1996.

79. Statement made by the San Francisco Archdiocese on Cable News Network, May 27, 1996.

80. See, e.g., Marcus J. Smith, *Dachau: The Harrowing of Hell* (Albany: State University of New York, 1995); David A. Hackett, *The Buchenwald Report* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); Eberhard Kolb, *Bergen-Belsen: From "Detention Camp" to Concentration Camp, 1943–1945* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, [2nd. ed.] 1988).

81. Schmel Krakowski, "The Death Marches in the Evacuation of the Camps," in *The Nazi Concentration Camps: Structure and Aims, The Image of Prisoners, The Jews in the Camps* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashim, 1984); Yehuda Bauer, "The Death-Marches, January–May, 1945," in Michael R. Marrus, ed., *The Nazi Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews*, Vol. 9 (Westport, CT: Meckler, 1989).

82. For example: "It is clearly wrong to separate from the essence of the Holocaust those Jews...who starved in the ghettos of eastern Europe, or who were wasted by disease because of malnutrition or neglect"; Robert R. Marrus, *The Holocaust in History* (Hanover, NH: Brandeis University & University Press of New England, 1987) p. 20.

83. For comprehensive information on the prosecutions of these second- and third-tier individuals, see Office of United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law N. 10, Vols. 1–15* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951–53).

84. Grant Foreman, *Indian Removal: The Immigration of the Five Civilized Tribes* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953); Ronald Satz, *American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975); Ernest Downs, "How the East Was Lost," *American Indian Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1975. For a good dose of the rhetoric attending passage of the Removal Act, see U.S. Congress, *Speeches on the Removal of the Indians, April–May, 1830* (New York: Jonathan Leavitt, 1830; New York: Kraus Reprints, 1973).

85. Gloria Jahoda, *The Trail of Tears: The Story of the Indian Removals* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1975); Thurman Wilkins, *Cherokee Tragedy: The Ridge Family and the Destruction of a People* (New York: Macmillan, 1970); Arthur H. DeRosier, Jr., *The Removal of the Choctaw Indians* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970); Michael D. Green, *The Politics of Indian Removal: Creek Government and Society in Crisis* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982).

86. Russell Thornton, "Cherokee Population Losses During the Trail of Tears: A New Perspective and a New Estimate," *Ethnohistory*, No. 31, 1984, p. 293; included in William L. Anderson, ed., *Cherokee Removal, Before and After* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991).

87. Russell Thornton, *The Cherokees: A Population History* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990) pp. 75–7.

88. James M. Mooney, *Historical Sketch of the Cherokee* (Chicago: Aldine, 1975 reprint of the 1900 edition) p. 127.

89. The best available treatment will be found in Arrel M. Gibson, *The Chickasaws* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971).

90. Clifford E. Trafzer, *The Kit Carson Campaign: The Last Great Navajo War* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982.).

91. Lynn R. Bailey, *Long Walk* (Los Angeles: Westernlore, 1964); Lawrence C. Kelly, *Navajo Roundup* (Boulder, CO: Pruett, 1970); Ruth Roessel, ed., *Navajo Stories of the Long Walk* (Tsaile, AZ: Navajo Community College Press, 1973).

92. Roberto Mario Salmon, "The Disease Complaint at Bosque Redondo (1864–68)," *The Indian Historian*, No. 9, 1976; Gerald Thompson, *The Army and the Navajo: The Bosque Redondo Reservation Experiment, 1863–1868* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982).

93. S. Ryan Johansson and S.H. Preston, "Tribal Demography: The Navajo and Hopi Populations as Seen Through Manuscripts from the 1900 Census," *Social Science History*, No. 3, 1978.

94. Kenneth Carley, *The Sioux Uprising of 1862* (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1961).

95. Keith A. Murray, *The Modocs and Their War* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959).

96. Robert Emmitt, *The Last War Trail: The Utes and the Settlement of Colorado* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954); Marshall Sprague, *Massacre: The Tragedy at White River* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957).

97. Mari Sandoz, *Cheyenne Autumn* (New York: Avon, 1964) pp. 11–30; Donald J. Berthrong, *The Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal: Reservation and Agency Life, 1875–1907* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976) pp. 17–9, 28–32.

98. Daniel Inouye, "1986 Black Hills Hearings on S. 1453, Introduction," *Wicazo Sa Review*, Vol. IV, No. 1, Spring 1988; Edward Lazarus, *Black Hills, White Justice: The Sioux Nation versus The United States, 1775 to the Present* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991) pp. 72–95.

99. Britton Davis, *The Truth About Geronimo* (Chicago: Lakeside Press, 1951 reprint of 1929 edition) p. 48. Overall, see Richard J. Perry, *Apache Reservation: Indigenous Peoples and the American State* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993) pp. 129–36.

100. This was in Roanoke Colony where the first English were welcomed by the local Indians and, as would be the case in Massachusetts forty years later, fed throughout their first winter. The following spring, they were taught to plant and thus to survive. Two years later, when an Indian was accused of having failed to return a borrowed cup, the colonists seized the excuse, sallied forth and burned their benefactors' village and fields, leaving the Indians destitute in the face of oncoming winter; Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery—American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975) pp. 25–43.

101. Edward Waterhouse, *A Declaration of the State of the Colony and Affaires in Virginia* (London, 1622) p. 23; quoted in Stannard, *American Holocaust*, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

102. An interesting exploration of this connection will be found in an M.A. thesis by Frank Parella entitled *Lebensraum and Manifest Destiny: A Comparative Study in the Justification of Expansion* (Georgetown: Dept. of Political Science, Georgetown University, 1950).

103. Statement of the Council of Virginia, quoted in Morgan, *American Slavery—American Freedom*, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

104. Stannard, *American Holocaust*, *op. cit.*, pp. 106–7. On the extent of the indigenous agricultural base that was destroyed—3,000 acres near present-day Hampton, Virginia, alone—see Philip A. Bruce, *Economic History of Virginia* (New York: P. Smith, 1896) pp. 7–13.

105. The smaller peoples included the Kiskiaks, Warraskoyaks, Quiyoughcohannocks, Appamatuks, Orapaks, Youghtanunds, Mattaponis, Payankatanks. On the size of the residual population, see Robert Beverly, *The History and Present State of Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947 edited reprint of 1705 edition) pp. 232–3.

106. Robert Bennett to Edward Bennett [June 9, 1623], "Bennetes Welcome," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 2nd. Ser., No. 13, 1933, p. 219.

107. On the size of the preinvasion Powhatan population, see J. Leitch Wright, Jr., *The Only Land They Knew: The Tragic Story of the Indians of the Old South* (New York: Free Press, 1981), p. 60. On the settler population, tallied at 62,800 by 1700, see Morgan, *American Slavery—American Freedom*, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

108. On these and other wars in the region, see Wright, *The Only Land*, *op. cit.*

109. On Roanoke, see Morgan, *American Slavery—American Freedom*, *op. cit.* On Plymouth, the "first Thanksgiving," etc., see generally, William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620–1647* (New York: Random House, 1981 edited reprint of the 1650 original); Francis Dillon, *A Place of Habitation: The Pilgrim Fathers and Their Quest* (London: Hutchinson, 1973).

110. The Puritan campaign against the Pequots and allied peoples relied much more on direct forms of annihilation than on destruction of the native economic base. However, as a prelude, they burned a number of fields of corn and other vegetables both on the mainland and on Block Island, just offshore;

see, e.g., John Mason, *A Brief History of the Pequot War* (Boston: Kneeland & Green, 1736); Jennings, *Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 202–27.

111. Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian Hating and Empire Building* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980).

112. Anonymous, *A True Account of the Most Considerable Occurrences that have Hapned in the Warre Between the English and the Indians in New England* (London, 1676); Douglas Edward Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1958).

113. Quoted in James M. O'Donnell, III, *Southern Indians in the American Revolution* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1973) p. 52. Even James Mooney was willing to corroborate the effects. Within months, he wrote, the Cherokees "were on the verge of extinction. Over and over again their towns had been laid in ashes and their fields wasted. Their best warriors had been killed and their women and children had starved and sickened in the mountains"; *Historical Sketch of the Cherokee*, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

114. Quoted in Drinnon, *Facing West*, *op. cit.*, pp. 331–2, 65.

115. Quoted in Richard Drinnon, *Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American Racism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987) p. 23.

116. *Ibid.*

117. Trafzer, *The Kit Carson Campaign*, *op. cit.*

118. General Philip Sheridan to Commanding General William Tecumseh Sherman, May 2, 1873; quoted in Paul Andrew Hutton, *Phil Sheridan and His Army* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985) p. 246. At one point in the mid-1870s, Congress considered legislation to preserve what was left of the dwindling herds. Sheridan vociferously opposed it, suggesting that the legislators instead "strike a medal, with a dead buffalo pictured on one side and a discouraged Indian on the other," and present it to the buffalo hunters; John R. Cook, *The Border and the Buffalo: An Untold Story of the Southwest Plains* (New York: Citadel Press, 1976) pp. 163–5. Also see William T. Hornaday, *Extirminating the American Bison* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1899); Tom McHugh and Victoria Hobson, *The Time of the Buffalo* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972).

119. General—later U.S. president—Andrew Jackson, for one, was quite explicit about this, making native women and children a *priority* target for American troops. To do otherwise, he explained in his usual "homespun" style, would be like pursuing "a wolf in the hammocks without knowing first where her den and whelps were"; quoted in Takaki, *Iron Cages*, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

120. As John Mason, captain of the Puritan militia, put it with regard to the Pequots in 1637, the idea was to be so thorough as "to cut off the Remembrance of them from the Earth"; quoted in Drinnon, *Facing West*, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

121. For a classic rendering, see H.R. Schoolcraft, *Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the History, Condition, and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States* (Philadelphia: Lippencott, Grambo & Co., 1851).

122. This dynamic is described very well by David E. Stannard in his essay, "The Consequences of Contact: Toward an Interdisciplinary Theory of Native Responses to Biological and Cultural Invasion," in David Hurtz Thomas, ed., *Columbian Consequences*, Vol. 3: *The Spanish Borderlands in Pan-American Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1991). Also see Henry F. Dobyns, "More Methodological Perspectives on Historical Demography," *Ethnohistory*, No. 36, 1989.

123. See, e.g., J.V. Neel, "Health and Disease in Unacculturated Amerindian Populations," in Ciba Foundation, *Health and Disease in Tribal Societies* (Amsterdam: Elsevier/Excerpta Medica, 1977).

124. See, e.g., David E. Stannard, "Disease and Infertility: A New Look at the Collapse of Native Populations in the Wake of Contact," *Journal of American Studies*, No. 24, 1990.

125. This tidy turn of the phrase may be attributed to James Axtell, during his lecture at the University of Florida, *op. cit.*

126. Robert O'Connell, *Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 171.

127. For an overview, see John Duffy, *Epidemics in Colonial America* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953); E. Wagner Stearn and Allen E. Stearn, *The Effects of Smallpox on the Destiny of the Amerindian* (Boston: Bruce Humphries, 1945).

128. Jennings, *Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 207–8.

129. The process is described in notations dated July 26 and 30, 1636, in John Winthrop's *The History of New England from 1630 to 1649*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1853 edited reprint of 1690 original) p. 191. It is also covered in a letter from Roger Williams to Governor Winthrop dated Sept. 9, 1637.

130. There were four such conflicts over an eighty-year period.

131. On Pontiac, see generally, Howard Henry Peckham, *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1970).

132. Stearn and Stearn, *The Effects of Smallpox*, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–5. It should be noted that, according to Yamasee historian Donald A. Grinde, Jr., Howard Peckham, head of the American Historical Association for many years, discovered the Amherst/Bouquet correspondence and related archival materials during the late 1930s. He then proceeded to suppress it “because of the impression it might give” for more than a decade, admitting its existence only when it was independently discovered by Allen Stearn.

133. Stearn and Stearn, *The Effects of Smallpox*, *op. cit.*, p. 49. Also see John Duffy, “Smallpox and the Indians in the American Colonies,” *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, No. 25, 1951. For a detailed and comprehensive, albeit somewhat biased, overview of the fighting in this region from start to finish, see Allan W. Eckert, *That Dark and Bloody River: Chronicles of the Ohio River Valley* (New York: Bantam, 1995).

134. O’Connell, *Son of the Morning Star*, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

135. The phrase is again attributable to James Axtell, this time in a talk given during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association (AHA) in Washington, D.C., Dec. 1993 (tape on file).

136. Stearn and Stearn, *The Effects of Smallpox*, *op. cit.*, pp. 89–94; Francis A. Chardon, *Journal at Fort Clark, 1834–39* (Pierre: State Historical Society of South Dakota, 1932).

137. Attribution of the trivializing phrase is once again to James Axtell, AHA Talk (q & a), *op. cit.*

138. Connell, *Son of the Morning Star*, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

139. “Exciting News From Tehema-Indian Thefts—Terrible Vengeance of the Whites,” *Daily Alta California*, Mar. 6, 1853; excerpted in Robert F. Heizer, ed., *The Destruction of California Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993 reprint of 1974 Peregrine Smith ed.) p. 251.

140. “Indian Butcheries in California,” *San Francisco Bulletin*, July 10, 1860; reproduced in Heizer, *Destruction of California Indians*, *op. cit.*, pp. 253–5.

141. The “ghettoization/privation” phraseology accrues from Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of European Jews* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985). According to Arno J. Meyer, “from 1942 to 1945, certainly at Auschwitz, but probably overall, more Jews were killed by so-called ‘natural’ causes... sickness, disease, undernourishment, [and] hyperexploitation... than by ‘unnatural’ ones [like] shooting, hanging, phenol injection, or gassing”; Arno J. Meyer, *Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? The “Final Solution” in History* (New York: Pantheon, 1990) pp. 226–7. David E. Stannard, estimates that a minimum of 2.4 million of 5.1 million Jews who died during the Holocaust perished from these “natural” causes rather than the “unnatural” ones; “The Politics of Holocaust Scholarship: Uniqueness as Denial,” in Rosenbaum, *Is the Holocaust Unique?*, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

142. Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint and John Pritchard, *Total War: Causes and Courses of World War II* (New York: Pantheon, [2nd. ed., revised] 1989) pp. 576–8.

143. Katz, “Uniqueness,” *op. cit.*, p. 21.

144. Ibid. This is hardly a new game; see, e.g., Don Russell, “How Many Indians Were Killed? White Man Versus Red Man: The Facts and the Legend,” *American West*, July 1973.

145. *Report on Indians Taxed and Not Taxed* (1890), *op. cit.*, pp. 637–8; quoted in Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust and Survival*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

146. Ibid., p. 49.

147. Ibid., p. 49.

148. For example, he quotes no less than James Mooney to the effect that, in California, “the enormous decrease from about a quarter million to less than 20,000 is due chiefly to the cruelties and wholesale massacres perpetrated by the miners and the early settlers”; *ibid.*, quoting Mooney, “Population,” *op. cit.*, p. 286.

149. Robert S. Weddle, *Spanish Sea: The Gulf of Mexico in North American Discovery, 1500–1685* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1985) pp. 44–6, 51–3; Randolph J. Widmer, *The Evolution of the Calusa: A Nonagricultural Chiefdom on the Southwest Florida Coast* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988).

150. Weddle, *Spanish Sea*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
151. John Farmer, "Piñeda's Sketch," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, No. 63, 1959; John H. Parry, "The Navigators of the Conquista," *Terra Incognita*, No. 10, 1978.
152. One of these, Pedro de Salazar, encountered people on the South Carolina coast, probably Yamasees, who treated the Spaniards "graciously" until Salazar's men began to seize them as slave cargo; Paul E. Hoffman, "A New Voyage of North American Discovery: Pedro de Salazar's Visit to the 'Island of Giants,'" *Florida Historical Quarterly*, No. 58, April 1980.
153. The intended colony was established by a nobleman, Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón, who invested his family fortune against the potential profits of a thriving trade in native flesh but died of a cold during the first winter; David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) p. 35.
154. These economics are well handled in Paul E. Hoffman, "Nature and Sequence of the Spanish Borderlands, 1500–1566," *South Carolina Historical Magazine*, No. 84, 1983.
155. A good overview is provided in Paul E. Hoffman, *A New Andalusia and A Way to the Orient: The American Southeast During the Sixteenth Century* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990); also see Ronald Sanders, *Lost Tribes and Promised Lands: The Origins of American Racism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).
156. The Cíbola story—there were supposed to be seven golden cities, of which Cíbola was the most opulent—was promoted by Fray Marcos de Niza, a Franciscan who claimed to have seen it during a northern reconnaissance in 1538, of which he was the only survivor. The lie was probably designed to draw Spanish presence northward, an idea to which he seems to have been committed, and as a cover for the fact that he had run away and left his comrades in extremis ("If I died, I would not be able to make a report of this country."); Cleve Hallenbeck, ed. and trans., *The Journey of Fray Marcos de Niza* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1987); George P. Hammond, "The Search for the Fabulous in the Settlement of the Southwest," in David J. Weber, ed., *New Spain's Far Northern Frontier: Essays on Spain in the American West* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979).
157. Carl O. Sauer, "The Road to Cíbola," in John Leighy, ed., *Land and Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).
158. Herbert Eugene Bolton, *Coronado on the Turquoise Trail: Knight of the Pueblos* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1949) pp. 153–68.
159. George P. Hammond and Agapito Rey, eds. and trans., *Narratives of the Coronado Expedition, 1540–1542* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1940) p. 22, n. 68.
160. Edward Gaylord Bourne, ed., *The Narratives of Hernando de Soto*, 2 vols. (New York: A.S. Barnes, 1904). De Soto, it should be noted, had served as an officer under Pizarro in Peru.
161. Weber, *Spanish Frontier*, *op. cit.*, p. 51; he is quoting from chronicler Oviedo, who is in turn quoted by Rodrigo Ranjel in his "Narrative of De Soto's Expedition," in Bourne, Vol. 2, *op. cit.*, pp. 117, 60.
162. Weber, *Spanish Frontier*, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
163. "Relacion of Luys Hernández de Biedma," in Bourne, Vol. 2, *Narratives of Hernando de Soto*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
164. Weber, *Spanish Frontier*, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
165. By this point lacking the strength to militarily confront large bodies of Indians, de Soto attempted a subterfuge which had worked for other conquistadors in Mexico, sending word to the Natchez that he was the "Sun God" in hopes that they might voluntarily submit to his authority. Instead, unimpressed, the Indians sent back word that if he dived up the Mississippi, they'd believe him; Carl O. Sauer, *Sixteenth Century North America: The Land and the Peoples as Seen by Europeans* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) p. 170.
166. John R. Swanton, *Final Report of the United States de Soto Expedition Commission* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1939) pp. 83, 88.
167. This was the mission-fort at San Agustín, established on September 8, 1565; Eugene Lyon, *The Enterprise of Florida: Pedro Menéndez de Avilés and the Spanish Conquest, 1565–1568* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1983).
168. Although Santa Fe was not formally established until 1610—it existed as early as 1608 (or earlier, if the small group left behind by Coronado is counted)—the actual Spanish occupation of what

became New Mexico began with the expedition of Juan de Oñate in 1598; Marc Simmons, *The Last Conquistador: Juan de Oñate and the Settling of the Far Southwest* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

169. Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques & Discoveries of the English Nation*, Vol. 5 (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1907) pp. 144–5.

170. K.G. Davies, *Europe and the Age of Expansion, Vol. IV: The North Atlantic World in the Seventeenth Century* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974) p. 17.

171. For the standard interpretation of Roanoke, see Samuel Elliot Morison, *The European Discovery of America, Vol. 2: The Northern Voyages* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) pp. 621–84. Also see David Beers Quinn, ed., *The Roanoke Voyages, 1584–1590* (Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 1955).

172. See note 100, above.

173. John Greenway, *The Inevitable Americans* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964) p. 34.

174. With typical European arrogance, they immediately named the river after their current ruler, James I, rather than inquiring whether it had already had a name bestowed upon it by the local populace; Philip L. Barbour, ed., *The Jamestown Voyages Under the First Charter, 1606–1609* (Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 2nd ser., 1969). On the confederation of indigenous peoples who were encountered, and its leaders, see Christian F. Feest, “Powhatan: A Study in Political Organization,” *Wiener Völkerkundliche Mitteilungen*, No. 13, 1966; Helen C. Rountree, *The Powhatan Indians of Virginia: Their Traditional Culture* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989).

175. Stannard, *American Holocaust*, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

176. Morgan, *Wilderness at Dawn*, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

177. James Axtell, *After Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 201.

178. *Ibid.*; Axtell is quoting from George Percy, “‘A Trewe Relacyon’: Virginia from 1609 to 1612,” *Tyler’s Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, No. 3, 1922, p. 265. Also see J. Frederick Fausz, “An ‘Abundance of Blood Shed on Both Sides’: England’s First Indian War, 1609–1614,” *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, No. 98, 1990.

179. As Wahunsenacock put it to Smith himself in 1609, after the latter had committed one of his many vile acts, “it is better to eat good meate, lie well, and sleep with my women & children, laugh and be merrie with you, have copper, hatchets, or what I want, being your friend: then bee forced to flie from al[], to lie cold in the woods, feed upon acorns, roots, and such trash, and be so hunted by you that I can neither rest, eat, nor sleep”; quoted in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, *op. cit.*, p. 426. Also see Michael J. Puglisi, “Revitalization or Extirpation: Anglo-Powhatan Relations, 1622–1644” (Williamsburg, VA: M.A. thesis, Dept. of History, College of William & Mary, 1982).

180. Governor Francis Wyatt, quoted in H.R. McIlwaine, ed., *Minutes of the Council and General Court of Virginia* (Richmond: Virginia State Historical Society, 1924) p. 484. A good overview of such outlooks is provided in William L. Shea, *The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983).

181. Jamestown was actually abandoned altogether just before this. De la Warr left the colony before Smith, dispatching a subordinate, Thomas Gates, to stand in. Gates, however, was shipwrecked off Bermuda while en route. He finally arrived in June 1610, after a winter so bleak the colonists resorted to cannibalism to survive. With his effective strength down to sixty men, Gates immediately gave up and set sail for home, taking the survivors with him. As they sailed down the James for Chesapeake Bay and the Atlantic, however, they were met by de la Warr, who was in the process of returning with 300 men. The war commenced less than sixty days later; Axtell, *After Columbus*, *op. cit.*, pp. 204–5.

182. It is a safe estimate that upwards of 1,000 Indians were killed by Percy’s troops during the late summer and fall of 1610. Dale’s men probably killed somewhere between twice and three times that number in the 1611 campaign; see generally, Percy, “A Trewe Relacyon,” *op. cit.*, pp. 276–7.

183. *Ibid.*, p. 270.

184. It seems likely that, from 1612–1614, a minimum of 1,000 Indians were killed by English raiders, patrols, sentries, and random acts of violence. The Pocahontas story is too well known to go into here; an interesting twist will be found in J. Frederick Fausz, “George Thorpe, Nemattanew, and the Powhatan Uprising of 1622,” *Virginia Cavalcade*, No. 28, 1979.

185. The timing of the attack was wrong for several reasons. March was too early for the trees to have leafed out, providing good cover. Food supplies were also low at the end of a hard winter, and the fighters had not had time to limber up. Opechancanough was forced to move, however, when the Tsenacommacahs' principal military leader, Nemattanow ("Jack-of-Feathers"), was suddenly murdered by a pair of young colonists, taking his place among the growing piles of his gratuitously slain relatives; J. Frederick Fausz, "Opechancanough: Indian Resistance Leader," in David G. Sweet and Gary B. Nash, eds., *Struggle and Survival in Colonial America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); "The Barbarous Massacre' Reconsidered: The Powhatan Uprising of 1622 and the Historians," *Explorations in Ethnic Studies*, No. 1, 1978.

186. Axtell, *After Columbus*, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

187. Kingsbury, Vol. 4, *Records of the Virginia Company*, *op. cit.*, pp. 221–2.

188. Kingsbury, Vol. 3, *Records of the Virginia Company*, *op. cit.*, p. 665; Vol. 4, pp. 10, 507–8.

189. William S. Powell, "Aftermath of the Massacre: The First Indian War, 1622–1632," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, No. 66, 1958.

190. Axtell, *After Columbus*, *op. cit.*, pp. 219–20.

191. Beverley, *History and Present State of Virginia*, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

192. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 47. The Piscataways, a small and unoffending people, never recovered from the disaster, and were very nearly annihilated altogether in the Virginia campaigns conducted a half-century later; James H. Merrell, "Cultural Continuity among the Piscataway Indians of Colonial Maryland," *William and Mary Quarterly*, No. 36, 1979.

193. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 53; also see Washburn, *The Governor and the Rebel*, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–1.

194. On the fates of some of these smaller peoples, see Wood, Waselkov and Hatley, *Powhatan's Mantle*, *op. cit.* Also see Bernard Sheehan, *Savagism and Civility: Indians and Englishmen in Colonial Virginia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

195. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

196. See generally, Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984) pp. 18–22, 127–30; "Glory, Death and Transfiguration: The Susquehannock Indians in the Seventeenth Century," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, No. 112, 1968.

197. *Historical Statistics*, *op. cit.*, p. 14; Dobyns computes the preinvasion density of the tidewater area (i.e., Jamestown Colony) at 4.9–6.8 persons per square kilometer. This works out to a beginning population of up to a beginning population for all of Virginia of perhaps 750–800,000; *Their Number Become Thinned*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

198. These expeditions are covered in David Beers Quinn, *England and the Discovery of America, 1481–1620* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974) pp. 419–31; and Neal Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence: Europeans, Indians and the Making of New England, 1500–1643* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) pp. 86–93. Also see Colin G. Calloway, *Dawnland Encounters: Indians and Europeans in Northern New England* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1991).

199. See note 27, above.

200. Philip L. Barbour, ed., *The Complete Works of Captain John Smith, 1580–1631*, 3 vols. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986) Vol. 1, pp. 293–4, 433; Vol. 2, pp. 403, 441. Also see Salisbury, *Manitou*, *op. cit.*, pp. 96–101.

201. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 84; also see Snow and Lamphear, "European Contact," *op. cit.*

202. The arsenal included twelve cannon; H.L. Peterson, "The Military Equipment of the Plymouth and Bay Colonies, 1620–1690," *New England Quarterly*, No. 20, 1947.

203. Salisbury, *Manitou*, *op. cit.*, 101–9.

204. For the best overview of colonial demography in this region, see David Cressy, *Coming Over: Migration and Communication between England and New England in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

205. This process, which continued for more than a century, is addressed in William Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists and the Ecology of New England* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1983).

206. When you add the intrigues of the French and Dutch to the mix, as well as those of their various indigenous allies, all of them seeking to play the volatile ingredients of New England off in such manner as to end up regionally ascendant, you encounter a confusing welter of alliances, double alliances,

even mutually exclusive triple-alliances, the entirety of which was in almost continuous flux; an excellent snapshot of this complex interplay will be found in Steele, *Wapathis*, *op. cit.*, pp. 86–90.

207. It should be noted that Narragansett trade with the Dutch predated their trade with the English by more than a decade.

208. William A. Starna, “The Pequots in the Early Seventeenth Century,” in Laurence M. Hauptman and James D. Wherry, eds., *The Pequots in Southern New England: The Fall and Rise of an American Indian Nation* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990) pp. 45–6.

209. Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

210. There is compelling evidence that the Pequots had no idea a fight was brewing. As John Underhill, a professional mercenary who accompanied the Block Island expedition and then went on to participate in the Mystic Massacre, put it, “they did not think we intended warre”; the Pequots tried to decline warfare with people capable of such savage behavior; *Newes from America; or, A New and Experimental Discovery of New England* (London, 1638) p. 7.

211. On the composition of Mason’s forces, see Steele, *Wapathis*, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

212. It seems there may have been qualms about the nature of the planned slaughter even among some of the militia’s officers, notably, Lt. Lion Gardiner and the mercenary Underhill. It was necessary that the proposed course of action be “commended” by a Calvinist chaplain before they consented to go along; Mason, *A Brief History*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

213. Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

214. Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation*, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

215. Steele, *Wapathis*, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

216. Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 215–26; Salisbury, *Manitou*, *op. cit.*, 218–25.

217. Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 226; Steele, *Wapathis*, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

218. “For present purposes we need not pursue every last band of Pequots to its final disposition. There were more atrocities; the whole story of the Pequot ‘war’ is one long atrocity”; Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

219. *Ibid.*

220. Drinnon, *Facing West*, *op. cit.*, p. 55. It is worth noting that Katz (“Pequot War,” *op. cit.*) actually refers to the 21 surviving Pequots of the 1660s as a “proof” that genocide was not committed against their people.

221. In a 1642 meeting with the Montauks, for example, Miantonomi argued that, “we are all Indians as the English are, and say brother to one another; so we must be one as they are, otherwise we shall all be gone shortly”; quoted in Salisbury, *Manitou*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

222. On the Mohawk Alliance, see Neal Salisbury, “Towards the Covenant Chain: Iroquois and Southern New England Algonkians, 1637–1685,” in Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrill, eds., *Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600–1800* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987). The Narragansett leader had also seriously proposed that a union between his people and the rival Mohegans be solidified by his marrying of Uncas’ daughter. Another union, between the Narragansetts and Wampanoags, would be sealed with the marriage of Miantonomi’s brother to the daughter of Massasoit, principal sachem of the latter people; *ibid.*, p. 95.

223. On the meeting and execution, which was actually carried out by Uncas as a gesture of “friendship and good faith,” see Salisbury, *Manitou*, *op. cit.*, pp. 228–35. Overall, see Harry M. Ward, *The United Colonies of New England, 1643–1690* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1961).

224. War was briefly declared on the Narragansetts by the United Colonies in 1645, just long enough to cow several prominent sachems into repudiating the relationship Miantonomi had established with the Mohawks and consenting to English “protection”; for context, and examples of “conspiracy” rhetoric, see Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 258–81.

225. Donna Merwick, *Possessing Albany, 1630–1710: The Dutch and English Experiences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

226. Concerning the Massachusetts raids on Acadia (Nova Scotia), see George A. Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia’s Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia Relations, 1630 to 1784* (Montréal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1973) pp. 23–7.

227. On colonial population, see *Historical Statistics*, series Z, pp. 5, 6, 8; Wells, *Population*, *op. cit.*

228. Neal Salisbury, "Indians and Colonists in Southern New England after the Pequot War: An Uneasy Balance," in Hauptman and Wherry, *The Pequots*, *op. cit.*; Philip Ranlet, "Another Look at the Causes of King Philip's War," *New England Quarterly*, No. 61, 1988.

229. Cook, "The Significance of Disease," *op. cit.*

230. On encroachment, especially in the area of Swansea, see Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 292–4; on arrogance, see Arthur J. Worrall, "Persecution, Politics and War: Roger Williams, Quaker, and King Philip's War," *Quaker History*, No. 66, 1977; on the executions, see Leach, *Flintlock*, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–6.

231. "[The] Indians never for a moment aspired to drive out all the English or hoped to gain mastery over them. Their purpose was to salvage some measure of self-government in secure territory"; Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 300. Also see Russell Bourne, *The Red King's Rebellion: Racial Politics in New England, 1675–1678* (New York: Atheneum, 1990).

232. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

233. On the relative strengths of the two sides at this point, see Adam J. Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth Century New England," *Journal of American History*, No. 74, 1987–1988.

234. Rhode Island officials protested vehemently that "the Indians had given no cause for warre"; quoted in Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

235. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

236. Leach, *Flintlock*, *op. cit.*, pp. 200–4.

237. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

238. Leach, *Flintlock*, *op. cit.*, pp. 211–2.

239. Quoted in George D. Langdon, Jr., *Pilgrim Colony: A History of New Plymouth, 1620–1691* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966) p. 180.

240. Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

241. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

242. Leach, *Flintlock*, *op. cit.*, pp. 226–7.

243. Increase Mather, *A Brief History of the Warr With the Indians in New England* (Boston, 1676), reprinted in Slotkin and Folsom, *So Dreadful a Judgement*, *op. cit.*, quote at p. 81.

244. Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 212; Nicholas P. Canny, "The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d. Ser., XXX, 1973; James Muldoon, "The Indian as Irishman," *Essex Institute Historical Collections*, No. 111, 1975. More broadly, see David Beers Quinn, *The Elizabethans and the Irish* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966).

245. Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 293–4.

246. *Ibid.*, p. 293; Rountree, *The Powhatan Indians*, *op. cit.*, p. 121; Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

247. This idea has been thoroughly explored elsewhere, notably by Roy Harvey Pierce, *Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the American Indian in the American Mind* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1953), and *The Savages of America: A Study of the Indian and the Idea of Civilization* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965). Also see David R. Wrone and Russell S. Nelson, Jr., *Who's the Savage? A Documentary History of the Mistreatment of the North American Indians* (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett, 1973).

248. There is a strong emergent literature analyzing the overall framework of what is at issue here; for a variety of approaches, see, e.g., Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978); Hans Kellner, *Language and Historical Representation: Getting the Story Crooked* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989); Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (London/New York: Routledge, 1990); Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson, eds., *De-Scribing Empire: Post-colonialism and Textuality* (London/New York: Routledge, 1994).

249. The phrase quoted comes from Increase Mather, *A Relation Of the Troubles which have hapned in New-England By reason of the Indians there* (1677), later edited and published by Samuel G. Drake under the title *Early History of New England; Being a Relation of Hostile Passages between the Indians and the European Voyagers and Settlers* (Albany: New York State Historical Society, 1864). Cotton Mather, the son of Increase, incorporated the very same language into his *The Life and Death of the Renown'd Mr. John Eliot, Who was the First Preacher of the Gospel to the Indians in America* (London, 2nd ed., 1691), and it was used frequently by historians, including John Palfrey Gorham and Francis Parkman during the nineteenth century. The phrasing itself has been abandoned in the late twentieth century, but the idea remains

entrenched; see, e.g., Duane Schultz, *Month of the Freezing Moon: The Sand Creek Massacre, November 1864* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990) p. 16.

250. Peter Farb, *Man's Rise to Civilization as Shown by the Indians of North America from Primeval Times to the Coming of the Industrial State* (New York: Dutton, 1968) pp. 123–4.

251. Edgar S. Cahn, ed., *Our Brother's Keeper: The Indian in White America* (Washington, D.C.: New Community Press, 1969) p. 176.

252. Canny, "Ideology," *op. cit.*, p. 582.

253. Lazarus, *Black Hills*, *op. cit.*, p. 29. For that matter, as lately as the early 1970s, U.S. troops working with the CIA's notorious Operation Phoenix in Vietnam were busily collecting and displaying heads of suspected Vietcong cadres, as evidenced by photos included in the documentary film *CLA: Phoenix Rising*, shown on The History Channel on July 13, 1996. The matter of "tradition" tends to speak for itself here.

254. This sort of thing was done in Plymouth, almost from the outset, as when Myles Standish killed the Wampanoag leader Wituwamat, took his head, and mounted it atop the Pilgrims' fort; Sidney V. Yates, ed., *Three Visitors to Early Plymouth: Letters about the Pilgrim Settlement in New England during Its First Eleven Years* (Plymouth Plantation, 1963) p. 31.

255. Leach, *Flintlock*, *op. cit.*, p. 113. Most sources say "heads." However, at least one makes reference to "head-skins"; Lincoln, *Narratives*, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

256. It was "a convenient way to collect provincial bounties for heads without having to lug the awkward impedimenta attached to the scalps"; Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, *op. cit.*, p. 160. Bounty hunters "got tired of lugging in the heads so soon they just brought in the scalp to show that they'd killed an Indian... Whites introduced scalping to tribes that had never practiced it themselves"; Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., *The Indian Heritage of America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968) p. 305.

257. E. B. O'Callaghan, *Laws and Ordinances of New Netherlands, 1638–1647* (Albany: State Historical Society of New York, 1868) pp. 28–9; Alan Axelrod, *Chronicle of the Indian Wars from Colonial Times to Wounded Knee* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1993) p. 39.

258. "Cornplanter's Talk," Draper Collection, 16 F 277, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison; quoted in Axtell, "The Unkindest Cut," *op. cit.*, p. 18.

259. Quoted in Dorothy Clarke Wilson, *Bright Eyes: The Story of Susette La Flesche* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974) p. 221.

260. E.B. O'Callaghan and Bethold Fernouw, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, 15 vols. (Albany: New York State Historical Society, 1856–1857) Vol. 3, p. 562.

261. *The Acts and Resolves of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay*, 21 vols. (Boston: State of Massachusetts Historical Society, 1869–1922) Vol. 1, pp. 175–6, 594.

262. O'Callaghan and Fernouw, *Documents*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, 150n.

263. Viola Barnes, *The Dominion of New England* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923) pp. 218–9.

264. Axtell, "Scalping," *op. cit.*, pp. 228, 234.

265. The Reverend Thomas Barton, quoted in Carl Van Doren and Julian P. Boyd, eds., *Indian Treaties Printed by Benjamin Franklin* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938) pp. lxxii–lxxiii. Also see Henry J. Young, "A Note on Scalp Bounties in Pennsylvania," *Pennsylvania History*, No. 24, 1957.

266. Clifford K. Shipton, *Sibley's Harvard Graduates: Biographical Sketches of Those Who Attended Harvard College* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard College, 1837) Vol. 6, pp. 407–8; Vol. 7, pp. 176–7.

267. The problem is covered in Richard R. Johnson, "The Search for a Usable Indian: An Aspect of the Defense of New England," *Journal of American History*, No. 64, 1977.

268. Axtell, "Scalping," *op. cit.*, p. 237; he is quoting from William A. Whitehead, ed., *Documents Relating to the Colonial, Revolutionary, and Post-Revolutionary History of the State of New Jersey*, *Archives of the State of New Jersey* (Trenton: 1st Ser. Vol. 20, 1898) pp. 43–4; *Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania*, Vol. 7, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

269. James Pinney Baxter, ed., *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, *Collections of the Maine Historical Society* (2nd Ser., No. 23, 1916) pp. 131–2, 139–40.

270. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

271. The above-mentioned 1688 Québec scalp bounty was the opening round of this, while that of New York in 1696 was the initial English response (notes 260 and 261).

272. Axtell, "Scalping," *op. cit.*, p. 217–8. Analysis of these economic realities will be found in Leroy V. Eid, "'National' War Among Indians of Northeastern North America," *Canadian Review of American Studies*, No. 16, 1985.

273. Samuel Hazard, et al., eds., *Pennsylvania Archives*, 1st Ser., Vol. 3, 1853, p. 199.

274. Captain John Knox, *An Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America for the Years 1757, 1758, 1759, and 1760* (London, 1769) pp. 438, 468.

275. The best sources on the group headed by Captain Samuel Brady, and Lewis Wetzel, are the Brady and Wetzel papers, 16 vols., Draper Manuscript Collection, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison.

276. E.g., well after peace was declared, Colonel Henry Bouquet—of smallpox blanket fame—discovered that "one of the Maryland Volunteers, had killed a Shawnee Indian near Fort Pitt & produced a Scalp for the reward; And that Some of the Frontier People were [still] out in the Woods Endeavoring to fall upon some straggling Indians to get their Scalps"; quoted in James Sullivan, et al., eds., *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, 14 vols. (Albany: State Historical Society of New York, 1921–1965) Vol. 6, p. 102.

277. Peter S. Schmalz, *The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) p. 99; Anthony, F.C. Wallace, *The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970) pp. 141–4.

278. Thomas Harris, *The Silence of the Lambs* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

279. Stannard, *American Holocaust*, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

280. There were not less than three official investigations conducted with regard to the Sand Creek Massacre, during which the extent and type of atrocities committed were testified to by participants and other eyewitnesses in excruciating detail; see U.S. House of Representatives, "Massacre of Cheyenne Indians," *Report on the Conduct of the War* (Washington, D.C.: 38th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Governing Printing Office, 1865); U.S. Senate, "Sand Creek Massacre," *Report of the Secretary of War* (Washington, D.C.: Sen. Exec. Doc. 26, 39 Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1867); U.S. Senate, "The Chivington Massacre," *Reports of the Committees* (Washington, D.C.: 39 Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1867). Verbatim excerpts from testimonies are also included as an appendix to Stan Hoig's *The Sand Creek Massacre* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961).

281. The full quote reads, "Among the brilliant feats of arms in Indian warfare, the recent campaign of our Colorado Volunteers will stand in history with few rivals, and none to exceed it in final results... All acquitted themselves well, and Colorado soldiers have again covered themselves with glory"; *Rocky Mountain News*, Dec. 17, 1864. Such sentiments are still widely prevalent; see Reginald S. Craig, *The Fighting Parson: A Biography of Col. John M. Chivington* (Tucson, AZ: Westernlore, 1959); Lt. Colonel William R. Dunn, "I Stand by Sand Creek": *A Defense of Colonel John M. Chivington and the Third Colorado Cavalry* (Ft. Collins, CO: Old Army Press, 1985).

282. Lazarus, *Black Hills*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

283. Virginia P. Miller, "Whatever Happened to the Yuki?" *Indian Historian*, No. 8, 1975, pp. 10–1. More extensively, see Lynwood Carranco and Estle Beard, *Genocide and Vendetta: The Round Valley Wars of Northern California* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981).

284. Newcomb, *Indians of Texas*, *op. cit.*

285. See, e.g., the extensive selection of quotations in David Svaldi, *Sand Creek and the Rhetoric of Extermination: A Case Study in Indian-White Relations* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989).

286. Tzvetan Todorov, *Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps* (New York: Henry Holt, 1996). Although scalp bounties were maintained against them in Arizona Territory until well into the 1880s, the "bloodthirsty" Chiricahua and other Apache groups never adopted the practice, considering it beneath their dignity as human beings; E. Leslie Reedstrom, *Apache Wars: An Illustrated Battle History* (New York: Sterling, 1990) p. 51. The same pertained to their cousins, the Diné; Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970) pp. 24–5.

287. *New Yorker*, Apr. 27, 1971, p. 104; quoted in Axtell, "The Unkindest Cut," *op. cit.*, p. 19.

288. Howard Peckham and Charles Gibson, eds., *The Attitudes of the Colonial Powers Towards the American Indian* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1969).

289. Paul Quattlebaum, *The Land Called Chicora: The Carolinas Under Spanish Rule with French Intrusions, 1520–1670* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1956).

290. Lyon, *Enterprise*, *op. cit.*; Paul E. Hoffman, *The Spanish Crown and the Defense of the Caribbean, 1565–1585: Precedent, Patrimonialism, and Royal Parsimony* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980).

291. Kathleen A. Deegan, “Cultures in Transition: Fusion and Assimilation Among the Eastern Timucua”; Lewis H. Larson, Jr., “Historic Gule Indians of the Georgia Coast and the Impact of the Spanish Mission Effort”; both in Jerald T. Milanich and Samuel Proctor, eds., *Tacachale: Essays on the Indians of Florida and Southeastern Georgia During the Historic Period* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1978). Also see John Tate Channing, *The Spanish Missions of Georgia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1935).

292. Robert Allen Matter, “Missions in the Defense of Spanish Florida,” *Florida Historical Quarterly*, No. 54, 1975; John H. Hann, *Apalachee: The Land Between the Rivers* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988). On the trade, which was for the Cuban port city of Havana, which the British had recently conquered, see Steele, *Warpathis*, *op. cit.*, p. 36. It is worth noting that, of the thousands of Indians who had been missionized over the preceding 110 years, only 83 survived at this point.

293. Actually, this happened in stages, with the panhandle region coming under U.S. control in 1812; Joseph Burholder Smith, *The Plot to Steal Florida: James Madison’s Phony War* (New York: Arbor House, 1983); Charles Carroll Griffin, *The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810–1822: A Study of the Relations of the United States with Spain and with the Rebel Spanish Colonies* (New York: Octagon Books, 1968).

294. It would be 1640 before the Acomas began to rebuild their community in its present location; Jack D. Forbes, *Apache, Navajo and Spaniard* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960) pp. 89–90. So successful was Oñate’s brutality that, in 1680, the Pueblos revolted as a unified people and drove the Spanish out of their territory for a half-century; Robert Silverberg, *The Pueblo Revolt* (New York: Weybright & Talley, 1970). It is worth noting that in 1781, the Yumas managed to accomplish much the same feat in their desert stronghold just north of the Gulf of California; Jack D. Forbes, *Warriors of the Colorado: The Yumas of the Quechan Nation and Their Neighbors* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965) pp. 192–200.

295. The plan did not include the two northerly or “Plains” Apache peoples, the Jicarillas and Kiowa Apaches; Delores A. Gunnerson, *The Jicarilla Apaches: A Study in Survival* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974) pp. 234–92.

296. Rubí also explicitly advocated the killing or capture and enslavement of Apache women so that the “race” would be unable to reproduce itself; Lawrence Kinnard, ed. and trans. *The Frontiers of New Spain: Nicolás de Lafora’s Description, 1766–1768* (Berkeley: Quivera Society, 1958) p. 217.

297. Alfred Barnaby Thomas, ed. and trans., *Forgotten Frontiers: A Study of the Spanish Indian Policy of Don Juan Bautista de Anza, Governor of New Mexico, 1777–1787* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1932) pp. 35–7, 45–6. On the inducements of weapons, etc., an innovation based on contemporaneous French Indian policy in Louisiana, see Elizabeth Howard West, “The Indian Policy of Bernardo de Gálvez,” *Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association*, No. 8, 1914–1915.

298. José Cortés, *Views from the Apache Frontier: Report on the Northern Provinces of New Spain* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1989 edited reprint of 1803[?] original); Max Moorhead, *The Apache Frontier: Jacobo Ugarte and Spanish-Indian Relations in New Mexico, 1769–1791* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968). On the demise of the Lipáns, see Henry F. Dobyns, *The Apache People* (Phoenix, Tribal Indian Series, 1971).

299. Forbes, *Apache, Navajo, Spaniard*, *op. cit.*; McNitt, *Navajo Wars*, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–2; William B. Griffin, *Utmost Good Faith: Patterns in Apache-Mexican Hostilities in Northern Chihualhua Border Warfare, 1821–1848* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988).

300. Dan Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967). On reduction of Chiricahua population, see Dobyns, *The Apache People*, *op. cit.*

301. *Historical Statistics*, series Z, pp. 15–6.

302. “The French did...resist the genocidal tendencies exhibited by British colonists who were bent on erasing all Indian presence from the fertile lands the colonists so coveted for their farms”; Charles J. Balesi, *The Time of the French in the Heart of North America, 1673–1818* (Chicago: Alliance Française, 1992) p. 152.

303. Marcel Trudel, *The Beginnings of New France, 1524–1663* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973) pp. 34–53. The next French attempt to plant a fixed colonial base, the Huguenots in Florida, also failed; see notes 288 and 289, above. Overall, see George M. Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1928).

304. De Monts had created an entity not unlike the English Virginia Company organized just three years earlier. His and Champlain's initial attempts to establish a base were at the Ile Sainte-Croix, in Passamaquoddy Bay, and at Port Royal; Salisbury, Manitou, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–72.

305. Bruce G. Trigger, *The Children of Aataentsic*, 2 vols. (Montréal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1976) Vol. 1, pp. 214–24; also see Conrad Heidenreich, *Huron: A History and Geography of the Huron Indians, 1600–1650* (Toronto: McClellan and Stewart, 1971).

306. Trudel, *Beginnings of New France*, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–81.

307. Trigger, *The Children of Aataentsic*, Vol. 1, *op. cit.*, pp. 246–56; H.P. Bigger, ed., *The Works of Samuel de Champlain*, 6 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1922–1936) Vol. 2, pp. 82–107.

308. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 65; Bigger, *Works of Samuel Champlain*, *op. cit.*, pp. 122–34.

309. The Mohawks, a people of only about 5,000 at the time, were engaged with a long struggle with the Susquehannocks to the south, and could ill-afford a two-front war, even if weaponry had been equal; Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, Vol. 1, *op. cit.*, pp. 256–61.

310. *Ibid.*, pp. 308–15; Trudel, *Beginnings of New France*, *op. cit.*, pp. 119–21.

311. W.J. Eccles, *France in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) pp. 26–9; Trudel, *Beginnings of New France*, *op. cit.*, pp. 172–8.

312. The Mahicans had sought to be middlemen, positioned to regulate the flow of materiel and brokering whatever goods the Mohawks might receive from the Dutch at a profit to themselves; Bruce G. Trigger, "The Mohawk-Mahican War (1624–28): The Establishment of a Pattern," *Canadian Historical Review*, No. 52, 1971.

313. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, pp. 69–70; Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, Vol. 2, *op. cit.*, pp. 463–7.

314. Bruce G. Trigger, *Natives and Newcomers: Canada's "Heroic Age" Reconsidered* (Montréal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1985).

315. Susan Johnson, "Epidemics: The Forgotten Factor in Seventeenth Century Native Warfare in the St. Lawrence Region," in Bruce A. Cox, ed., *Native People, Native Lands* (Ottawa: Carlton University Press, 1988) pp. 14–31.

316. Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, Vol. 2, pp. 546–51.

317. *Ibid.*

318. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, 70–1; Brian J. Givens, "The Iroquois Wars and Native Firearms," in Cox, *Native People*, *op. cit.*

319. Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, Vol. 2, *op. cit.*, pp. 789–840.

320. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

321. Axelrod, *Chronicle of the Indian Wars*, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–5.

322. The evidence suggests this was a northerly branch of the Susquehannock. In any event, their defeat set off renewed fighting between the Haudenosaunee and their powerful southern counterpart which would last for three decades; *ibid.*, p. 45.

323. Axelrod, *Chronicle of the Indian Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 45; George T. Hunt, *The Wars of the Iroquois: A Study in Intertribal Relations* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960) pp. 151–7. The New England colonists were also interested in developing a commercial relationship with the Mohawks at this time, not only for economic reasons, but to facilitate the emergence of an alliance which might be of use in their intended destruction of the much more proximate Wampanoags and Narragansetts; Bernard Bailyn, *The New England Merchants of the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) pp. 125–39.

324. On Haudenosaunee overtures in this area at the time, see Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, *op. cit.*; Patricia C. Calloway, ed., *La Salle and His Legacy: Frenchmen and Indians in the Lower Mississippi Valley* (Jackson: Mississippi State University Press, 1982).

325. A campaign to subdue the Mohawks undertaken by 600 freshly imported French regulars and a hundred Algonquins and Huron remnants in 1666 proved, at best, indecisive; Jack Verney, *The Good Regiment: The Carignan-Salières Regiment in Canada, 1665–1668* (Montréal: McGill-Queens University

Press, 1991) pp. 71–84; W.C. Eccles, *Canada Under Louis XIV, 1663–1701* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964) pp. 41–4. To argue that the fate of the Hurons, Eries and others was “unintended” by the French is irrelevant. Their purpose had been to create a situation in which the Five Nations, or at least the Mohawks, would suffer it. Having quite deliberately set the process in motion for their own purposes, they are responsible for the genocidal nature of the outcome, even though it was, from their perspective, visited upon the “wrong” Indians.

326. Eccles, *France in America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–88.

327. Ibid. Also see Balesi, *Time of the French*, *op. cit.*; Sauer, *Seventeenth Century North America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 127–216.

328. The Hudson’s Bay Company, following the French example, had long since begun trading guns to the Crees for furs (by 1689, they would have more than 10,000 modern weapons). The French, meanwhile, offered the Indians extraordinary trade inducements—and ample supplies of powder and lead—to turn this newly acquired firepower on the very English who’d provided it. The Cree began attacking Hudson’s Bay posts at least as early as 1680; M.L. Brown, *Firearms in Colonial America: The Impact on History and Technology* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1980) p. 157.

329. “The most ambitious solution suggested was extermination”; Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 64; also see William Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier, 1534–1760* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, [rev. ed.], 1983), p. 148; R. David Edmunds and Joseph L. Peyser, *The Fox Wars: The Mesquakie Challenge to New France* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).

330. Joseph L. Peyser, “The 1730 Siege of the Foxes,” *Illinois Historical Journal*, Vol. LXXX, No. 3, 1967.

331. Joseph L. Peyser, “The Fate of the Fox Survivors: A Dark Chapter in the History of the French in the Upper Country, 1726–1737,” *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, Vol. 73, No. 2, 1890–1990.

332. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

333. Patricia D. Woods, “The French and the Natchez Indians in Louisiana, 1700–1731,” *Louisiana History*, No. 19, 1978.

334. The Natchez had once been the regional power, having achieved a distinctive Mobilian agricultural civilization well before 1500. A series of epidemics had reduced them by as much as 95 percent by 1700; Charles M. Hudson, *The Southeastern Indians* (Knoxville: University of Kentucky Press, 1976).

335. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, pp. 67–8; Woods, “The French and the Natchez,” *op. cit.*

336. Joseph L. Peyser, “The Chickasaw Wars of 1736 and 1740,” *Journal of Mississippi History*, February 1982; Balesi, *Time of the French*, *op. cit.*, Chap. 10, inclusive. Also see Arrell M. Gibson, *The Chickasaws* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971).

337. Patricia D. Woods, *French-Indian Relations on the Southern Frontier, 1699–1762* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980).

338. See generally, the early chapters of C.R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1800* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965).

339. Allen W. Trelease, *Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) pp. 25–34.

340. Bruce J. Givens, “The Iroquois Wars and Native Firearms,” in Cox, *Native People*, *op. cit.*

341. Trigger, “The Mohawk–Mohegan War,” *op. cit.*; Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, *op. cit.*, 49, 53, 71; Givens, “The Iroquois Wars,” *op. cit.*, pp. 3–13; Trelease, *Indian Affairs*, *op. cit.*, pp. 46–8; Daniel K. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois Confederation in the Era of Colonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992) pp. 1–49.

342. Van Cleaf Bachman, *Peltries or Plantations: The Economic Policies of the Dutch West Indian Company in New Netherland, 1623–1629* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969).

343. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

344. On the Dutch provision of muskets to the Mohawks at this time, see Steele, *op. cit.*, p. 115; otherwise, see Trelease, *Indian Affairs*, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–80.

345. Axelrod, *Chronicle* *op. cit.*, p. 39.

346. Ibid.

347. Ibid., p. 40.

348. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
349. Ibid.; Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
350. Ibid.
351. Trelease, *Indian Affairs*, *op. cit.*, pp. 138–68.
352. Jennings, *The Ambiguous Empire*, *op. cit.*, pp. 108–11.
353. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 118; Richard I. Melvoin, *New England Outpost: War and Society in Colonial Deerfield* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989) pp. 35–50.
354. The second Anglo-Dutch War lasted from 1665–67; Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, pp. 118–9.
355. By 1667, the Mohawks had absorbed so many captives in an effort to keep their strength up that they'd become a minority in their own villages. Exhausted, they needed a period of respite to rejuvenate themselves; Gordon G. Day, "The Ouragie War: A Case History in Iroquois-New England Indian Relations," in Michael K. Foster, Jack Campisi and Marianne Mithun, eds., *Extending the Rafters: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Iroquoian Studies* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984) pp. 35–50; Richter, *Ordeal*, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–74; Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, *op. cit.*, pp. 84–112, 128–9.
356. This newest English holding had already been promised as a personal proprietary to the English king's youngest brother, the Duke of York and Albany. Hence the names bestowed upon the colony and its capital; Robert C. Richie, *The Duke's Province: A Study of New York Politics and Society, 1664–1691* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1977) pp. 9–24.
357. See, overall, Klaus E. Knorr, *British Colonial Theories, 1570–1850* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1944) pp. 68–80.
358. Hugh Edward Egerton, *A Short History of British Colonial Policy* (London: Methuen, 6th ed., 1920). Also see D.K. Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Delacourt, 1967) pp. 55–83.
359. On the Tuscaroras, see Leitch Wright, *The Only Land*, *op. cit.*, pp. 117–20.
360. Douglas W. Boyce, "'As the Wind Scatters the Smoke': The Tuscarora in the Eighteenth Century," in Richter and Merrill, *op. cit.*
361. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
362. Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, pp. 165–6.
363. The colonists were so desperate at one point that they armed some 500 African slaves to assist in the defense of Charleston; *ibid.*, p. 166. Also see David H. Corkoran, *The Creek Frontier, 1540–1783* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967) pp. 59–81.
364. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 62; Steele, *Warpaths*, *op. cit.*, p. 166.
365. James Leitch Wright, Jr., *The Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in North America* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1971) pp. 90–1.
366. Although the Abenaki were aligned with the French as trading partners, they were completely independent and pursued a course of military neutrality which English aggression ultimately denied them; Kenneth M. Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) pp. 117–9.
367. See Edward P. Hamilton, *The French and Indian Wars* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962); Howard M. Peckham, *The Colonial Wars, 1689–1762* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Albert Marrin, *Struggle for a Continent: The French and Indian Wars, 1690–1760* (New York: Atheneum, 1987).
368. See, e.g., Fred Anderson, *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1984).
369. "Most [indigenous nations] sided in varying degrees with the French, hoping to eke out some advantage thereby, or hoping merely to survive"; Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
370. Balesi, *Time of the French*, *op. cit.*
371. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 76; also see Randolph C. Downes, *Council Fires on the Upper Ohio* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1940).
372. Richter, *Ordeal*, *op. cit.*, pp. 162–213; Dale Miquelon, *New France: "A Supplement to Europe"* (Toronto: McClellan and Stewart, 1987) pp. 18–25.
373. Indeed, by 1730 all three had gone out of existence, their remnants being absorbed mainly by the Penobscots and Abenakis; Calloway, *Western Abenaki*, *op. cit.*

374. In 1699, for example, France's western allies, particularly the Ojibway, administered a humiliating defeat to the Haudenosaunee on the shores of Lake Erie; Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

375. *Ibid.*, p. 56. The captives, of course, were sold into slavery; Hann, *Appalachee*, *op. cit.*, pp. 264–83.

376. A good overview of the falsity of this "peace" will be found in the early chapters of John Robert McNeill's, *The Atlantic Empires of France and Spain: Louisbourg and Havana, 1700–1763* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1985). On the impact of the war on the Abenaki and their tributaries, see Calloway, *Western Abenaki*, *op. cit.*

377. Allan W. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

378. See Charles Morse Stotz, *Outposts of the War for Empire* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1985); James Titus, *The Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991).

379. See Hamilton, *French and Indian Wars*, *op. cit.*

380. Probably the best overview of the raiding will be found in Eckert, *That Dark and Bloody River*, *op. cit.* Also see his *The Wilderness at War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978) and Leroy V. Eid, "'A Kind of Running Fight': Indian Battlefield Tactics in the Late Eighteenth Century," *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine*, No. 71, 1988.

381. Lee McCardell, *Ill-Starred General: Braddock of the Coldstream Guards* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1958); Stanley G. Pargellis, "Braddock's Defeat," *American History Review*, No. 41, 1936.

382. Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, *op. cit.*, pp. 162–3; Peter E. Russell, "Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare, 1740 to 1760," *William and Mary Quarterly*, No. 35, 1978.

383. Fort William Henry is the installation featured in James Fenimore Cooper's *Last of the Mohicans*. For a much more accurate account of what happened there, see Ian K. Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the "Massacre"* (New York: Oxford University Press, rev. ed., 1993).

384. The promissaries devolved upon guarantees of indigenous territoriality. On English diplomacy in this connection, see Wilbur R. Jacobs, *Diplomacy and Indian Gifts: Anglo-French Rivalry Along the Ohio and Northwestern Frontiers, 1748–1763* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1950); Richard Middleton, *Bells of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the Seven Years' War, 1757–1762* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

385. Downes, *Council Fires*, *op. cit.* Also see Stephen F. Auth, *The Ten Years' War: Indian-White Relations in Pennsylvania, 1755–1765* (New York: Garland, 1989); Anthony F.C. Wallace, *King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung, 1700–1763* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949).

386. David H. Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and Survival, 1740–1762* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962).

387. Brian Leigh Dunnigan, *Siege 1759: The Campaign Against Niagara* (Youngstown, NY: New York Historical Association, 1986); C.P. Stacy, *Quebec 1759: The Siege and the Battle* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1959).

388. Although English negotiators were officially enjoined by the Crown to assure native land rights through such treaties, the Micmacs were shortly dispossessed through a sleight of hand involving interpretation of the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht; Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–4. More generally, see George F. Stanley, *New France: The Last Phase, 1744–1760* (Toronto: McClellan and Stewart, 1968); Francis Gardiner Davenport, ed., *European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and Its Dependencies*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1917); Dorothy V. Jones, *License for Empire: Colonialism by Treaty in North America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

389. Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, *op. cit.*, pp. 142–272; Gary C. Goodwin, *Cherokees in Transition: A Study of Changing Culture and Environment prior to 1775* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).

390. Thornton, *The Cherokees*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–37.

391. Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, *op. cit.*; Goodwin, *Cherokees in Transition*, *op. cit.*

392. Jack M. Sosin, *Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760–1775* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961).

393. Duane Champagne, "The Delaware Revitalization Movement of the Early 1760s: A Suggested Reinterpretation," *American Indian Quarterly*, No. 12, 1988; Gregory Evans Dowd, "Thinking and Believing: Nativism and Unity in the Ages of Pontiac and Tecumseh," *American Indian Quarterly*, No. 16, 1992.

394. Peckham, *Colonial Wars*, *op. cit.*; also see Gregory Evans Dowd, "The French King Wakes Up in Detroit: 'Pontiac's War' in Rumor and History," *Ethnohistory*, No. 37, 1990. On the nature of the alliance Pontiac sought to form, see Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). Also see Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

395. On the demise of these four peoples from the contemporaneous perspective of Amherst's replacement, see Clarence Edwin Carter, ed., *The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State, 1763–1775, Vol. 1* (New Haven: Yale College and University Press, 1931). Also see Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust and Survival*, *op. cit.*

396. Jack Stagg, *Anglo-Indian Relations in North America to 1763 and an Analysis of the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763* (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Ministry of Canada, 1981).

397. William G. Godfrey, *Pursuit of Profit and Preferment in North America: John Bradstreet's Quest* (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1982).

398. George Washington, to take a prime example, had planned to profit from thousands of acres to which he'd laid claim in Kentucky and Ohio; Eckert, *That Dark and Bloody River*, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–4. Also see North Callahan, *George Washington: Soldier and Man* (New York: William Morrow, 1972).

399. Bernard Knollenberg, *The Origin of the American Revolution, 1759–1766* (New York: Macmillan, 1960). Also see Peter Marshall, "Colonial Protest and Imperial Retrenchment: Indian Policy, 1764–1768," *Journal of American Studies*, No. 5, 1971; Jack P. Greene, "The Seven Years' War and the American Revolution: The Causal Relationship Reconsidered," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, No. 8, 1980.

400. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 99. It is worth noting that no one was ever prosecuted for these crimes.

401. To be fair, Dunmore was doing little more than formalizing an existing situation, since Virginians and others had been literally pouring into the more easterly portions of the proscribed territory despite the Proclamation of 1763; Sosin, *Whitehall*, *op. cit.*

402. Cornstalk's brother, Silverheels, was killed in the ambush. Thereafter, roughly 700 Indians inflicted 222 fatalities on the governor's 3,000 man column, at which point Dunmore ordered a full retreat; E.O. Randolph, "The Dunmore War," *Ohio Archaeological and Historical Publications*, No. 11, 1931.

403. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

404. Gregory Schaaf, *Wampum Belts and Peace Trees: George Morgan, Native Americans and Revolutionary Diplomacy* (Golden, CO: Fulcrum, 1990).

405. Thomas Perkins Abernathy, *Western Lands and the American Revolution* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1959); Wilbur R. Jacobs, *Dispossessing the American Indian: Indians and Whites on the Colonial Frontier* (New York: Scribner's, 1972); Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

406. Although the more populous Senecas probably provided the greater manpower, the sharp end of the Haudenosaunee offensive was as always provided by the Mohawks, this time led by Thayendanegea (Joseph Brant). The Oneidas, alone among the Six Nations, sided with the rebels against the Crown; Barbara Greymount, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1975).

407. Alan W. Eckert, *The Twilight of Empire* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988); *That Dark and Bloody River*, *op. cit.*

408. Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, *op. cit.*, pp. 197–244; R.S. Cotterill, *The Southern Indians: The Story of the Five Civilized Tribes before Removal* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954).

409. The implications are analyzed in Eric Robinson's *The American Revolution in Its Political and Military Aspects, 1763–1783* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955).

410. The commanders were General Andrew Williamson, heading 1,800 troops from Georgia and South Carolina; General Griffith Rutherford, heading 2,500 from North Carolina; and Colonel William Christian, heading another 2,000 from Virginia and North Carolina; Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

411. Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, *op. cit.*, pp. 231–5.

412. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 119; also see the final chapters of David H. Corkran, *The Creek Frontier, 1540–1783* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967).

413. Quoted in John Tebbel and Keith Jennison, *The American Indian Wars* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960) p. 124.

414. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

415. Page Smith, *A New Age Now Begins: A People's History of the American Revolution*, Vol. 2 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976) p. 1172. For details, see Frederick Cook, *Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John Sullivan against the Six Nations of Indians in 1779* (Auburn, NY: New York Historical Society, 1887).

416. Tebbel and Jennison, *American Indian Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 125. Also see the early chapters of Wallace, *The Death and Rebirth of the Senecas*, *op. cit.*

417. This is well-covered in Frederick Austin Ogg, *The Old Northwest* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1921). Also see William Albert Galloway, *Old Chillicothe: Shawnees and Pioneer History* (Xenia, OH: Buckeye Press, 1934).

418. Chillicothe had been burned again, and Clark was advancing with little opposition; Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 122. The 1782 accords ended the fighting although the actual Treaty of Paris was not finalized and signed until September 3, 1783.

419. Eckert, *That Dark and Bloody River*, *op. cit.*, p. 440. This and related materials will be found in Alden T. Vaughan, *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789* (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, 1979).

420. Eckert, *That Dark and Bloody River*, *op. cit.*, p. 440.

421. As Washington stated it, "There is nothing to be gained by an Indian war but the soil they live on and this can [often] be obtained...at less expense" through the sort of expedients he recommended so long as treaty commissioners did not "grasp at too much" at any given moment. Direct applications of military force should be undertaken only when other means failed; Eckert, *That Dark and Bloody River*, *op. cit.*, pp. 440-1.

422. *Ibid.*, p. 441.

423. In this, the Constitution merely reflects a longstanding principle of international law, that the legal relations between nations possesses a standing superior to the domestic legal arrangements of any given nation; Emer Vattel, *The Laws of Nations* (Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson, 1855); Alfred Nussbaum, *A Concise History of the Laws of Nations* (New York: Macmillan, 1954). For the perspective of Canada, see George Brown and Ron Mcguire, *Indian Treaties in Historical Perspective* (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Ministry of Canada, 1979).

424. 1 Stat. 50 (1787). See generally, Francis Paul Prucha, *American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970); Vine Deloria, Jr., and Clifford M. Lytle, *American Indians, American Justice* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983).

425. On Marshall's holdings, see L. Baker, *John Marshall: A Life in Law* (New York: Macmillan, 1976) p. 80. On his doctrine of Indian law, see my "Perversions of Justice: Examining the Doctrine of U.S. Rights to Occupancy in North America," in David S. Caudill and Steven Jay Gould, *Radical Philosophy of Law: Contemporary Challenges to Mainstream Legal Theory and Practice* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1995). Also see Donald E. Worcester, ed., *Forked Tongues and Broken Treaties* (Caldwell, ID: Caxton, 1975).

426. Andrew Jackson, who was president at the time Marshall finalized his theory in the so-called "Cherokee Cases" of 1831-32, openly defied the high court's conclusions, announcing that "Justice Marshall has rendered his opinion, now let him enforce it"; Michael P. Rogin, *Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975) pp. 206-48.

427. Quoted in Eckert, *That Dark and Bloody River*, *op. cit.* p. 440.

428. Quoted in Drinnon, *Facing West*, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

429. On the common underpinnings of the two pseudophilosophies, see Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Parella, *Lebensraum and Manifest Destiny*, *op. cit.*; Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansion in American History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935); Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963).

430. As the Seneca leader Red Jacket explained to President Washington in 1792, when his very name was mentioned among the Haudenosaunee, "our women look behind them and turn pale, and our children cling to their mothers' necks"; quoted in Wallace, *The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca*, *op. cit.*, p. 144. Also see Michael S. Manley, "Red Jacket's Last Campaign," *New York History*, No. 21, April 1950.

431. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

432. The expedition, conducted while the Shawnees were assembled for another round of talks with George Rogers Clark, burned thirteen mostly vacant Shawnee towns. A total of ten men and a dozen women were killed and scalped. "In addition, all the Shawnee crops, ready for the harvesting, had been destroyed." The best rendering of Logan's "campaign" will be found in Allan W. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

433. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

434. Little Turtle served as the principal political strategist of the alliance, while Blue Jacket became its primary military leader; Allan W. Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart: The Life of Tecumseh* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992).

435. Knox estimated that it would take 2,500 men and \$200,000 to defeat the Miami-Shawnee alliance. Plainly not knowing much about Indians, or at least *these* Indians, he calculated that only \$15,000 would be needed to "buy their cooperation." Harmer's command, which had lost 31 men to an ambush only two days earlier, suffered losses of 108 dead militiamen and 75 regular army soldiers; Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

436. St. Clair had some 1,400 men with him on the day of the battle. Of these, 623 soldiers were killed, as well as 24 civilian teamsters. Another 271 soldiers were wounded. The Indians lost 21 dead and 40 wounded; Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

437. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

438. The best overall account of the hostilities is probably Wiley Sword's *President Washington's Indian War* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985).

439. Treaty of Greenville, August 1795. For the text of this and 370 other ratified treaties between the U.S. and indigenous peoples, see Charles J. Kappler, ed., *Indian Treaties, 1778-1883* (New York: Interland, 1972). After the treaty, Congress subdivided the old Northwest Territory into three parts: Indiana (est., 1800), Michigan (est., 1805) and Illinois (est., 1809); Malcolm J. Rohrbough, *The Trans-Appalachian Frontier: Peoples, Societies and Institutions, 1775-1850* (New York: Oxford, 1978) p. 115.

440. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

441. *Ibid.*, p. 150; Harrison passed around plenty of liquor before the signing. He then claimed to have "purchased" 50 million acres of prime farmland for \$2,234.50 in gifts and a \$1,000 annuity in goods. Small wonder Black Hawk considered the whole thing a fraud; Donald Jackson, ed., *Black Hawk: An Autobiography* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

442. Benjamin Drake, *The Life of Tecumseh and His Brother the Prophet* (Cincinnati: Anderson, Gates & Wright, 1841); R. David Edmunds, *The Shawnee Prophet* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983); *Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984).

443. Probably the most detailed account is in Armstrong Perry's *The Sauks and the Black Hawk War* (Springfield, IL: H. W. Rokker, 1887).

444. Bradford Perkins, *Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961); Reginald Horsman, *The Causes of the War of 1812* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962).

445. This southern diplomacy is well-handled in Glenn Tucker, *Tecumseh: Vision of Glory* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956).

446. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 132. Also see Freeman Cleaves, *Old Tippecanoe: William Henry Harrison and His Times* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat, 1969 reprint of 1939 ed.); Moses Dawson, *Historical Narrative of the Civil and Military Service of Major-General William Henry Harrison* (Cincinnati: Cincinnati Advertiser, 1824).

447. The implications of this action are analyzed in detail in Philip P. Mason, ed., *After Tippecanoe: Some Aspects of the War of 1812* (East Lansing, MI & Toronto: Michigan State University Press & Ryerson Press, 1963).

448. Pierce Berton, *The Invasion of Canada, 1812-1813* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).

449. For analysis, see Carl F. Klinck, ed., *Tecumseh: Fact and Fiction in the Early Records* (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1961).

450. At least one British officer, Major General Henry Proctor, was later prosecuted in this connection; Victor Lauriston, "The Case for General Proctor," in Morris Zaslow and Wesley B. Turner, eds., *The Defended Border: Upper Canada and the War of 1812* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1964).

451. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 135. Winchester lost more than 400 of his 980 men; A.R. Gilpin, *The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958) p. 231.

452. See John C. Frederickson, "Kentucky at the Thames, 1813," *Register of Kentucky History*, Spring 1985.

453. Bert Anson, *The Miami Indians* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970).

454. The ordeals of these peoples are depicted in Peter D. Clark, *The Origin and Traditional History of the Wyandots* (Toronto: Hunter, Rose, 1870); Arrell M. Gibson, *The Kickapoos: Lords of the Middle Border* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963); R. David Edmunds, *The Potawatomes: Keepers of the Fire* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978). On the Ottawas, see H. Hickerson, *The Chippewa and Their Neighbors: A Study in Ethnohistory* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970).

455. Thomas Wildcat Alford, *Civilization and the Story of the Absentee Shawnees* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1936); James H. Howard, *Shawnee: Ceremonialism of an American Indian Tribe* (Athens, OH: University Press of Ohio, 1981).

456. Jackson's army devastated "every Red Stick town in its path," destroyed winter food stores, and killed whatever Indians it came upon; Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

457. For a glowing account of the "heroism" of Jackson's men in shooting hundreds of unarmed Indians who were attempting to swim to safety—but virtually no mention of the wholesale mutilation of their corpses—see William Alexander Caruthers, *The Knights of the Horseshoe* (New York: A.L. Burt, n.d., circa 1835).

458. The Red Stick faction of the (Upper) Creeks, led by William Weatherford (Red Eagle), joined Tecumseh's alliance in an attempt to avert total dispossession of their homeland. They were opposed by the White Sticks (Lower Creek) faction, who erroneously believed some reasonable accommodation might be negotiated with the U.S. The Upper Creeks were virtually exterminated during the war. The Lower Creeks were then almost entirely dispossessed by their American "allies"; Joel W. Martin, *Sacred Revolt: The Muskogees' Struggle for a New World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991). Also see Angie Debo, *The Road to Disappearance: A History of the Creek Indians* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941); Frank Lawrence Owsley, Jr., *Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New Orleans, 1812–1815* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1981).

459. Treaty of Horseshoe Bend, Aug. 9, 1814; Kappler, *Indian Treaties*, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–10.

460. "Even for admirers of the seventh president of the United States, the name of Andrew Jackson is forever linked to the inequitable, immoral, and inhumane Federal policy of Indian 'removal.' It is true that the Indian Removal Act of 1830 was the work of the Jackson administration and that Jackson, as well as his Indian agents and treaty commissioners, shamelessly manipulated the law and interfered with internal Indian affairs well beyond the point of fraud in order to compel tribal cession of eastern land and the removal of [indigenous nations] to the West." The idea of removal originated with George Washington, however, and was pursued by each of the presidents who followed him; Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 137. Also see Louis Filler and Allen Guttman, eds., *The Removal of the Cherokee Nation: Manifest Destiny or National Dishonor?* (Boston: Heath, 1962).

461. U.S. objectives are spelled out in John K. Mahon, *History of the Second Seminole War, 1835–1842* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967). The Seminole side of things is reasonably well explained in William Hartley and Ellen Hartley, *Osceola: The Unconquered Indian* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1973).

462. "For every two Seminoles who were sent West, one soldier died—1,500 in all. The war cost the federal government \$20 million, and it ended in 1842 not through any victory on either side, but because the government simply stopped trying to flush out the remaining Seminoles who had hidden themselves deep in the Everglades." A third war was fought with these remnants from 1855 to 1858, with even less-conclusive results; Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, pp. 146–7.

463. *Ibid.*, pp. 150–1.

464. Perry, *op. cit.*; Frank E. Stevens, *The Black Hawk War: Including a Review of Black Hawk's Life* (Chicago: Aldine, 1903); Edward J. Nichols, *Zach Taylor's Little Army* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1963).
465. The best overview of the campaign is in Miriam Gurko's *Indian America: The Black Hawk War* (New York: Crowell, 1970).
466. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
467. Gurko, *Indian America*, *op. cit.*, p. 238.
468. Jackson, *Black Hawk*, *op. cit.*
469. William T. Hagan, *The Sac and Fox Indians* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958).
470. See my "Like Sand in the Wind: The Making of an American Indian Diaspora," in *Since Predator Came: Notes on the Struggle for American Indian Liberation* (Littleton, CO: Aigis, 1995).
471. By 1821, Missouri had become a state. The last territory east of the Mississippi, Wisconsin, was created in 1836; Rohrbough, *Trans-Appalachian Frontier*, *op. cit.*, pp. 159, 219, 321.
472. T.R. Fehrenbach, *Lone Star: A History of Texas and Texans* (New York: Macmillan, 1968). Also see Anna Muckleroy, "The Indian Policy of the Republic of Texas" (4 pts.), *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, Apr., July, Oct. 1922; Jan. 1923.
473. David M. Pelcher, *The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon and the Mexican War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973).
474. Gene M. Brack, *Mexico Views Manifest Destiny, 1821-1846: An Essay on the Origins of the Mexican War* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975); James M. McCaffrey, *Army of Manifest Destiny: The American Soldier in the Mexican War, 1846-1848* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
475. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 155. Also see Merrill D. Peterson, *Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Alexander De Conde, *This Affair of Louisiana* (New York: Scribner's, 1973).
476. Quoted in Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
477. Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, *op. cit.*; Svaldi, *Sand Creek*, *op. cit.*
478. See note 138, above.
479. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 162.
480. See, e.g., Gunnerson, *The Jicarilla Apaches*, *op. cit.*; Thrapp, *op. cit.*; C.L. Sonnichsen, *The Mescalero Apaches* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958); Odie B. Faulk, *The Geronimo Campaign* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); Leigh H. Basso, *The Cibique Apache* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970); D.C. Cole, *The Chiricahua Apache, 1846-1876: From War to Reservation* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988).
481. Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust and Survival*, *op. cit.*
482. *Daily Alta California*, May 4, 1852.
483. *Ibid.*
484. *San Francisco Bulletin*, June 18, 1860.
485. *Ibid.*
486. See note 283, above.
487. The reference is to another series of massacres in Mendocino County, California; *San Francisco Bulletin*, June 18, 1860. More broadly, see Carranco and Beard, *Genocide and Vendetta*, *op. cit.*
488. Cook, *The Conflict Between the California Indians and White Civilization*, *op. cit.*; William Eccleston, *The Mariposa Indian War, 1850-1851* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1957 reprint of 1851 original).
489. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-2. Also see Odie B. Faulk, *Destiny Road: The Gila Trail and the Opening of the Southwest* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); *Crimson Desert: The Indian Wars of the Southwest* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).
490. More than fifty California "mission bands" like the Juaneños were declared extinct by the federal government as part of the "Pit River Land Settlement" during the 1970s; Florence Connolly Shipeck, *Pushed into the Rocks: Southern California Indian Land Tenure, 1769-1986* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988). For selected tribally specific outcomes during the late nineteenth century, see Rose Taylor, *The Last Survivor* (San Francisco: Johnck & Seeger, 1932); Annie Mitchell, *Jim Savage and the Tulareño Indians* (Los Angeles, Westernlore Press, 1957); Frank F. Latta, *Handbook of Yokuts Indians* (Santa Cruz: Bear State Press, 1977); Lowell John Bean, *The Cahuilla* (New York: Chelsea House, 1989). Overall,

see Alberto L. Hurtado, *Indian Survival on the California Frontier* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988).

491. Ray Hoard Glassley, *Pacific Northwest Indian Wars* (Portland, OR: Binfords & Mort, 1953) pp. 13–38. This is a horribly racist volume but confirms certain gruesome details of what was done to the indigenous peoples of the region. A much better, but less focused, overview of the same events will be found in David Lavender's *Land of Giants: The Drive to the Pacific Northwest, 1750–1950* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1958).

492. Stephen Dow Beckham, *Requiem for a People: The Rogue River Indians and the Frontiersmen* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971); Terrance O'Donnell, *An Arrow in the Earth: General Joel Palmer and the Indians of Oregon* (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1991). Other coastal peoples—such as the Suquamish, Siwash, Nisquallies, Muckleshoots, Puyallups and Lummis—avoided such bloody confrontations only by signing a series of treaties in 1855 in which they relinquished most of their territories in exchange for guarantees of perpetual fishing rights in their “usual and accustomed places.” The white citizenry of Washington took the land, then ignored the native right to fish; American Friends Service Committee, *Uncommon Controversy: Fishing Rights of the Muckleshoot, Puyallup, and Nisqually Indians* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970); Faye G. Cohen, *Treaties on Trial: The Continuing Controversy over Northwest Indian Fishing Rights* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986).

493. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 175. Also see B.F. Manring, *The Conquest of the Coeur d'Alenes, Spokanes and Palouses* (Spokane, WA: Inland, 1912); Robert H. Ruby, *The Spokane Indians: Children of the Sun* (Norman: university of Oklahoma Press, 1970).

494. Glassley, *Pacific Northwest Indian Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

495. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

496. The two bands—called “Snakes” by local whites—numbered perhaps 1,200 people between them. By mid-1868, they had suffered 329 killed, 20 wounded and 225 captured at the hands of troops commanded by General George Crook. They thereupon surrendered and were dispersed to several reservations; *ibid.*, p. 214. Also see Sarah Winnemucca Hopkins, *Life Among the Piutes: Their Wrongs and Claims* (Bishop, CA: Chalfant Press, 1969 reprint of 1883 original).

497. Harvey Chalmers, *Last Stand of the Nez Percé: Destruction of a People* (New York: Twayne, 1962); Merrill D. Beal, “I Will Fight No More Forever”: Chief Joseph and the Nez Percé War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963); John D. McDermott, *Forlorn Hope: The Battle of Whitebird Canyon and the Beginning of the Nez Percé War* (Boise: Idaho State Historical Society, 1978).

498. Axelrod, *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, pp. 236–7.

499. Glassley, *Pacific Northwest Indian Wars*, *op. cit.*, pp. 239–48.

500. William H. Goetzmann, *Army Exploration and the West, 1803–1863* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959); *Exploration and Empire* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966).

501. On trade, see David Lavender, *Bent's Fort* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1954); *The Great West* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1987). On passage, see Henry Inman, *The Old Santa Fe Trail: The Story of a Great Highway* (Minneapolis: Ross & Haines, 1966 reprint of the 1897 original); John D. Unruh, *The Plains Across: The Overland Immigrants and the Trans-Mississippi West, 1840–1860* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979).

502. Burton S. Hill, “The Great Indian Treaty Council of 1851,” *Nebraska History*, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1966; also see LeRoy R. Hafen and Francis Marion Young, *Fort Laramie and the Pageant of the West, 1834–1890* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984 reprint of 1938 original).

503. Kappler, *Indian Treaties*, *op. cit.*, pp. 594–6. Most of Nevada had already been disposed of in similar fashion via the 1863 Treaty of Ruby Valley with the Western Shoshonis; *ibid.*, pp. 851–3.

504. George Armstrong Custer, *My Life on the Plains, or, Personal Experiences with the Indians* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1964 reprint of 1873 original) p. 237. Also see Frank Gilbert Roe, *The Indian and His Horse* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955).

505. LeRoy R. Hafen, ed., *Colorado Gold Rush* (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, 1941); *Pike's Peak Gold Rush Guidebooks of 1859* (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, 1941); Nolie Mumey, *History of the Early Settlements of Denver, 1859–1860* (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, 1942).

506. At least as early as the beginning of 1863, Major Scott J. Anthony, a ranking army officer in Colorado Territory, noting that the influx of whites had frightened away the buffalo upon which they

subsisted, recommended starving the Cheyennes to death as being "a much easier way of disposing of them" than direct military action; United States Department of War, *The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, four series, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880–1901) Series I, Vol. XXII, Pt. 2, p. 571.

507. Grace Hebard and E.A. Brindenstool, *The Bozeman Trail*, 2 vols. (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, 1922); Dorothy M. Johnson, *The Bloody Bozeman* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971).

508. Dee Brown, *Fort Phil Kearny: An American Saga* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971).

509. Also called the "Comanche Barrier"; see Rupert Norval Richardson, *The Comanche Barrier to Southern Plains Settlement: A Century and a Half of Savage Resistance to Advancing White Settlement* (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, 1933). Also see Ernest Wallace and E. Adamson Hoebel, *The Comanches: Lords of the Southern Plains* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952); Stanley Noyse, *Los Comanches: The Horse People, 1715–1845* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993).

510. "The Texas Rangers knew best how...to exterminate Indians...and their impatience with [any] humanitarian policy...was colossal"; Walter P. Webb, *The Texas Rangers: A Century of Frontier Defense* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989 reprint of 1935 original).

511. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., *The Civil War in the American West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992).

512. Ray C. Colton, *The Civil War in the Western Territories* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959).

513. An interesting tangent: factions of the Cherokees, Muskogeans, and other southern peoples who had been removed to Oklahoma a generation earlier allied themselves to the Confederate States of America in exchange for promises that, in the event of a secessionist victory, the Indians' fully sovereign national status would be recognized, restored, and respected. The Cherokees in particular, led by Stand Watie, fought well in the Pea Ridge Campaign; Annie Heloise Abel, *The American Indian in the Civil War, 1862–1865* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992); Kenny A. Franks, *Stand Watie and the Agony of the Cherokee Nation* (Memphis: Memphis State University Press, 1979); W. David Baird, ed., *A Creek Warrior for the Confederacy* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968); Edwin C. Bearss, "The Battle of Pea Ridge," *Arkansas Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1961.

514. Quoted in Carley, *Sioux Uprising*, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

515. Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

516. Gary Clayton Anderson, *Little Crow* (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1986); Walter N. Trenerry, "The Shooting of Little Crow: Heroism or Murder?" *Minnesota History*, Vol. 38, 1962.

517. Major Edwin Hatch, a subordinate of Sibley operating out of the village of Pembina, just south of the Canadian border, retained John McKenzie, an American living in Canada, to bribe a pair of Canadian officials into drugging Shakopee and Medicine Bottle during a "friendly meeting." The two unconscious Indians were then handed over to Hatch in Pembina. After the hangings, the Minnesota legislature appropriated the sum of \$1,000 to reward McKenzie for his part in the crime; William W. Folwell, *A History of Minnesota* (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1924) pp. 443–50. Also see Robin W. Winks, "The British North American West and the Civil War," *North Dakota History*, Vol. 24, 1957.

518. "The uprising had given the white citizens an opportunity to seize the Santees' remaining lands without even a pretense of payment. Previous treaties were abrogated, and the surviving Indians were informed that they would be removed to a reservation in Dakota Territory"; Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*, *op. cit.*, p. 65. Sibley and Ramsey, as well as their partners, profited mightily from the whole affair, which they had done so much to contrive in the first place.

519. *Ibid.*

520. Andrew Love Neff, *History of Utah, 1847 to 1869* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1940).

521. Madsen, *Shoshoni Frontier*, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

522. For use of the term "battle" to describe this massacre, see, e.g., Edward Tullidge, "The Battle of Bear River," *Tullidge's Quarterly Magazine*, Jan. 1881; Bill Judge, "The Battle of Bear River," *True West*, Jan.–Feb. 1961.

523. Leo P. Kirby, "Patrick Edward Connor: First Gentile in Utah," *Journal of the West*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1963; Aurora Hunt, *The Army of the Pacific* (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, 1951); Irma Watson Hance and Irene Warr, *Johnson, Connor and the Mormons: An Outline of Military History in Northern Utah* (Salt Lake

City: University of Utah Press, 1962); Brigham D. Madsen, *Glory Hunter: A Biography of Patrick Edward Connor* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990).

524. Quoted in Edward Tullidge, "The Cities of Cache Valley and Their Founders," *Tullidge's Quarterly Magazine*, July 1881.

525. This is consistent with a May 1863 statement by Evans that, if there were to be a war against the Cheyennes, "it would be a war of extermination to them"; quoted in U.S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1863) pp. 239–46.

526. Quoted in *The War of Rebellion*, *op. cit.*, Series I, Vol. XLI, Pt. 1, pp. 237–8. It should be noted that all of this was happening during an election year. Both Evans and Chivington, backed by Byers and the *News*, desired to become U.S. senators and were thus key figures in a "Colorado Statehood Party." One organ of the opposition, the *Black Hawk Journal*, opined on August 22 that Byers, Evans, and Chivington "cooked up the Indian war together to prove that only as a state could Colorado get...sufficient troops to control her Indians." On the face of it, the argument is highly plausible. For details on Evans, see Edgar Carlisle McMechen, *Life of Governor John Evans: Second Territorial Governor of Colorado* (Denver: Walgren, 1924); on Chivington, see Reginald S. Craig, *The Fighting Parson: A Biography of Col. John M. Chivington* (Tucson: Westernlore, 1994 reprint of 1959 original).

527. Quoted in Hoig, *Battle of the Washita*, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

528. The camp was that of Big Wolf, one of the Cheyenne "peace chiefs." Nichols later contended the attack was justified because the scalp and clothing of a white woman was found in Big Wolf's lodge. This evidence of "hostility" was, however, never produced; *The War of Rebellion*, Series I, Vol. XLI, Pt. 3, pp. 789–90.

529. Wynkoop was originally a hardliner, inclined to shooting Indians on sight. After meeting with Black Kettle and White Antelope in September 1864, at their request, he radically altered his view, having been convinced that they and their people bore no ill-intentions towards whites. He therefore engineered the Camp Weld meeting to negotiate terms under which the Cheyenne "peace faction" might be formally recognized as noncombatants by Evans, Chivington, and other territorial authorities. He then accompanied the Indians to the meeting in order to ensure their safety; Stan Hoig, *The Peace Chiefs of the Cheyennes* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980).

530. See, e.g., "From Bloodless to Bloody: The Third Colorado Cavalry and the Sand Creek Massacre," *Journal of the American West*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1967.

531. On Connor's visit and Evans' and Chivington's reaction to it, see *Rocky Mountain News*, Nov. 14, 16, 1864; *Denver Republican*, Nov. 18, 1864. The terms of service of all the roughly 450 enlisted men, and most officers, of the Third Colorado Volunteers who participated in the Sand Creek Massacre—the remainder were drawn primarily from the Colorado First—had expired prior to the event. They were there because they wanted to be, not because they "had" to be; for implications, see Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, *op. cit.* On the First Colorado and its participation, see O.J. Hollister, *Boldly They Road: A History of the First Colorado Regiment of Volunteers* (Lakewood, CO: Golden Press, 1965 reprint of 1873 original).

532. Quoted in Hoig, *Sand Creek Massacre*, *op. cit.*, pp. 142, 147.

533. U.S. Dept. of War, "Sand Creek Massacre," *op. cit.*, p. 138.

534. Hoig, *Sand Creek Massacre*, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

535. U.S. Senate, "The Chivington Massacre," *op. cit.*, pp. 95–6. Bent places the total number of fighting-age males in the village, all of whom had been disarmed, at 35. There were another 60 "old men" present. The remainder of the several hundred village residents were women and children.

536. "The Chivington Massacre," *op. cit.*, p. 42. Corroborating testimony is too voluminous to review further; see the entire report cited here; "Sand Creek Massacre," *op. cit.*; U.S. House of Representatives, "Massacre of the Cheyenne Indians," *op. cit.*; *The War of Rebellion*, *op. cit.*; and Hoig, *Sand Creek Massacre*, *op. cit.*, pp. 177–92.

537. Actually, if it was war he'd wanted, Chivington plainly knew where to find it by the time of the massacre. The Cheyenne combatants, "3,000-strong," were, as he put it in his after action report, camped along the Smoky Hill River, about eighty miles from Sand Creek; *The War of Rebellion*, *op. cit.*, pp. 950–1. It is instructive that, instead of moving to engage these real "hostiles," the colonel turned tail and ran in the opposite direction; Hoig, *Sand Creek Massacre*, *op. cit.*, pp. 158–9. Also see Walter S. Campbell,

"The Cheyenne Dog Soldiers," *Chronicles of Oklahoma*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1923; Grinnell, *Fighting Cheyennes*, *op. cit.*

538. "In January, 1865, the alliance of Cheyenne, Arapaho, and Sioux launched a series of raids along the South Platte. They attacked wagon trains, stage stations, and small military outposts. They burned the town of Julesburg, scalping the white defenders in revenge for the scalping of Indians at Sand Creek. They ripped out miles of telegraph wire. They raided and plundered up and down the Platte route, halting all communications and supplies. In Denver there was panic as food shortages began to grow"; Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-6.

539. Stanley Vestal, *Warpath and Council Fire: The Plains Indian Struggle for Survival in War and Diplomacy, 1851-1891* (New York: Random House, 1948); James R. Mead, "The Little Arkansas," *Transactions of the Kansas State Historical Society*, Vol. 10, 1908.

540. General Phil Sheridan to General of the Army William Tecumseh Sherman, Oct. 15, 1868; quoted in Hutton, *Phil Sheridan*, *op. cit.*, p. 53. Sherman replied that he would back Sheridan with his "whole authority, and stand between you and any effort that may be attempted in your rear to restrain your purpose or check your troops."

541. Custer had been court-martialed by Hancock for deserting his command toward the end of the 1867 campaign, and taken out of active service. He was reinstated in 1868, at the request of Sheridan, for the specific purpose of conducting the sort of operations which occurred on the Washita; Frederick F. Van de Water, *Glory-Hunter: A Life of General Custer* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1934); Jess C. Epple, *Custer's Battle of the Washita and a History of the Plains Indian Tribes* (New York: Exposition Press, 1970).

542. Black Kettle attempted to place his band under the protection of the army at Fort Cobb. This was refused by the post commandant, General William B. Hazen, on November 20, despite the fact that he recognized the group as "friendly"; Hoig, *Battle of the Washita*, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

543. Col. William Sturtevant Nye, *Carbine and Lance: The Story of Old Fort Sill* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1937).

544. Berthrong, *Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal*, *op. cit.*; J.H. Moore, *The Cheyenne Nation: A Social and Demographic History* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987); Virginia Cole Trenholm, *The Arapahoes: Our People* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970).

545. The expression accrues from Charles J. Brill, *The Conquest of the Southern Plains: Uncensored Narrative of the Battle of the Washita and Custer's Southern Campaign* (Oklahoma City: Golden Saha, 1938). Also see Cyrus T. Brady, *The Conquest of the Southwest: The Story of a Great Spoilation* (New York: Appleton, 1905); William H. Leckie, *The Military Conquest of the Southern Plains* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963); Harry A. Stroud, *The Conquest of the Prairies* (Waco, TX: Texian Press, 1968).

546. A total of 4,373,730 buffalo hides were shipped east by rail from Kansas during the years 1872-74 alone; another million are estimated to have been shipped by other means during the same period; James L. Haley, *The Buffalo War: The History of the Red River Indian Uprising of 1874* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985 reprint of 1976 original) p. 22. On the army's role in promoting this carnage—mainly to destroy the Indians' ability to subsist independently—see note 118, above. Also see John R. Cook, *The Border and the Buffalo* (Topeka, KS: Crane, 1907); Carl Coke Rister, "The Significance of the Destruction of the Buffalo in the Southwest," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1929; Mari Sandoz, *The Buffalo Hunters: The Story of the Hidemen* (New York: Hasting House, 1954); Wayne Gard, *The Great Buffalo Hunt* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959).

547. F.A. Hunt, "Adobe Walls Argument: An Indian Attack on a Party of Buffalo Hunters," *Overland Monthly*, May 1909; Rupert N. Richardson, "The Comanche Indians at the Adobe Walls Fight," *Panhandle-Plains Historical Review*, No. 4, 1931; Virginia Wiesel Johnson, *The Unregimented General: A Biography of Nelson A. Miles* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1962).

548. Edward S. Wallace and Adrian S. Anderson, "R.S. Mackenzie and the Kickapoos: The Raid into Mexico in 1873," *Arizona and the West*, Vol. VII, 1965. On the colonel himself, see Ernest Wallace, *Ranald S. Mackenzie on the Texas Frontier* (Lubbock: West Texas Museum Association, 1964).

549. Haley, *Buffalo War*, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-94. Also see J. Marvin Hunter, Sr., "The Battle of Palo Duro Canyon," *Frontier Times*, Vol. XXI, No. 4, 1944.

550. Clarence R. Wharton, *Satanta: The Great Chief of the Kiowas and His People* (Dallas: B. Upshaw & Co., 1935); Zoe A. Tilghman, *Quannah: Eagle of the Comanches* (Oklahoma City: Harlow, 1958). The

other Comanche bands—Penatekas, Yapparikas, Kotsotekas, and Nakonis—had already surrendered by the time Quannah and the Quahadis gave up; Colonel W.S. Nye, *Plains Indian Raiders: The Final Phases of Warfare from the Arkansas to the Red River* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968).

551. William T. Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations: The Reservation Years* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990 reprint of 1976 original); Mildred P. Mayhall, *The Kiowas* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962); John Upton Terrell, *The Plains Apache* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975). Also see Rupert N. Richardson, "The Comanche Reservation in Texas," *West Texas Historical Association Yearbook*, Vol. V, 1929; Martha Buntin, "The Removal of the Wichitas, Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches to the Present Agency," *Panhandle-Plains Historical Review*, No. 4, 1931.

552. Brown, *Fort Phil Kearny*, *op. cit.*; Hebard and Brindenstool, *Bozeman Trail*, *op. cit.*

553. Olson, *Red Cloud*, *op. cit.*

554. A good account will be found in the memoirs of the post commander; Colonel Francis C. Carrington, *My Army Life and the Fort Phil Kearny Massacre* (Philadelphia: Lippencott, 1911). Also see John Guthrie, "The Fetterman Massacre," *Annals of Wyoming*, No. 9, 1932; Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*, *op. cit.*, pp. 135–7.

555. General of the Army William Tecumseh Sherman himself appeared on the scene in an unsuccessful effort to impress the Indians into frittering away by treaty what they had defended on the battlefield; John F. Marszalek, *Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order* (New York: Free Press, 1993) pp. 389–91. Also see Robert G. Athearn, *William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956).

556. "We are on the mountains, looking down on the soldiers and the forts. When we see the soldiers moving away, and the forts abandoned, then I will come down and talk"; quoted in the *Omaha Weekly Herald*, June 10, 1868. The first post abandoned, on July 29, 1868, was an unfinished facility called Fort C.F. Smith. Phil Kearny was next, then the most southerly, Fort Reno. The Lakotas and Cheyennes torched each one before the retreating soldiers were out of sight. On the treaty-signing process, see Remi Nadeau, *Fort Laramie and the Sioux* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967).

557. The expedition was mounted on the basis of 1872 reports by Father Jean de Smet, a Jesuit missionary who had been illegally prospecting in the Hills for some time; Donald Jackson, *Custer's Gold: The United States Cavalry Expedition of 1874* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966); Watson Parker, *Gold in the Black Hills* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966).

558. There were at least 800 miners in the Hills within six months; Jackson, *Custer's Gold*, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

559. This was the "Jenny Expedition," a team of scientists escorted by six companies of cavalry and two of infantry under General George Crook; William Ludlow, *Report of a Reconnaissance of the Black Hills of Dakota* (Washington, D.C.: 43d Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1875); Walter P. Jenny, *Report on the Mineral Wealth, Climate and Rainfall and Natural Resources of the Black Hills of Dakota* (Washington, D.C.: 44th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Doc. No. 51, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1876). The sale was demanded by the Allison Commission during the fall of the same year; U.S. Department of Interior, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs*, 1875 (Washington, D.C.: 43d Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1875).

560. An excellent examination of the government's maneuverings to force a war with the Lakotas while making it appear the other way around will be found in Frank Pommersheim, "The Black Hills Case: On the Cusp of History," *Wicazo Sa Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1988. Also see Lazarus, *op. cit.* The best account of U.S. military preparations, strategy and the offensive itself is John E. Gray's *The Centennial Campaign: The Sioux War of 1876* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988).

561. J.W. Vaughn, *With Crook at the Rosebud* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1956).

562. In an opening round of the campaign, one of Crook's unit commanders, Captain Anson Mills, was able to surprise the small Lakota encampment of 37 lodges, led by American Horse at Slim Buttes, north of the Black Hills, on September 9, 1876. The fewer than 40 warriors, short of ammunition, were virtually annihilated by Mills' 150 well-armed soldiers, as were a number of women and children; Jerome A. Greene, *Slim Buttes: An Episode of the Great Sioux War, 1876* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982).

563. Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

564. Ibid. Also see John G. Bourne, *Mackenzie's Last Fight with the Cheyennes* (New York: Argonaut, 1966).

565. The best account is in Sandoz, *Crazy Horse*, *op. cit.*

566. Berthrong, *Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal*, *op. cit.*

567. The unarmed Oglala leader, his arms pinioned behind his back, was bayoneted in the kidney at Camp Robinson, Nebraska, on September 5, 1877; Robert A. Clark, ed., *The Killing of Chief Crazy Horse* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1976).

568. See note 97, above.

569. Sandoz, *Cheyenne Autumn*, *op. cit.*; Peter M. Wright, "The Pursuit of Dull Knife from Fort Reno, 1878–1879," *Chronicles of Oklahoma*, No. 46, 1968.

570. Dull Knife, 75 years old at the time, responded to this news with the observation that his people would rather "die right here" than return to Oklahoma; quoted in Anonymous, "The Liquidation of Dull Knife," *Nebraska History*, No. 22, 1941.

571. Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*, *op. cit.*, p. 347. Also see John Edward Weems, *Death Song: The Last of the Indian Wars* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976).

572. This pitiful handful of survivors, including Little Wolf's group of about 40, was granted a reservation in the Powder River Country later the same year; Berthrong, *Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal*, *op. cit.*

573. On erosion of Lakota territoriality after 1877, mostly under provision of the General Allotment and Homestead Acts, see Lazarus, *Black Hills*, *op. cit.* On sociopolitical erosion, see Sidney L. Harring, *Crow Dog's Case: American Indian Sovereignty, Tribal Law, and the United States in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). On the abolition of spiritual practices, see Richard Erdoes, *The Sun Dance People: The Plains Indians, Their Past and Present* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972). As to starvation policies, "The Sioux had been assured they would continue to receive the same rations after giving up so much of their lands, but immediately after[ward], Congress cut the beef ration by 2,000,000 pounds at Rosebud Reservation, by 1,000,000 pounds at Pine Ridge, and by lesser amounts at the other three reservations" left to the Lakotas within what had been one consolidated landbase only a few years before. At Pine Ridge, a further 50-percent reduction was imposed in April 1890; Ralph K. Andrist, *The Long Death: The Last Days of the Plains Indian* (New York: Macmillan, 1964) p. 340.

574. The seven bands are the Oglala, Hunkpapa, Minneconjou, Sicungu (Brûlé), Bohinunpa (Two Kettles), Ituzipco (Sans Arc), Sihasapa (Blackfeet; not to be confused with the indigenous nation of the same name). On the Ghost Dance, as practiced by the Lakotas during this period, see James M. Mooney, *The Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, 1896); John G. Neihardt, *Black Elk Speaks* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961).

575. See generally, Robert M. Utley, *The Last Days of the Sioux Nation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

576. Vestal, *Sitting Bull*, *op. cit.* Also see Martin F. Schmidt and Dee Brown, *Fighting Indians of the West* (New York: Scribner's, 1948) p. 335.

577. Andrist, *Long Death*, *op. cit.*, pp. 351–2. Also see James H. McGregor, *The Wounded Knee Massacre from the Viewpoint of the Survivors* (Baltimore: Wirth Brothers, 1940).

578. "No one knows [precisely] how many Indians died on that miserable field, because by the time anyone could count the bodies, some had already been removed"; Andrist, *Long Death*, *op. cit.*, p. 352. The best firsthand account accrues from the Santee Dakota Charles A. Eastman, who served on the burial detail; see his *From the Deep Woods to Civilization: Chapters in the Autobiography of an American Indian* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1916) pp. 111–2. Also see Raymond Wilson, *Ohiyesa: Charles Eastman, Santee Sioux* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983).

579. *Aberdeen Saturday Pioneer*, December 20, 1890; quoted in Elliott J. Gorn, Randy Roberts and Terry D. Bilhartz, *Constructing the American Past: A Source Book of a People's History* (New York: HarperCollins, 1972) p. 74.

580. Charles C. Royce, *Indian Land Cessions in the United States: 18th Annual Report, 1896–97*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of American Ethnography, Smithsonian Institution, 1899); Jay P. Kinney, *A Continent Lost—A Civilization Won: Indian Land Tenure in America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1937); Imre Sutton, ed., *Irredeemable America: The Indians' Estate and Land Tenure* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985).

581. For a good overview of policy and sentiment during this period, see Oliver Knight, *Following the Indian Wars* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960).

582. Lawrie Tatum, *Our Red Brothers and the Peace Policy of Ulysses S. Grant* (Philadelphia: Winston, 1899); Elsie M. Rushmore, *The Indian Policy During Grant's Administration* (New York: Marion Press, 1914); Henry E. Fritz, *The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860–1890* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963); Francis Paul Prucha, *Americanizing the American Indian: Writings of the "Friends of the Indian," 1800–1900* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973).

583. Francis E. Leupp, *The Indian and His Problem* (New York: Scribner's, 1910) p. 93. The attitude expressed is obviously consistent with all of the most authoritarian and paternalistic aspects of U.S. Indian policy; see generally, Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indian* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984).

584. Letter from Charles Burke to William Williamson, Sept. 12, 1921 (William Williamson Papers, Box 2, File—Indian Matters, Miscellaneous I.D., Weeks Library, University of South Dakota, Vermilion). For further expression of comparable attitudes, see Robert M. Kvasnicka and Herman J. Viola, eds., *The Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1824–1977* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979).

585. D.S. Otis, *The Dawes Act and the Allotment of American Indian Land* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973).

586. According to the Act (ch. 119, 24 Stat. 362, 385, now codified at 18 U.S.C. 331 *et seq.*), to be considered "Indian," and thus eligible to receive a parcel of reservation land, one was required to document being of at least one-half "blood" of a specific and federally recognized "tribal group." One could not be, say, one-quarter by descent of four different indigenous peoples through intermarriage, and still be legally identified as native. Nor could one be adopted or naturalized as a citizen/member of an indigenous nation. Needless to say, such criteria not only negated one of the most important sovereign prerogatives of native peoples—definition of their own polities—it left far fewer eligible Indians than available plots of reserved land. Hence, the massive "surplus" of indigenous property.

587. Kirk Kicking Bird and Karen Ducheneaux, *One Hundred Million Acres* (New York: Macmillan, 1973); Janet A. McDonnell, *The Dispossession of the American Indian, 1887–1934* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). Comparable maneuvers were undertaken in Canada, where expropriation occurred with a quantitatively much lesser degree of physical violence; see, e.g., Daniel Raunet, *Without Surrender of Consent: A History of the Nishga Land Claims* (Vancouver, B.C.: Douglas & McIntire, 1984).

588. Similar initiatives were being taken in Canada during this period. See Douglas Cole and Ira Chaikan, *An Iron Hand Upon the People: The Law Against the Potlatch on the Northwest Coast* (Vancouver, B.C.: Douglas & McIntire, Ltd., 1990); Katherine Pettipas, *Severing the Ties That Bind: Government Repression of Indigenous Religious Ceremonies on the Prairies* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1994).

589. The process had been ongoing in less than systematic fashion since at least as early as John Eliot's establishment of Harvard College; Benjamin Pierce, *A History of Harvard University from Its Founding in the Year 1636 to the Period of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Brown, Shattuck, 1833). This experiment was rendered somewhat more consistent with Eleazer Wheelock's founding of Moore's Charity School for Indians in 1755 and Dartmouth College in 1769; James D. McCallem, ed., *The Letters of Eleazer Wheelock's Indians* (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Pubs, 1932); Leon B. Richardson, *The History of Dartmouth College*, 2 vols. (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Pubs., 1932). Wheelock's model was steadily enlarged upon until the point it began to be incorporated into federal policy during the 1870s; Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., *Salvation and the Savage: An Analysis of Protestant Missions and American Indian Response, 1787–1862* (Knoxville: University of Kentucky Press, 1865); Rushmore, *Indian Policy*, *op. cit.* By the late 1880s, the structure by which compulsory education might be universally imposed as a means of assimilating native youth was being perfected; Col. Richard H. Pratt, *Battlefield and Classroom: Four Decades with the American Indian* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964); Michael C. Coleman, *American Indian Children at School, 1850–1930* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1993); David Wallace Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875–1928* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995). From roughly 1890 to 1970, an average of more than 70 percent of each succeeding generation of native youngsters was subjected to the boarding school experience;

Thomas Thompson, ed., *The Schooling of Native America* (Washington, D.C.: American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, 1978). Again, very much the same procedure was followed in Canada; Basil H. Johnson, *Indian School Days* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989); J.R. Miller, *Shingwauk's Vision: A History of Native Residential Schools* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).

590. Ch. 233, 43 Stat. 25 (1924). For analysis of the effects of the Citizenship Act on indigenous polities, see Hazel W. Hertzberg, *The Search for an American Indian Identity: Modern Pan-Indian Movements* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1971). For analysis of the implications of the formal redesignation of indigenous nations as "tribes," see my "Naming Our Destiny: Toward a Language of American Indian Liberation" in *Indians Are Us? Culture and Genocide in North America* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1994).

591. Such conclusions were reached in a report prepared for the Bureau of Indian Affairs by a committee of 100 individuals selected primarily for their prominence in business and finance; U.S. House of Representatives, *The Indian Problem: Resolution of the Committee of One Hundred by the Secretary of Interior and Review of the Indian Problem* (Washington, D.C.: 68th Cong., 1st Sess., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1925). The same perspective—and practices—prevailed in Canada in somewhat modified form; see the analysis of the handling of Treaty 3 offered by John Kelly in his "We Are All Part of the Ojibway Circle," in Michael Ondaatje, ed., *From Ink Lake* (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1990). Also see J.R. Miller, *Sweet Promises* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).

592. The shift in emphasis is evident in a major policy study prepared by the Institute for Government Research; Lewis Meriam, et al., *The Problem of Indian Administration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1928). The actual redefinition of policy was engineered by John Collier, Indian Commissioner for the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt; Kenneth Philp, *John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, 1920–1954* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977); Lawrence C. Kelly, *Assault on Assimilation: John Collier and the Origins of Indian Policy Reform* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983). A comparable trajectory is evident in Canada; Indian Affairs of Canada, *Indian Acts and Amendments, 1868–1950* (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Ministry of Canada, 1981).

593. See, e.g., Ronald L. Trosper, "Appendix I: Indian Minerals," in American Indian Policy Review Commission, *Task Force 7 Final Report: Reservation and Resource Development and Protection* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977); U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Indian Lands Map: Oil, Gas and Minerals on Indian Reservations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978); Louis R. Moore, *Mineral Development on Indian Lands: Cooperation and Conflict* (Denver: Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, 1983); Presidential Commission on Indian Reservation Economies, *Report and Recommendation to the President of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Nov. 1984).

594. C.B. Glasscock, *Then Came Oil: The Story of the Last Frontier* (Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1938); Carl C. Riser, *Oil! Titan of the Southwest* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949); H. Craig Miner, *The Corporation and the Indian: Tribal Sovereignty and Industrial Civilization in Indian Territory, 1865–1907* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1976); Terry P. Wilson, *The Underground Reservation: Osage Oil* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985).

595. The legal basis for the presumed right of the U.S. to "manage" indigenous resources in whatever manner it sees fit was articulated in the Supreme Court's ruling in the 1886 *U.S. v. Kagama* case (118 U.S. 375), and again in its 1903 opinion in *Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock*, (187 U.S. 553). In both instances, the high court held that the federal government possessed "plenary"—that is, absolute and unchallengeable—power over the affairs of American Indians. In *Lone Wolf*, it specifically included disposition of native assets within the scope of such authority.

596. Probably the best examination of the principle involved will be found in Michael Hector, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); as applied to American Indians, see Robert K. Thomas, "Colonialism: Classic and Internal," *New University Thought*, Winter 1966–1967.

597. On the IRA, see Graham D. Taylor, *The New Deal and American Indian Tribalism: The Administration of the Indian Reorganization Act, 1934–45* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980); Vine Deloria, Jr., and Clifford M. Lytle, *The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty* (New York: Pantheon Press, 1984). A succinct review of the form of "classic" colonial regimes

will be found in Raymond E. Betts, *Europe Overseas: Phases of Imperialism* (New York: Basic Books, 1968). On the Nazi variations, see Dallin, *German Rule*, *op. cit.*; Pierre Tissier, *The Government of Vichy* (London: Macmillan, 1942). For analysis of the Canadian counterpart to the U.S. internal colonial model, see Bruce Clark, *Native Liberty, Crown Sovereignty: The Existing Aboriginal Right to Self-Government in Canada* (Montréal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1990).

598. See, e.g., Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, ed., *Economic Development on American Indian Reservations* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Native American Development Series, 1979); Michael Garrity, "The U.S. Colonial Empire is as Close as the Nearest Reservation," in Holly Sklar, ed., *Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for Global Management* (Boston: South End Press, 1980); Joseph Jorgenson, ed., *American Indians and Energy Development* (Cambridge, MA: Anthropological Resource Center, 1978) and *American Indians and Energy Development II* (Cambridge, MA: Anthropological Resource Center, 1984); Marjane Ambler, *Breaking the Iron Bonds: Indian Control of Energy Development* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990).

599. Reservation unemployment rates have been over 60 percent, nationwide, every year since 1950. On some reservations, like Pine Ridge, the rate has consistently exceeded 85 percent. The poorest locality in the U.S. for 33 of the past 35 years has been Shannon County, on Pine Ridge. During the mid-1970s, per capita annual income on Pine Ridge was \$1,200. Adjusted for inflation, the situation there is only marginally better today; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Division, Racial Statistics Branch, *A Statistical Profile of the American Indian Population* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Oct. 1984); U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, *Chart Series Book* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988).

600. *A Statistical Portrait of the American Indian Population*, *op. cit.*, pp. 122–3.

601. The argument to this effect is made exceedingly well in Robert Davis and Mark Zannis, *The Genocide Machine in Canada: The Pacification of the North* (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1973). Also see my "Genocide: Toward a Functional Definition," in *Since Predator Came*, *op. cit.*

602. This policy was effected under provision of House Resolution 108 (1953), the complete text of which appears in Edward H. Spicer, *A Short History of the Indians of the United States* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969). For effects, see Gary Orfield, *A Study of Termination Policy* (Denver: National Congress of American Indians, 1965); Oliver LaFarge, "Termination of Federal Supervision: Disintegration and the American Indian," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, No. 311, May 1975; Larry W. Burt, *Tribalism in Crisis: Federal Indian Policy, 1953–1961* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982). A few of the terminated peoples, such as the Menominee and Siletz, were able to attain reinstatement after protracted struggle; Nicholas Peroff, *Menominee DRUMS: Tribal Termination and Restoration, 1954–1974* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982).

603. The program was launched under the "Navajo-Hopi Relocation Act of 1974" (P.L. 93–531); Anita Parlow, *Cry, Sacred Ground: Big Mountain, U.S.A.* (Washington, D.C.: Christic Institute, 1988). It is entirely consistent with a 1972 recommendation of the National Academy of Sciences that the Four Corners region of the Colorado Plateau and the Black Hills Region—the two locales in which reservation concentration is greatest—be declared "National Sacrifice Areas" in the interests of U.S. energy resource development; Thadius Box, et al., *Rehabilitation Potential for Western Coal Lands* (Cambridge, MA: u, 1974). The correlation between sacrificing the landbase of landbased peoples, and sacrificing the peoples themselves, is a well-established principle in applied anthropology; with specific reference to Big Mountain, see, Thayer Scudder, et al., *No Place to Go: Effects of Compulsory Relocation on Navajos* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982). The same situation prevails in Canada; see, e.g., John Goddard, *Last Stand of the Lubicon Cree* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntire, 1991).

604. Andrea Smith, "The HIV-Correlation to Hepatitis-A and B Vaccines," *WARN Newsletter*, Summer 1992.

605. See my "Radioactive Colonization: The Hidden Holocaust in Native American Environments," in *Struggle for the Land*, *op. cit.*

606. See, e.g., M.J. Samet, et al., "Lung Cancer and Uranium Mining Among Navajo Men," *New England Journal of Medicine*, No. 310, 1984; Christopher McCleod, "Uranium Mines and Mills Have Caused Birth Defects Among Navajo Children," *High Country News*, Feb. 4, 1985.

607. See generally, Charles C. Reith and Bruce M. Thomson, *Deserts as Dumps? The Disposal of*

*Hazardous Materials in Arid Ecosystems* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992). On U.S. nuclear testing in the Western Shoshoni treaty territory, see Dagmar Thorpe, *Neve Segobia: The Western Shoshoni People and Land* (Lee, NV: Western Shoshoni Sacred Lands Association, 1982).

608. "The purpose of philosophy is not just to understand history, but to change it," Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (New York: International, 1963); initially penned in "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and of Philosophy as a Whole," in *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (New York: International, 1964).

609. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990) p. 4.

610. Chalk and Jonassohn (*ibid.*) observe that they "take it for granted that we are all against genocide," an assumption unlikely to be valid. Hence, the formulation "people of conscience," used herein.

611. David E. Stannard, response to a question following a lecture at the University of Colorado/Boulder, May 2, 1995 (tape on file).

612. For a prospectus on how this might be accomplished, see my "I Am Indigenist," in *From a Native Son: Selected Essays in Indigenism, 1985-1995* (Boston: South End Press, 1996).